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INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys have a pervasive and influential role in the activities of 
employee benefit plans. To help with the establishment of a plan, the 
sponsor likely will engage an attorney to draft the plan documents 
and, where possible, obtain a letter determining qualification from the 
Internal Revenue Service. During the life of the plan, attorneys en-
gaged by the plan and its fiduciaries may continually provide advice 
and assistance to help them comply with statutes, regulations, and the 
plan docu1nent. 1· For example, in the course of the plan,s operation, 
attorneys may assist the administrator with preparing and filing an-
nual reports and other required information; guide the plan and its 
fiduciaries through contested benefit claims; obtain from the Internal 
Revenue Service exemptions from prohibited transaction rules; advise 
and assist on plan amendments; closely work with the fiduciaries to 
1. Use of an attorney is sometimes required by law. For example, where the fiduci-
ary is a national bank, it must "designate, employ or retain legal counsel who shall be 
readily available to pass upon fiduciary matters and to advise the bank and its trust de-
partment." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(c) (1989). 
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help them avoid breaches of their fiduciary obligations; and for1nally 
request ,guidance on difficult questions from the Department of Labor, 
the Internal Revenue Service or a federal court. When a plan is ter-
minated, an attorney may be needed to help guide the parties through 
the regulatory requirements and deal with any controversies that 
arise. A plan without an attorney is as helpless as a would be 
corporation. 
This article deals with one group of attorneys who perform legal 
work in connection with employee benefit plans: ERISA plan attor-
neys. By "ERISA plan attorneys'' (or "plan attorneys'') we mean 
those attorneys who are engaged either by a plan governed by ER-
ISA, 2 or by a fiduciary of such a plan in his capacity as such. 3 The 
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 
93406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974), substantially codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001·1461 (1974) and 
in various provisions of the, Internal Revenue Code. The original statute has been 
amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
364, 94 Stat. 1426 (1980); the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98..:369, 
98 Stat. 494 (1984); the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-483; the Single-
Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub~ L. No. 99-272, tit. XI, 100 Stat. 
237 (1986); the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509~ 100 Stat. 1874 (1986); 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 
(1987); the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L .. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 
2106 (1989); and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, P,ub~ L. No. 101-508, 
104 Stat.! 388 (1990). None of these amendments significantly affect the policies or basic 
regulatory approach of ERISA, and there generally will be no need in this article to 
distinguish the original portions of the 1974 act from those added later. 
3. Thus, the term "ERISA plan attorney'' does not refer to attorneys who represent 
plan sponsors (such as employers and unions) in their non-fiduciary capacities. The rea-
son for excluding them from the discussion will emerge in Section JV(A)(2), irzfra notes 
363-375 and accompanying text. Nor does it refer to attorneys for plans not governed by 
ERISA. ERISA§ 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b), exempts from the statute's coverage: gov-
-ernmental plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)); certain church 
plans (as defined in ERISA§ 3(33)), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)); plans "maintained solely for 
the purpose of complying_ with applicable workman's compensation laws or unemploy'"' 
ment compensation or disability insurance laws"; certain foreign plans; and unfunded 
excess benefit plans (as defined in ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36)). Some of the 
conclusions reached here might be applicable to attorneys for such plans. The extent to 
which they might be applicable would depend greatly on the character of the plan in 
question and the nature of state regulation of it. Thus, it is difficult to draw general 
conclusions and we do not try to do so here. 
Finally, the term "ERISA plan attorney" does not refer to an attomey who provides 
legal services through a prepaid legal services plan (which is a kind of plan subject to 
ERISA). See ERISA §§ 3(1), 4(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1003(a). The reason for ex-
. . . 
eluding those attorneys is discussed in Section II(B)(3)(b), infra notes 221-230 and ac-
companying text. 
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purpose of the article is to demonstrate that there should be, and that 
there can be, a federal cotnmon law comprehensively govertting the 
plan-related conduct of these attorneys. 
Although there are currently some federal comtnon law rules 
that govern plan attorneys, they are few and isolated. They deal with 
narrow topics, such as attorney-client privilege and liability for partic-
ipation in a fiduciary's breach of duty, and they do so in an unsys-
tematic way. There is simply no body of federal cotntnon law that 
coherently and comprehensively deals with the plan attorney's fiduci-
ary and professional conduct, and no recognized set of principles that 
might be used to develop such a body of law. The reason is that there 
is a little appreciation of the need for such a body of law and the 
possibility that such a body of law can be developed. 'l'bis article aitns 
to remedy that state of affairs. 
The article is divided into three main parts. In the first part (Sec-
tion 1), we review some fundamental principles of ERISA and charac-
teristics of plans. One purpose of the discussion is to explain key 
concepts to the uninitiated reader. Another purpose is to cl · a few 
itnportant points in particular, the nature of plans, the importance 
of ERISA's disclosure policies, and the noncomprehensiveness of the 
statute that are central to the subsequent argument. 
In the second part (Sections 11-111), we show that a federal com-
mon law of plan attorneys is necessary and that courts have both the 
authority and discretion to develop it. We begin this part of the dis-
cussion by seeking to identify sources of rules that might legititnately 
govern the conduct, responsibilities, and liabilities of plan attorneys. 
We shall see that ERISA itself contains very little express regulation 
of plan attorneys (Section II(A)). We will then see that, contrary to 
nortnal expectations, state law is not available because ERISA's pre-
emption provision is so expansive that it ousts all state regulation of 
attorneys who are acting in their capacity as legal counsel to an ER-
ISA plan or plan fiduciary. (Section II(B)). This obviously leaves an 
unacceptable regulatory lacuna. As we shall see, the gap in the law is 
one that may properly be filled by courts exercising their authority, 
derived from ERISA and elsewhere, to develop federal common law 
(Sections II(C) & III). 
In the final part (Sections IV-VI), we show how a federal com-
mon law of plan attorneys may be developed on a principled basis. 
We first address some fundamental issues concerning the relationship 
between the plan attorney and the plan entities with which he deals 
(Section IV). We discuss who, if anyone, may be deemed. the client of 
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the plan attorney (Section IV(A)), and what should be the scope of 
the attorney-client privilege in the plan representation context (Sec-
tion IV(B)).- We next tum to the fiduciary obligations of the plan 
attorney, first dealing specifically with his responsibilities when he 
. . 
learns of a breach of duty by a plan fiduciary (Section V(A)), and then 
dealing more generally with the contours of his various fiduciary obli-
gations to the several kinds of persons involved in the plan (Section 
V(B.)). Finally, we turn to the subject of the civil liabilities of plan 
attorneys (Section VI). We show that courts have clear authority to 
impose. liability on plan attorneys for their wrongdoings (Section 
Vl(A)), and we deal with the question of who has standing to bring 
remedial actions (Section VI(B)). 
In dealing with the questions raised in this last part, we not only 
try to develop basic rules, we also show how the policies of .ERISA 
and the characteristics of plans must carefully be taken into account 
to ensure that the rules developed properly address the specific needs 
of plans, as well as the legitimate needs of their participants, benefi-
ciaries and fiduciaries. In that regard, we shall find the following gen-
eral conclusions to be most important for proper development of the 
common law of plan attorneys: 
• Plan attorneys, although not ERISA fiduciaries, have characteristics 
that bring them within the ambit of some of ERISA's policies. 
•Plans are sufficiently unlike corporations that one cannot uncriti-
cally apply to them rules especially rules concerning legal repre~ 
sentation that have been developed for corporations. 
•The traditional concept of "client" is not appropriate in the ·plan 
representation context. 
•ERISA's policy of promoting disclosure of fiduciary conduct renders 
much of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct inappropriate as guides to 
plan attorney conduct. 
•Courts have extensive, but hitherto largely unused, power to develop 
common law rules for the remedy of wrongs by plan attorneys. 
The rules and principles developed in the third part of the article 
do not exhaust the important topics in the area of plan attorney con-
duct. Thus, we conclude (Section VII) by suggesting other topics that 
are appropriate for further inquiry. 
I. ERISA: AN OVERVIEW 
ERISA is a lengthy, and in many respects highly technical, stat-
ute. Books and other resources abound that explain the technical pro-
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visions of ERISA and their administrative elaborations. 4 The 
arguments in this article, though, are based on only a few central fea-
tures of ERISA and of benefit plans, and, in general, do not tur11 on 
the more technical provisions of the statute. Thus, an overview of the 
central policies -and a few of the key requirements of ERISA will be 
enough for the reader unfa1niliar with ERISA or with benefit plans. 5 
A. What Constitutes an ~'Employee Benefit Plan''? 
Although the ultimate purpose of ERISA is to promote the avail-
ability and security of employee benefits, the statute cannot be charac-
terized as the federal law of employee benefits. Rather, it is the law of 
employee benefit plans, and its stated policy is "to protect .• . . the 
interests of participants in employee benefit plans."6 If benefits are 
provided to employees without a plan, ERISA does not apply.7 Ac• 
cordingly, to fully understand ERISA's policies and its rules, one 
must first understand what an employee benefit plan is. 
ERISA is surprisingly unhelpful. It presumes the existence of 
employee benefit plans8 and immediately divides them into two broad 
kinds: pension benefit plans,9 which are plans that provide for retire-
4. See, e.g., J. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW ERISA AND BEYOND 
(1990); S .. YOUNG, PENSION AND PROFIT~SHARING PLANS (1989); PENSION PLAN 
GUIDE (CCH); M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
PLANS (1990 ed.); Sollee & Shapiro, Pension Plans Qualification (BNA Tax Manage· 
ment Portfolio No. 351, 1990); Kroll, Reporting and Disclosure Under ERISA (BNA 
Tax Management Portfolio No. 361-2d (1988)). 
5. In this section, however, we do explain some important aspects of ERISA and 
plans that are not often emphasized in either the case law or academic literature., Conse-
quently, the discussion here may also be useful to the ERISA specialist. 
6. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § lOOl(b). 
7. See Fort Halifax Packaging Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 19 (1987); see also Taggart 
Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., Inc., 617 F.2d 1208, 1211 (Sth Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). 
8. For example, the lengthy finding in Section 2(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a), 
begins with a description of the then-,current state of affairs: 
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee 
benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational 
scope and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the 
continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents 
are directly affected by these plans. . ., . 
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (a). 
9. ERISA§ 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). See also 29 C.P.R. § 2510.3-2 (1990). Pen-
sion benefit plans are further differentiated into two major groups: defined benefit plans, 
in which retirement benefits are determined by a formula, usually dependent on compen-
sation and years of service, ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S._C. § 1002{35); and defined contribu-
tion plans (or individual account plans), in which an individual's retirement benefit is 
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ment income, and welfare benefit plans, 10 which provide for medical 
or other current needs of employees. Each of these kinds is respec-
tively defined as a "plan, fund, or program ... established or main-
tained ... for the purpose of-providing'' delineated types of benefits to 
participants and beneficiaries. The terrn "employee benefit plan" (or, 
for short, "plan") is then defined purely as a shorthand term . . · as 
"an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan 
or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an em-
ployee pension benefit plan.''tt As a result of this definitional scheme, 
the nature of ERISA's central concern, the benefit plan) must be in-
ferred from the statutory and judicial treatment of it. 
The treatment has been sparse, but it is reasonably cle_ar that em-
ployee benefit plans have two aspects, ones that are usually not found 
together. On the one hand, a plan is just an established program for 
paying benefits that are sufficiently regular to create in some people a 
reasonable expectation of receiving the benefits.12 The core concept is_ 
that of a program.13 A plan is not a contract, 14 person, organization, 
determined by the amount contributed over time to his individual account in the plan, 
and to the investment performance of the funds in that account, ERISA § 3(34); 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(34). A fundamental difference between the two types is that in defined 
benefit plans~ the sponsor (who is responsible for contributing sufficient funds to satisfy 
the promised level of benefits) bears the investment risk, whereas in defined contribution 
plans, investment risk falls on the participant. Defined benefit plans cover more employ-
ees, see, e.g., R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 96 (1986); 
HANDBOOK OF PENSION STATISI'ICS 1985, at Table-13 (R. Ippolito & W. Kolodrubetz, 
eds. 1986), and are subject to more extensive-regulation under ERISA. 
10. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The kinds ofplans which are included in 
and excluded from this category are specified in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1. 
11. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). 
12. Brundage-Peterson v~ Compcare Health Serv. Ins. Corp., 877 F.2d 509, 510-11 
(7th Cir .. 1989); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F .. 2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (en bane) 
. . ("At a minimum . . . a 'plan, fund, or program' under ERISA implies the existence of 
intended benefits, intended beneficiaries, a source of financing and a procedure to apply 
for and collect benefits."); Rizzo v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 Ill. App. 3d 67, 71-72, 549 
N.E.2d 810, 813 (1989). 
l3. Treasury Regulations concerning benefit plans clearly reflect this. Treas~ Reg. 
§ 1.401-1 (as amended in 1976), which clarifies the kind of "plan, fund or program'' 
eligible for favored tax treatment, defines a (qualified) plan as a certain kind of "definite 
written program and arrangement," and further explains that "[t]he tenn 'plan' implies a 
permanent as distinguished from a temporary program.', Id. (b)(2). Treas. Reg .. 
§ 1.404(b)-l (as amended in 19_84), which relates to employer deductions for contribu-
tions to plans, is even more expansive, and explains that the provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code which governs such deductions "is not confined to fonnal ... plans, but it 
includes any method ofcontributions of compensation having the effect of a stock bonus, 
-
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or item of property. Rather, it is an activity;: a regularly conducted 
one, but one that may be more or less formal. 
On the other hand, a plan is also treated by ERISA as. a legal 
entity distinct from its sponsor.15 It may sue or be sued, 16 have judg-
ment .entered against it,17 enter into contacts, own property, engage 
attorneys, and hire employees.18 In this respect, a plan is an artificial 
individual, akin to a corporation or a trust. 
This hybrid concept of an employee benefit plan as an activity 
that is also a discrete legal entity is virtually without counterpart in 
any other area of law.19 It is entirely a creation of ERISA.20 As we 
shall later see, because of the unorthodox character of benefit plans, 
extreme care must be. used in .applying to them rules designed for arti-
ficial entities of a more fatniliar nature.21 
B. ERISA as Systematic, but Not Comprehensive, Pension Reform 
1. ERISA ·~ Systematic Character 
ERISA governs a wide variety of pension and welfare benefit 
plans: profit-sharing plans, employee stock ownership plans, long-
terrn disability plans, severance plans,. and prepaid legal plans, to give 
just a few examples. Despite the wide scope of its coverage, Con-
gress's main interest was much narrower: programs that '-'provid[e] 
retirement income for employees who have spent their careers in use-
pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan, or similar plan deferring the receipt of compen-
sation/' Id. at (b)(l). 
14. See, e.g., Jervis v. Elerding, 504 F. Supp. 606, 608·09 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
15. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal' Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 686 
(1990) (plan and union sponsor were "distinct entities''; wrong by plan fiduciary to union 
sponsor was not wrong to plan remediable under ERISA). ·. 
16. ERISA§ 502{d){l), 29 U.S.C., § ll32(d)(l) ("An employee benefit plan may sue 
or be sued .. . . as an entity,). 
17. ERISA§ 502(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2) ("Any money judgment under (the 
enforcement provisions of ERISA] against an employee benefit plan shall be enforceable 
only against the plan as an entity. . . . "). 
18. See generally ERISA§ 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (regulation ofbusiness activ-
ities of plans). 
19. But cf. 24 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: 
EVIDENCE 5476, at 173-74 (1986) (describing model of corporation as activity, rather 
than person-like entity, for purposes of analyzing attorney-client privilege). 
20. The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, a statute superseded by ERISA, 
contained definitions of "employee welfare benefit plan'' and "employee pension benefit 
plan'' similar to those found in ERISA. Pub. L.. No. 85-836, 3, 72 Stat. 997 (1958). 
However, that act did not recognize· plans as legal entities in any significant way. 
21. See infra notes 357403 and accompanying: text. 
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ful and socially productive work."22 The record of abuses in connec-
tion with retirement plans was a major irnpetus for pension refor1n,23 
and the legislative history is replete with horror stories about workers 
who had unfairly been deprived of pensions that they had thought 
that they would get. 24 
In the early 1970's, when Congress took up the cause of pension 
refortn, benefits and benefit plans were governed by a patchwork of 
state and federal regulation. The Labor Management Relations Act 
provided limited fiduciary regulation for those plans which had been 
adopted through the process of collective bargaining.2s The Internal 
Revenue Code imposed some fiduciary standards for retirement 
trusts, but only as a condition of their obtaining favorable tax treat-
ment.26 The Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act, the first fed-
eral statute to deal exclusively with employee benefit plans, imposed 
limited reporting and disclosure obligations on plans and plan admin-
istrators.27 And some state trust laws governed the fiduciary obliga-
tions of retirement fund trustees.28 
Congress found this existing collection of laws to be inadequate 
as a framework for protecting the interests of plan participants in 
their benefits, and concluded that the problems it wished to remedy 
demanded systematic treatment.29 Among the problems that Con-
gress wished to remedy were overly-stringent vesting rules, un-
• 
22. E.g., S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in II SEN. COMM. ON 
LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLA'TIVE HISTORY OF THE 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY] at 1069 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4890. 
23. See GORDON, OVERVIEW: WHY WAS ERISA ENACTED?, reprinted in Special 
Sen. Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE (Comm. Print 1984). 
24. See, e.g., I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 90, 207-08, 210-15, 673; II 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1599, 1622, 1634, 1635, 1666, 1667-68, 1758, 
1762, 1772, 1866; III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3584, 3592, 4710, 4713, 
4716-17, 4749-50, 4790, 4792, 4794, 4799. 
25. Labor Management Relations Act§ 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1988). 
26. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-752, 56 Stat. 798, 862 (1942) 
(formerly codified at 26 U.S.C. § 165). 
27. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. §§ 997, 999-1001 (1958) (formerly codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 301-309), repealed by ERISA. 
28. See, e.g., Humpa v. Hedstrom, 341 Ill. App. 605, 94 N.E.2d 614 (1950). 
29. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGIS· 
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4849 ("the nature and extent of the problems determined to exist required one omnibus 
legislative proposal which would embody. essential and indispensable reforms"); id. at 15, 
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 601 and in 1974 U.S. CODE 
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derfunding of plans, inadequate disclosure requirements, insufficient 
fiduciary requirements, and inadequate enforcement mechanisms.30 
To deal with them, Congress relied on the existing tax, reporting, and 
fiduciary approaches, but added provisions and systems of provisions 
that it believed would make federal regulation more effective.31 In 
particular, it added minimum vesting funding standards, more com-
prehensive reporting and disclosure requirements, an extensive regu-
latory and enforcement role for the Department of Labor, more 
stringent and sweeping fiduciary rules, and a broad civil enforcement 
scheme. The approach can fairly be characterized as systematic, in 
that a well defined group of problems was sought to be corrected 
through a single statute, taking an integrated approach based on ar-
ticulate,d policy choices. 
But, although ERISA is systematic, one must be careful not to 
suppose, that it is comprehensive,. It is true that the Supreme Court 
has described ERISA as a "comprehensive and reticulated statute"32 
and a ''comprehensive legislative scheme,''33 and that lower courts 
have repeated those phrases endlessly. Yet the description is clearly 
an overstatement. ERISA may well have been an initial attempt at 
comprehensive regulation, 34 but, like many initial attempts, it failed to 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4851 ("the problems in the private pension field ... are so 
interrelated that they cannot be resolved without a comprehensive legislative program''). 
30. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1973), reprinted in II 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2352-55 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4643-46~ See also GORDON, supra note 23, at 19-20; WOODRUFF, THE 
GOALS OF ERISA AND THE IMPACT OF ERISA ON PLAN PARTICIPANTS, reprinted in 
Special Sen. Contm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT IN-
COME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE (Comm. Print 1984). 
31. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in II LEG"" 
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2597 {"Your committee regards the present legisla-
tion as part of an evolutionary process which keeps [the] basic framework but which 
builds on it new provisions which experience indicates are necessary, for the proper func-
tioning of these plans."). 
32. E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) 
(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)). 
33. Id. at 147 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc~ v. Transport Workers, 451 u~s. 77, 
97 (1981)). 
34. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 4777 (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE. HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 3583 (the act is "long overdue but represents a strong first step toward 
reforrn'') (remarks of Rep. Reid); id. at 4779, III LEG-ISLATIVE HISTORY~ supra note 22, 
at 3589 ("This bill is a necessary first ste,p") (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 120 CoNG. REc. 
29,193 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4658 
(''the bill does not cover everything that we might desire but is a beginning that should 
have been made long ago") (remarks, of Rep.- Perkins); id. at 29,196, reprinted in III 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4666 ("We know that there will be many trials 
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address issues and problems that were legitimate candidates for regu-
lation through the same statute.35 Some of those problems and issues 
Congress just did not foresee~ 36 On others, Congress was unable to 
reach agreement. Others, Congress did not intend to regulate by stat-
ute, preferring to let courts37 or agencies38 work out appropriate rules. 
Others; it did not wish to regulate at all. 
Congress, in fact, was well aware that ERISA was neither com-
prehensive nor the last word on the subject of benefit plan regula-
tion. 39 To that end, it provided in the statute itself for six different 
groups to study ERISA's effects and to report to Congress for pur-
poses of further legislation. In particular; Congress established an 
Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans, 
consisting of representatives of a wide variety of interested groups and 
enterprises,40 who were "qualified to appraise the programs instituted 
under" ERISA~41 Its recommendations were to be submitted to Con-
,gress every year by the. Secretary of Labor.42 Congress also "author-
ized and directed'; the Secretary of Labor "to undertake research 
studies relating to pension plans,'' in particular on the effects of Title 
I, on the general role of private pensions, on the operation of private 
and errors in its interpretation and in its administrationn) (remarks of Re,p. Dent); 120 
CONG. R.Ec. 29,954 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
22, at 4,804 ("we can use our high ·hopes as a guide to future reforms") (remarks of Sen. 
Nelson). 
35. A paper prepared for a Senate Committee in 1984 identified benefit portability, 
public employee plan regulation, mandatory employee pensions, and inflation protection 
as the major areas left unaddressed. See WooDRUFF; supra, note 30, at 30-31. 
36. "There are problems not contemplated in its provisions and we will be busy for 
many years attacking those problems." 120 CONG~ R.Ec. 29,196 (Aug. 20, 1974), re-
printed in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4668 (remarks of Rep. Dent) .. 
37. See infra text accompanying notes 313·327. 
38. See~ e.g., ERISA§ 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (plan claim procedures shall be "[i]n 
accordance with regulations of the Secretary [of Labor]"). 
39. "It is a modest bill. It does not purport to solve every problem. Further study 
and deliberation by our own committee and by other committees of the Congress will be 
necessary." 120 CONG. REc. 4278 (Feb. 26, 1974), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, 3369 (remarks of Rep. Perkins). See· id. at 4279, reprinted in II 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 3373 ("although this not a perfect bill, it does 
provide a good beginning") (remarks of Rep., Brademas). 
40. ERISA§ 512(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a). The fifteen member council was to draw 
representatives from employee organizations, employers, pension benefit recipients, the 
general public, insurance companies, corporate trust companies, actuarial consultants, 
investment counseling companies; investment managers, and accounting firtns .. 
41. ERISA§ 512(a)(1)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1142(a)(1)(2). 
42. ERISA § 513(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1143(b). 
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pension plans, and on methods of encouraging pension plan growth~43 
The findings and conclusions were to be submitted to Congress annu-
ally.44 Congress also established a Joint Pension, Profit Sharing, and 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan Task Force, which was to study 
questions concerning discrimination, portability, small employer 
plans, stock ownership, and preemption, and to report its findings to 
Congress within twenty-four months.45 Finally, three congressional 
com1nittees were directed to study government pension plans and to 
report their findings. 46 
Thus, while ERISA may fairly be called systematic; it is far from 
a comprehensive or complete law of employee benefit plans. 
2. Plans as Voluntary Arrangements 
To understand why ERISA is not a comprehensive statute, one 
must appreciate its key premise that pension benefit plans (and, a for-
tiori, welfare benefit plans) should be voluntary arrangements.47 Con-
gress intended that the private retirement plan system should be one 
that is voluntarily established and self-administered to the greatest ex-
tent possible.48 The rationale was not only to avoid "excessive Fed-
eral interference,"49 but as well the belief that employers should have 
the flexibility to adopt or not adopt plans as they deemed best, and 
should have substantial freedom to design plans that they believed 
43. ERISA § 513(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1143(a)(2). 
44. ERISA§ 513(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1133(b). 
45. ERISA§§ 3021-22, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-22. 
46. ERISA§ 3031, 29 U.S.C: § 1231. 
47. See, e.g~, H.R. REP. No. S33, 93d Cong., lstSess.l (1973), reprinted in I LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2348, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.; 
NE\VS 4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension· 
rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of pri-
vate retirement plans"); H.R. REP. No. 779, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 8-9 (1974), reprinted 
in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2591, 2597-98 and in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4671, 4676-78. See also 120 CQNG. REC. 7418, 7419 (Mar. 13, 
1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 212, 215 (remarks of Sen. 
Bentsen); 120 CONG. REC. 4777 (Feb. 28; 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 3583-84 (remarks of Rep. Price). 
48. Congress, though, presupposed the existence of the mandatory Social Security 
system .. See, e.g., 120 CoNG. REc. 30,010 (Sept. 8, 1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE_ 
HISTORY, supra note 22,.at 1619 (remarks of Sen. Moss) .. For an analysis of the current, 
mixed voluntary and mandatory retirement system, see Graetz, The Troubled Marriage 
of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 851 (1987). 
49. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7419 (March 13, 1973), reprinted in l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 215 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen). 
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would best serve their needs and the needs of their employees. 50 As a 
result, nothing in ERISA, or any other law, makes retirement plans 
mandatory. 
3. The Cost-Benefit Calculus 
ERISA's noncomprehensive character results from its two com-
peting purposes. One of ERISA's main goals is to encourage employ-
ers to establish retirement plans for their employees. The other is to 
safeguard participants' rights to benefits once a plan has been estab-
lished. ERISA is largely a set of policy adjustments between those 
two goals. 51 
To implement the policy of encouraging employers to adopt re-
tirement plans, ERISA, through the Internal Revenue Code, provides 
favorable tax treatment to employers and employees. 52 The employer 
receives an immediate deduction for contributions to the plan, while 
the employees are allowed to defer taxation of the employer's contri-
butions and investment income realized on plan funds until they re-
ceive their benefits. 53 This is the satne method that had been used 
under prior law to encourage employers to establish retirement plans 
for employees. s4 
50. E.g., 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7418 (March 13, 1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS· 
TORY, supra note 22, at 212 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); S~ REP~ No. 127, 93d Cong., lst 
Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4646-47. 
51. E.g., S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 599 and in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4647; S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 46 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1107, 1114 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4899, 4904; 120 CONG. R.Ec. 30,004 (Sept. 18, 1973}, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 1601 (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CoNG. REc. 29,210 (Aug. 
20, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4706 (remarks of 
Rep. Rostenkowski). See A-T-0, Inc. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 634 F.2d 1013, 
1021 (6th Cir. 1980) (ERISA is a "finely tuned balance between protecting pension bene~ 
fits for employees while limiting the costs to employers"). 
52. "The basis of all private pensions is the tax law. We have private pensions be-
cause a payment or contribution to the pension fund is tax-free. Those pension funds 
grow so they can do the job because the earnings are tax-free." 120 CONG. REc. 30,044 
(Sept. 18, 1973}, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1642 (remarks 
of Sen. Curtis). See also S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 2, 10 (1973), reprinted in I 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1070, 1078 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4898-99. 
53. I.R.C. §§ 402, 404, 501(a). 
54. See 120 CONG. R.Ec. 7417 (Mar. 13, 1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS· 
TORY, supra note 22, at 211 (remarks of Sen. Bentsen). 
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Under prior law, the employer and the participants would re-
ceive favorable tax treatment the plan was said to be "qualified" -
if certain minimal protections for plan funds were in place. ERISA 
changed the terms of this bargain. As new and additional conditions 
for qualification, ERISA imposed standards that Congress believed 
would help prevent unfair benefit deprivations. Favorable tax treat-
ment was the reward for establishing plans that contained safeguards 
of employees' rights to benefits. ss 
In determining which new requirements to impose, Congress 
sought to avoid placing such a burden on employers as to make it 
undesirable for them to establish plans. As one Senate Report 
explained: 
Generally, it would appear that the wider or more comprehensive 
the coverage, vesting, and funding, the more desirable it is from the 
standpoint of national policy. However, since these plans are vol-
untary on the part of the employer and both the institution of new 
pension plans and increases in benefits depend upon employer will-
ingness to participate or expand a plan, it is necessary to take into 
account additional costs from the standpoint of the employer. If 
employers respond to more comprehensive coverage, vesting and 
funding rules by decreasing benefits under existing plans or slowing 
the rate of formation of new plans, little if anything would be 
gained from the standpoint of securing broader use of employee 
pensions and related plans. At the same time, there are advantages 
in setting minimum standards in these areas both to serve as a 
guideline for employers in establishing or improving plans and also 
to prevent the promise of more in the form of pensions or related 
benefits than eventually is available. 56 
Thus, ERISA's scope and substantive requirements reflect a compro-
mise between two not entirely consistent goals. 
55. In fact, ERISA has a third ;major goal (in addition to voluntariness and em-
ployee protection), that of ensuring that the plans established do not favor the more 
highly compensated employees or the corporate managers. This goal is reflected in the 
discrimination rules that are part of the Internal Revenue Code's qualification standards. 
See generally Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Inten-
tions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419 (1984). These provisions are of 
little importance to the s~bject of this article, however, so we do not discuss them further. 
56. S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess_. 18-19 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 1086-87, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4904. 
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C. Two Aspects of Plan Content Regulation 
For purposes of this article, it is necessary to consider two rela-
tively nontechnical parts of ERISA's regulation of the content of the 
plans. 
1. The Requirement of a Claims Procedure 
ERISA contains very little regulation of plan content. Indeed, 
the only content requirement applicable to every plan governed by 
ERISA 57 is the requirement that the plan have a claims procedure -
that is, a procedure for challenging denials of benefits in accord-
ance with regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. 58 This basic 
requirement is consistent with the conception of a plan as essentially a 
regularly conducted practice of providing benefits to employees. 
2. The Writing Requirement and Written Plans 
With insignificant exceptions, 59 ERISA requires every plan to 
"be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument."60 
The requirement that plans be established pursuant to a written in-
strument is a fiduciary provision, and it is a requirement designed to 
strengthen the substantive rules governing fiduciary conduct. Its 
chief purpose is to ensure that participants and fiduciaries will be able 
to know their respective rights and obligations, and to ensure that 
participants will easily be able to discover to whom they should tum 
.. 
57. Reporting and disclosure obligations, described infra notes 69-82 and accompa-
nying text~ are also universally applicable. 
58. ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133~ provides that: 
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary~ every employee benefit plan 
shall-
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary 
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the 
specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be under-
stood by the participant, and 
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for ben-
efits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named 
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim. 
Id. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor are found at 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1. 
59. See ERISA § 401(a), 29 U.S.C. § llOl(a). 
60. ERISA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a). Lack of a written instrument is a viola-
tion of ERISA. However, it does not preclude the existence of a plan, see, e.g., Dilling-
ham, 688 F.2d at 1372, any more than the lack of a written partnership agreement would 
preclude the existence of a partnership. 
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for infortnation or assistance in connection with the plan.61 It also 
"protects the plan's actuarial viability by setting forth the terms under 
which benefits may be paid ... [and] protects ERISA plans from the 
sort of corruption fostered by private verbal agreements."62 
All written plans must contain provisions dealing with the plans' 
fiduciaries. Specifically, the plan docutnents must identify the named 
fiduciaries who "shall have authority to control and manage the oper-
ation and administration of the plan, "63 and must identify the trustees 
(if the plan has any).64 Unlike the law oftrusts,65 ERISA permits-
but does not require written plans to have provisions that govern 
the allocation and delegation of fiduciary responsibility among vari-
ous plan fiduciaries. 66 
ERISA also contains various prohibitions. One express prohibi-
tion, applicable to all written plans, is the prohibition of "any provi-
sion . . . which purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or 
liability for any responsibility, obligation or duty [under ERISA's fi-
duciary provisions]."67 Congress viewed the fact that state trust laws 
had allowed such exculpation as a major flaw in existing fiduciary 
regulation that had to be rectified in federal standards. 68 
D. Reporting and Disclosure under ERISA 
Prior to ERISA, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act 
(hWPPDA")69 was the sole federal statute devoted exclusively to the 
regulation of benefit plans. The WPPDA did not govern all plans 
within the scope of the commerce clause: it regulated only larger 
61. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1974), reprinted in Ill 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4564 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5075-76; see Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
579 (1990); see also Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989). 
62. See Saret v. Triform Corp., 662 F. Supp. 312, 316 (N.D. ill. 1986). 
63. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
64. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
65 .. See RFSI"ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 171 (1959). 
66. ERISA §§ 402(b)(2) & (c)(2), 405(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(b)(2) & (c)(2), 
1105(c)(1). The plan document must also describe a procedure for establishing and im-
plementing a funding policy, ERISA§ 402(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1); specify a proce-
dure for amending the plan, ERISA§ 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3); and "specify the 
basis on which payments are made to and from the plan," ERISA§ 402(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1102(b){4). 
67. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). 
68. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88. 
69. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (formerly codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-
309, repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (a)(l)). 
• 
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plans, those with twenty-five or more participants. 70 
The WPPDA provided a limited framework for protecting the 
interests of plan participants. It did so principally by requiring disclo-
sure of information relating to the plan.71 To that end, it required 
plan administrators to publish a plan description and annual financial 
reports for the plan, and to file them with the Secretary of Labor and 
make them available for inspection by participants. 
It was widely believed that the WPPDA was ineffective. As 
Congress explained in one of the reports accompanying a bill that led 
to ERISA: "[WPPDA] is weak in its li1nited disclosure requirements 
and wholly lacking in substantive fiduciary standards. Its chief proce-
dural weakness can be found in its reliance upon the initiative of the 
individual employee to police the management of his plan."72 
Notwithstanding the perceived inadequacies, ERISA clearly 
builds on the WPPDA; several of the bills that led to ERISA were 
designed as elaborate amendments to cure some of its inadequacies. 73 
In those bills, and in others introduced around the same time that 
contained rules to govern reporting and disclosure, a close connection 
could be seen between the reporting and disclosure requirements and 
the fiduciary responsibility rules. In particular, the requirement of 
detailed reporting and disclosure was considered a prophylactic de-
vice to make the fiduciary rules more effective. In that respect, the 
reporting and disclosure requirements were seen as functioning simi-
larly to the writing requirement. Thus, as one of the congressional 
reports explained: 
The underlying theory of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclo-
sure Act to date has been that reporting of generalized infor1nation 
concerning plan operations to plan participants and beneficiaries 
and to the public in general would, by subjecting the dealings of 
70. Pub. L. No. 85 .. 836, § 4(b)(4), 72 Stat. 997, 999 (1958). 
71.. The WPPDA, as originally enacted, was exclusively a reporting and disclosure 
statute. In 1962, it was amended to impose criminal penalties for embezzlement, certain 
forms of fraud, and kickbacks in connection with benefit plans, and to impose bonding 
requirements for administrators, officers and employees of plans, and persons who handle 
plan funds and property. See Pub. L. No~ 87-420, 76 Stat. 3 (1962). 
72. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2351 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4642. 
73. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 22, at 3; H.R. 462, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 67; S. 1557, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 280. 
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persons controlling employee benefit plans to the light of public 
scrutiny, insure that the plan would be operated according to in-
structions and in the best interests of participants and benefi-
ciaries. . . . But experience has shown that the lilnited data 
available under the present Act is insufficient. Changes are there-
fore required to increase the infor1nation and data required in the 
reports both in scope and detail. Experience has also demonstrated 
a need for a more particularized form of reporting so that the indi-
vidual participant knows exactly where he stands with respect to 
the plan what benefits he may be entitled to, what circum-
stances may preclude hiln from obtaining benefits, what proce-
dures he must follow to obtain benefits, and who are the persons to 
whom the management and investment of his plan funds have been 
entrusted. At the same time, the safeguarding effect of the fiduci-
ary responsibility section will operate efficiently only if fiduciaries 
are aware that the details of their dealings will be open to inspec-
tion, and that individual participants and beneficiaries will be 
armed with enough information to enforce their own rights as well 
as the obligations owed by the fiduciary to the plan in general. 74 
To implement these policies, ERISA imposes reporting and dis-
closure obligations on every plan within its scope.75 It requires that 
every plan administrator furnish the participants with a sutnmary 
plan description76 (a brief, nontechnical description of the plan) and 
file a plan description with the Secretary of ·Labor. 77 The administra-
tor must also publish and file annual reports with the Secretary of 
Labor.78 The report must disclose information on transactions with 
parties in interest, losses caused by wrongdoing, plan finances, actua-
rial projections, and changes in fiduciaries. 79 The administrator must 
74. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 613 and in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4863. 
75. Pursuant to statutory authority, the Secretary of Labor has exempted from some 
of the reporting and disclosure requirements for certain small, unfunded welfare benefit 
plans, 29 C.F.R. § 2520 .. 104-20; group insurance arrangements, id. § 2520.104-21; and 
apprenticeship or training plans, id. § 2520.104-22. 
76. ERISA § 102(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1). 
77. ERISA § 102(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(2). 
78. ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023. Certain reports must also be filed with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, I.R.C. §§ 6057-6059 (1989); and the Pension Benefit Guaran-
tee Corporation, ERISA §§ 4041, 4043, 4065. In practice, a plan files a single annual 
report with the Secretary of the Treasury, which is distributed to the Secretary of Labor 
and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp. 
79. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-l{b). See Internal Revenue Service Form 5500 (''Annual 
Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan (with 100 or more participantsY'). 
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also furnish information regarding the plan and individual benefit en-
titlements to any participant who seeks such infor1nation.80 
ERISA also contains a specialized enforcement provision that al-
lows imposition of substantial civil damages and heavy fines on ad .. 
ministrators who refuse to comply with the reporting and disclosure 
rules. For example, an administrator must provide a participant, 
upon request, with information to which he is entitled within thirty 
days. Otherwise, the administrator may be subject to liability to the 
participant in an amount up to $100 per day.81 The administrator 
may also be fined under these provisions up to $1000 per day for fail-
ure to file an annual report on time. s2 The incentives thus are very 
strong for administrators to comply with the rules. 
E. Fiduciary Standards: Generally 
I. Pre-ERISA Fiduciaries 
ERISA's fiduciary provisions are sweeping, stringent, and one of 
the most innovative features of the law. 
Prior to ERISA, there were three sources of fiduciary protection 
for plans. One was the Internal Revenue Code, which required as a 
condition for qualification that the trust part of a plan be "for the 
exclusive benefit" of the participants and their beneficiaries. 83 An~ 
other was the various state laws of trusts. The third was the Labor 
Management Relations Act, which, for employee benefit plans estab-
lished by unions, pertnitted only those trust funds "established ... for 
the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees . . . and their families 
and dependents."S4 
Congress found substantial flaws with these existing forn1s of 
protection. One problem was scope. of coverage. Not all plans are 
union-established, and not all plans are qualified. The labor laws and 
tax code governed only select employee benefit plans. A more subtle, 
but equally serious problem, was that not all employee benefit plans 
are established as trusts. There were only minimal restrictions im--
posed up,on persons responsible for employee benefit plans whose. as-
80. ERISA§§ 105, 502(c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1025, 1132(c). 
81. ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C~ § l132(c)(l)(B). 
82. ERISA § 502(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(2). 
83. l.R.C. § 401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 40l(a). 
84. Labor Management Relations Act§ 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). 
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sets were not held in trust. ss 
Another problem was substantive. Traditional trust law was 
designed for the purpose of implementing the intent of settlors of inter 
vivos and testamentary trusts. Congress found this body of law to of-
fer inadequate protection to participants and beneficiaries of employee 
benefit plans because its rules allowed fiduciary conduct that Congress 
believed should be prohibited. As one of the early Committee reports 
explained: 
[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a 
trust, reliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to ade-
quately protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. 
This is because trust law had developed in the context of testamen-
tary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed to pass designated 
property to an individual or small group of persons) with an at-
tendant emphasis on carrying out the instructions of the settlor. 
Thus, if the settlor includes in the trust document an exculpatory 
clause under which the trustee is relieved from liability for certain 
,actions which wo~ld otherwise constitute a breach of duty, or if the 
settlor specifies that the trustee shall be allowed to make invest-
ments which might otherwise be considered imprudent, the trust 
law in many states will be interpreted to allow the deviation. In 
the absence of a fiduciary responsibility section in the present Act, 
,courts applying trust law to employee benefit plans have allowed 
the same kinds of deviations, even though the typical employee 
benefit plan, covering hundreds or even thousands of participants, 
is quite different from the testamentary trust both in purpose and 
in nature. 86 
To address these problems, Congress made two substantial 
changes in the law. First, it codified general fiduciary standards, de-
rived from trust law, and made them applicable to virtually any em-
ployee benefit plan irrespective of whether it used a trust as a funding 
mechanism. 87 Second, it eliminated rules that Congress deemed to be 
85. 120 CONG. REc. 12,075 (Aprill2, 1973), reprinted in l LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 275 (statement ofSen. Javits); S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 
(1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1914 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865 .. Thus, one of the bills that led to ERISA provided 
that "[e]very employee benefit plan shall be deemed to be a trust." H.R. 2, lll(a)(l), 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 41. This unnec-
essary legal fiction was subsequently discarded. 
86. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865. 
87. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 294-97 (1974), reprinted in III 
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unacceptable in the plan context. Thus, for example, ERISA prohib-
its exculpatory provisions88 and prohibits fiduciaries from deviating 
from the plan document. 89 To i1nplement ERISA's fiduciary policies, 
Congress also authorized courts to develop a fiduciary law specially 
adapted to benefit plans, that takes into account their special 
character. 90 
2. ERISA Fiduciaries: Who Are They? 
There are itnportant differences between a plan fiduciary under 
ERISA and a fiduciary under the common law of trusts. Trust law 
has one fiduciary, the "trustee," in whom all significant fiduciary re-
sponsibility for a trust is reposed.91 ERISA fiduciary law is more 
complex, in that it contemplates the existence of several plan fiducia-
ries, each of whom has a diiferent set of responsibilities. 
There are two types of fiduciary that every plan now must have. 
One is the so-called "named fiduciary," who has "authority to control 
and manage the operation and administration of the plan."92 This 
fiduciary is wholly a creature of ERISA, with no obvious counterpart 
in the common law of trusts. The importance of this fiduciary role 
lies in the fact that its holder is name,d in the plan document or pursu-
ant to it. Its existence ensures that there will be at least one fiduciary 
known as such to the participants and beneficiaries. 
The other fiduciary that every plan must have is the so-called 
''administrator." 'The administrator's fiduciary function is not de-
fined; there are sirnply obligations mainly ones dealing with report-
ing and disclosure imp-osed by ERISA on the person who has this 
role.93 Unlike the named fiduciary, the adtninistrator need not be 
named in or pursuant to the plan document, for if the plan document 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at4561-64 and 1974 UtS. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5076. 
88. ERISA§ 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § lllO(a). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying 
text. 
89. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(D). 
90. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974), reprinted in Ill 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4569, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD· 
MIN. NEWS 5083. See generally Section II(C)(3),-infra notes 279-327 and accompanying 
text. 
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 171, 184. 
92. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § l102(a)(l). 
93. ERISA §§ 101-105, 502(c), 606(a)(4), 4041, 4043, 4044, 4046, 406.5-4066, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025, 1132(c), ll66(a)(4), 1341, 1343, 1344, 1346, 1365-1366. 
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is silent, the plan sponsor becomes the administrator by default. 94 
In addition to these two mandatory fiduciaries, every plan whose 
assets are held in trust must have a trustee, who is designated in or 
pursuant to the plan document. 95 The trustee is the ERISA fiduciary 
most like the trust-law trustee; he has "exclusive authority and discre-
tion to manage and control the assets of the plan."96 In addition to 
the trustee, a plan may also have an "investment manager," appointed 
by the named fiduciary, who has power "to manage (including the 
power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a plan. " 97 
The named fiduciary, administrator, trustee, and investment 
manager are the four main fiduciary roles with respect to ERISA 
plans. ERISA contemplates that these roles may be filled by officers, 
agents, or other representatives of the employer.98 More than one 
person may be assigned each role and one person may be assigned 
two or more of such roles. 99 In addition, there is a network of rules 
governing allocation and delegation of these fiduciaries' 
responsibilities. 1 oo 
But those four roles do not exhaust the fiduciary roles with re-
spect to a plan. ERISA defines "fiduciary" very broadly, through a 
function-and-discretion test. Under ERISA, any person is automati-
cally a fiduciary to the extent that he perfortns certain functions in-
volving discretion: 
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he 
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control re-
specting management of such plan or exercises any authority or 
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he 
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct 
or indirect, with respect to any monies or other property of such 
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has 
any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan. tot 
This is a novel approach to fiduciary status. Unlike the common 
94. ERISA § 3(16)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). 
95. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
96. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
97. ERISA § 402(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a). 
98. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3). 
99. ERISA § 402(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(l). 
100. ERISA §§ 402(b)(2), 402(c)(2) & (3), 403(a), 405(b)(l){B), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1102(b)(2), 1102(c)(2) & (3), 1103(a), 1105(b)(l)(B). 
101. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2l)(A). 
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law, in which fiduciary status most commonly arises because of title 
(e.g., trustee, partner, lawyer), 102 ERISA diminishes the importance 
of title and imposes fiduciary status because of the discretionary role 
played in management or administration of the plan.103 This ap-
proach has three important corollaries for plan attorneys. 
First, a person's actual role in the plan may override the name of 
his office in determining fiduciary status. Thus, courts have found 
persons to be plan fiduciaries, notwithstanding their efforts to evade it 
through creative plan draftsmanship or avoidance of a title. 104 Con-
versely, courts have found persons labelled "trustees"105 or "adminis-
trators"106 not to be fiduciaries, after examining their actual roles and 
responsibilities. 
The second corollary arises from the "to the extent" language: in 
general, ERISA ·fiduciaries are limited fiduciaries, having fiduciary re-
sponsibility only for certain functions. This, too, is a novel feature of 
ERISA. It is an accommodation to the fact that benefit plans, unlike 
testamentary trusts, are complex, ongoing activities, often with tens of 
thousands of participants and often with hundreds of millions of dol-
lars or more of assets held in trust. Division of managerial, financial 
and administrative responsibility is as essential in a large ERISA plan 
as it is in a large business enterprise. Because fiduciary responsibility 
102. See generally J. SHEPARD, LAW OF FIDUCIARIES, ch. 2; Frankel, Fiduciary 
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795, 795-96 (1983). Thus, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act defines 
"fiduciary" as follows: 
'Fiduciary' includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, resulting or 
constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, 
trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer 
of a corporation, public or private officer, or any other person acting in a fiduci-
ary capacity for any person, trust or estate. 
UNIF. FIDUCIAR1ES ACT 1, 7A U.L.A. 395-96 (1985). 
103. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 633 F .. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Colo. 1986) 
(''it is a person's ability to make policy decisions outside of a pre-existing or separate 
framework of policies, practices and procedures which saddles that person with ERISA 
fiduciary liability"). 
104. See, e.g., PBGC v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (defendant 
could not escape fiduciary responsibility "by relying on the failure of an apparently non-
existent corporate board of directors formally to give him a fiduciary title~'). 
105 .. Richardson v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 350 (D.D.C. 
1985). 
106. Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359 
(N.D. Ga. 1986). See also, e.g., Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323, 1325 
(9th Cir. 1985) (corporation hired to administer plan was not a fiduciary); Munoz, 633 F. 
Supp. at 567-69 (company that performed non-discretionary processing of claims was not 
a fiduciary). 
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with respect to a plan follows upon managerial, financial and adminis-
trative responsibility, the natural division of labor in running the plan 
means division of fiduciary responsibility as well. 
Third, there is an inescapable element of arbitrariness in ERISA 
.fiduciary determinations. "Discretion," the key to fiduciary status, is 
a flexible term. A secretary to a fiduciary may have discretion as to 
some mundane matters of plan management, but secretaries are not 
thereby made fiduciaries not even limited ones. In principle, they 
could be, but experience and common sense suggests that a minimum 
level of discretion should be fixed, below which a person has no fiduci-
ary responsibility at all. 
The arbitrariness of the line drawn can be seen in the case of an 
attorney who regularly gives advice to a plan fiduciary. The attor-
ney's opinion might be extremely influential in, for example, cases of 
contested benefit determinations, and interpretation of the plan docu-
ment might, as a matter of practice, always be accepted by the fiduci-
ary responsible for benefit claims. It is entirely plausible to consider 
the attorney's responsibility for giving advice to be "discretionary au-
thority in the administration of [the] plan,'' or to consider the act of 
giving advice, to the extent accepted, an e~ercise of discretionary au-
thority in plan administration.107 But policy choices have been made 
to the contrary, and so regulations place plan attorneys, to the extent 
they act solely as attorneys, below the_ fiduciary-status line.-108 
It should be kept in mind, though, that the line easily could have 
been placed elsewhere, all the while_ remaining consistent with the text 
and policies of ERISA. Secretaries, attorneys and other persons 
could have been included as part of the class of fiduciaries by virtue of 
their discretion albeit limited in plan affairs. Thus, the fact that 
a person who is involved in a plan is not an ERISA fiduciary does not 
mean that he entirely lacks the kind of discretionary authority that is 
of concern under the policies of ERISA. As a result, ERISA's poli-
cies, though not its full complement of fiduciary rules, may still apply 
to persons below the line. 
107. Cfi Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) (international 
union official was fiduciary with respect to local unions' dental plans because of influence 
in fact over plans' choices of provider). 
108. ERISA § 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l). 
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3. ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility 
General Standards 
ERISA's basic rule goventing the conduct of fiduciaries is set 
forth in section 404(a)(l): 
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect. to a plan solely 
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and -
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their bene-
ficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering 
the plan; 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir ... 
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con-
duct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; 
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to mini-
Inize the risk of large losses, unless under the circurnstances it 
is clearly prudent not to do so; and 
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments gov-
erning the plan insofar as such documents and instruments 
are consistent with the provisions of this title or title IV.109 
Three of the basic duties made part of the rule ·· loyalty, c.are, and 
prudence are derived from the common law of trusts. The other 
two duties risk minimization and adherence to plan documents -
represent new fiduciary requirements adapted to the special needs. of 
plans. All of the fiduciary requirements apply, with very minor ex-
ceptions, to every plan subject to ERISA. 
Two of the fiduciary duties are of especial importance to plan 
attorneys: the duty of loyalty, and the duty to follow plan documents. 
z: The Duty ofLoyalty 
The fiduciary duty with which we shall be most concerned is the 
duty of loyalty: that of discharging duties ''solely in the interestu of 
participants and beneficiaries and ''for the exclusive purpose" stated 
in the section.110 Loyalty is not only the basic duty of ·any fiduci-
109. 29 C.P.R. § 2509 .. 75-5, at D-1. 
110. ERISA§ 404(a)(1) & (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(l) & (A) (1988). See also ER~ 
ISA § 406(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b). 
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ary, 111 it is one of the defining characteristics of any fiduciary. 112 The 
precise scope and character of the duty of loyalty varies from one 
fiduciary relationship to another. 113 ERISA largely incorporates the 
loyalty obligations of the law of trusts, with adaptations to take into 
account the special characteristics of plans. 
One adaptation is reflected in the characterization of the fiduci-
ary's duties as ones "with respect to a plan."114 This is an 11nusual 
formulation, because duties, and especially fiduciary duties, are con-
ventionally described as being "with respect to" matters or areas of 
responsibility, but as "owed to" persons or entities.115 Nothing in the 
legislative history of ERISA explains why the formulation, "with re-
spect to a plan," was chosen instead of a conventional fortnulation, 
such as that the fiduciary's duties are owed "to the plan" or "to the 
participants and beneficiaries.'' What, if anything, does it suggest 
about the differences between the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty 
and the duty of loyalty of the comtnon law trustee? 
It suggests a subtle, but si · cant, difference. Recall that a plan, 
although a legal entity, is also a regularly conducted activity estab-
lished for the purpose of providing benefits.116 The duties of the ER-
ISA fiduciary are thus duties "with respect to" this benefit-payment 
activity. But there is no one to whom those duties are said to be pri-
marily owed. A fiduciary is not required, or even per1nitted, under 
section 404(a)(l) to carry out his duties in the separate interests (plu-
ral) of the participants and beneficiaries. To the contrary, he is re-
quired to carry out his duties in their- "interest'' (singular). That 
single, collective interest is just the obverse of the purpose of the plan: 
it is the interest in receiving benefits and having the plan properly 
administered. Thus, the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty is a duty 
to discharge his substantive obligations solely to further the activity 
111. G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1978); IIA A. 
SCOIT & W. FRATCHER, LAW OF TRUSIS § 170 (4th ed. 1987). 
112. J. SHEPARD, supra note 102, at 35, 48 & ch. 6 (no fiduciary status without a 
duty of loyalty). 
113. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 541 (1949). 
114. This characterization applies to all of a fiduciary's duties, and not just that of 
loyalty. 
115. See, e.g., RESI'ATEMENT SECOND OF AGENCY§ 13 (fiduciary duty "with re-
spect to matters within the scope of the agency"); Investment Advisors Act 36(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (fiduciary duty "with respect to the receipt of compensation for serv-
ices, or of payments of a material nature"). 
116. See Section I(A), supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text. 
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that constitutes the plan. Missing from ERISA is a traditional duty 
of loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries, or to anyone else. In 
its stead is a duty of loyalty to an activity. This is a novel sort of duty, 
one that requires of a fiduciary a loyalty more akin to a player's loy-
alty to "the game," than akin to a trustee's loyalty to a beneficiary. 
In a practical sense, of course, the fiduciary,s obligations ulti-
mately run to the participants and beneficiaries. Since the fiduciary 
must carry out his responsibilities to further the purpose of the plan in 
providing benefits, he will necessarily perform his obligations to their 
advantage. But this loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries is de-
rivative of, and limited by, the fiduciary's statutory obligations to the 
ongoing program of providing benefits. Because the. primary obliga-
tion of the fiduciary is generally to the program, rather than to the 
participants and beneficiaries, a fiduciary is prohibited from further-
ing an interest of the participants and beneficiaries, or any group of 
them, in anything other than receipt of benefits. A fiduciary cannot, 
for example, act primarily to further some or all of the participants' 
interests in job security,117 by loaning money to the employer118 or by 
assisting the employer to resist a hostile takeover effort. 119 Similarly, 
because the fiduciary's duty of loyalty is not owed directly to the par-
ticipants and beneficiaries, they have no claim for compensatory dam-
ages, under ERISA, against a fiduciary who causes injury to them 
through a breach.12o 
117 ~ This point was explained by Senator Williams: 
There is an extremely important social purpose that is intended to be fostered 
by ERISA's fiduciary and other rules .. It is the supplying of retirement and 
deferred income and health and welfare benefits to employees covered under the 
plans, and it is the duty of every plan sponsor and any fiduciary investing plan 
assets to adopt economically sound objectives and methods policies, proce-
dures, and particular investment decisions designed to achieve that goal. 
• • • • 
... [S]ituations may arise where the interests of active employees may be at 
odds with the retirement income security interests of those same employees or 
present retirees. In such cases, a pension plan fiduciary must choose the course 
which is consistent with the primary duty of loyalty to the retirement income 
needs of plan participants. 
125 CONG. REc. 932 (Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See generally Hutchin-
son & Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Polit-
ical Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1340 (1980). 
118. ERISA§ 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a). 
119. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 
(1982). 
120. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (no individual right to damages under§ 502(a)(2)); Amos 
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 868 F.2d 430, 432 (11th Cir .. ), reh. denied (en bane), 875 F.2d 
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Recognizing that the fiduciary's duty of loyalty is owed primarily 
to the plan activity, and that it does not run directly to the partici-
pants and beneficiaries, helps clear up some apparent perplexities in 
ERISA's fiduciary rules. For example, the statutory provision which 
allows a plan sponsor to appoint an "officer, employee, agent, or other 
representative" as a fiduciary121 is sometimes thought to be an inex-
plicable departure from ERISA;s stringent duty of loyalty.122 'The 
reason for such belief is that the employee-fiduciary is seen as neces-
sarily having dual loyalties: to both the sponsor and the participants 
and beneficiaries. This is thought to create an otherwise impermissi-
ble conflictofinterest. But there is no dual loyalty in the sense feared, 
and no necessary conflict of interest, for there is no duty of undivided 
loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries that would be underrnined 
by the fiduciary's obligations to the sponsor. The duty of loyalty to 
the program of providing benefits is consistent with a generalized loy-
alty of the fiduciary to the sponsor. The consistency of the two should 
be obvious from the fact that the sponsor established and maintains 
the program of paying benefits, and that the sponsor appointed the 
fiduciary to the position of responsibility for it, presumably with the 
hope and expectation that the fiduciary would carry out those respon-
sibilities. Conflicts, of course, can arise in such a case, but conflicts of 
some kind can arise no matter who the fiduciary happens to be.123 
ii. The Duty to Follow Plan Documents 
Another fiduciary duty is the duty to act "in accordance with the 
documents and instruments goverrring the plan insofar as such docu-
874, cert. denied,- 110 S. Ct. 158 (1989) (compensatory damages not available under 
§ 502(a)(3)); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F .. 2d 821, 824-25 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988) (compensatory damages not available under § 502(a)(3)). 
But see Warren v. Society Nat'l Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990) (allowing claim for 
compensatory damages against administrator under § 502(a)(3)). The only compensa ... 
tory relief available under ERISA inures to the benefit of the plan. See ERISA 
§ 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). See generally Section I(F), infra notes 134-146 and 
• accompanYing text. 
121. ERISA § 4(l8(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3). 
122. E.g., Fischel & Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction~· The Exclusive 
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. 'L'! REv. 1105, 1126 (1988). 
123. Fischel and Langbein propose to resolve this and other perplexities relating to 
the ERISA fiduciary's duty of loyalty by "apply[ing] the exclusive benefit rule in a fash-
ion that recognizes that for -some purposes the employer is also a beneficiary of the pen-
sion plan." Fischel & Langbein, supra note 122, at 1128. This artificial proposal cannot 
possibly be squared with the statutory language defining "beneficiary." ERISA § 3(8), 29 
u.s.c. § 1002(8). ' 
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ments and instruments are consistent" with ERISA.124 The duty pro-
motes the policy behind the writing requirement (which itself is 
designed to help ensure proper fiduciazy conduct), 125 and is designed 
to prevent the kinds of deviations from written instruments that were 
permitted by the com•non law of trusts. 
One consequence of the duty is to give an itnportant role to attor-
neys in plan management and administration. The construction and 
interpretation of legal documents is an activity within the special ex-
pertise of attorneys. The peril to a fiduciary in failing to act in accord-
ance with plan documents can be great; it may lead to a suit for 
breach of fiduciary duty and concomitant exposure to huge liability. 
Thus, fiduciaries have great incentive to rely on the opinion of legal 
counsel as to the propriety of actions that might be questioned. In 
very difficult cases, the fiduciary may even deem it prudent to petition 
a court for instructions as to how to proceed 126 a course of -conduct 
that also calls for the involvement of an attorney. 
b. Prohibited Transactions 
ERISA recognizes that plans will engage in business and invest-
ment activities in order to increase the funds available to pay benefits 
and as part of the day-to-day management and administration of the 
plan. ERISA contains a set of rules to govern the plan's business 
• • • act1vtt1es. 
First, ERISA identifies a class of persons called "parties in inter-
est."t27 A party in interest is a person who potentially has power, 
directly or indirectly, to influence the plan. Parties in interest include 
the employer of the participants, any union that represents_ them, and 
.anyone who provides services to the plan. It also includes controlling 
persons, partners, related business entities, relatives, officers, directors 
and employees of any of the foregoing~ 128 The plan's business deal-
ings with these persons are subject to special rules. 
The rules are called "prohibited transaction" rules. 129 They pro-
124. ERISA§ 404(a)(l)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l)(D). 
125. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. 
126. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989). 
127. ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14). 
128. The definition of "party in interest" also includes fiduciaries, but it is confusing 
and unnecessary to treat a fiduciary also as a party in interest. In this article, the term 
"party in interest" will mean a party in interest who is not a fiduciary. 
129. The Internal Revenue Code contains parallel prohibitions in I.R.C. § 4975, 26 
u.s.c. § 4975. 
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hibit sales, leases, loans, services, transfers of assets, and stock trans-
actions between a plan and a party in interest, 130 unless the 
transaction meets statutory or administrative criteria of propriety.131 
These rules do not invalidate or otherwise prohibit the transactions, 
however. Instead, they merely prohibit fiduciaries from causing 
or per1nitting the plan to engage in the various prohibited 
transactions.I32 
F. Enforcement 
Pre-ERISA enforcement mechanisms were scattered, just as 
were pre-ERISA fiduciary standards. State law and the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act provided some remedies, but, for the reasons 
discussed above, did not do so comprehensively or etrectively.133 En-
forcement of the fiduciary standards contained in the tax code was 
inherently troublesome, because the only remedy for a violation was 
disqualification of the plan · a remedy that harmed participants and 
beneficiaries as much as it punished wrongdoing employers and 
fi.duciaries. 13-4 
To strengthen the enforcement scheme, ERISA made two sub-
stantial changes: it created an arsenal of remedies for participants, 
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries to use in redressing wrongs to the plan; 
and it gave a substantial enforcement role to the Department of La-
bor. As an early House report explained: 
The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to pro-
vide the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad 
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the Act. The 
intent of the Com1nittee is to .provide the full range of legal and 
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to 
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past 
appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary respon-
sibilities under state law for recovery of benefits due 
participants.135 
130., ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C~ § 1106(a). 
. . 
131._ ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108. 
132. ERISA § 406(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a). 
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
134. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., lst Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2351 and in 1974 U.S .. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4642. 
135. H.R~ REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in· II LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 2364 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4655. 
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ERISA contains certain specialized enforcement mechanisms, in-
cluding criminal penalties, 136 civil penalties, 137 special taxes, 138 and 
arbitration provisions. 139 The central enforcement provisions, 
though, are the civil liability provisions of section 502(a). Those pro-
visions are as follows: 
A civil action may be brought: 
(1) by a participant or beneficiary (A) for the relief provided for 
in subsection (c) of this section, or (B) to recover benefits due to 
him under the ter1ns of his plan, to enforce his rights under the 
tertns of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under 
the ter1ns of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary [of Labor], or by a participant, beneficiary or 
fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 409; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, (A) to enjoin any act 
or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of 
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title 
or the terms of the plan; 
(4) by the Secretary [of Labor] or by a participant, or beneficiary 
for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1 05( c); 
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), by the Secretary 
[of Labor] (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any pro-
vision of this title, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable re-
lief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of 
this title; or 
(6) by the Secretary [of Labor] to collect any civil penalty under 
subsection (i). 140 
An extensive body of case law has developed that applies and 
gives meaning to these provisions. For purposes of this article, only a 
few points are important. 
First, an action by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits 
under ERISA section 502(a)(l)(B) differs in important ways from an 
action for breach of fiduciary duty under section 502(a)(2), (3) or (5). 
An action for benefits is brought to correct a supposed wrong by the 
plan to a participant or beneficiary. An action for breach of fiduciary 
duty is brought to remedy a supposed wrong to the plan by a fiduci-
136. ERISA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 1131. 
137. ERISA § 502(i) & (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(i) & (1). 
138. I.R.C. § 4971 ff. 
139. ERISA§ 4221, 29 U.S.C. § 1401. 
140. ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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ary. 141 Thus, a benefit claim is brought on the participant's behalf 
and a fiduciary claim is brought on the plan's behalf. Individual bene-
fits are sought in the former ,action, while damages or equitable relief 
on behalf of the plan are sought in the latter. 
Second, Congress intended the enforcement mechanisms under 
ERISA to be interprete,d and applied expansively, and one must guard 
against too crabbed an interpretation of section 502(a). In Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 142 the Supreme Court 
stated that the six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions 
found in 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted provide strong evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it 
simply forgot to incorporate expressly,143 and professed to be "reluc-
tant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident 
care as the one in ERISA,"144 As a result of this emphasis on the 
comprehensiveness of ERISA's "enforcement scheme,'' some courts 
have read section 502(a) very narrowly to prohibit any remedy that 
Congress .did not expressly provide.145 
One must be careful not to misapply the Supreme Court's point. 
It is true that the civil enforcement provisions of section 502(a) are, in 
some respects, "comprehensive." It is also true that to ~'tamper" with 
the enforcement scheme in section 502(a) is to risk contravening con-
gressional intent. But unless providing ,a certain remedy can be 
deemed "tampering'' with the ''scheme" of section 502(a), it is not 
prohibited under Russell's reasoning. Thus, it is important to under-
stand the sense in which section 502(a) may be said to be 
"comprehe.nsive." 
What is the enforcement scheme of section 502(a) that may not 
be tampered with? It surely is not a scheme for all remedies relating 
to benefit plans. ERISA itself contains others, as does the Labor 
Management Relations Act146 and (as we shall see below) federal 
common law. Thus, section 502(a) is not comprehensive in any abso-
lute sense. It is substantially comprehensive only in the areas of bene-
fit claims ,and private civil remedies against plan fiduciaries. The 
141. See Russell, 473 U.S .. 134; Lister v. Stark, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 
1611, 1616--17 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
142. 473 u.s. 134. 
143. /d. at 146 (emphasis in original). 
144. Id. at 147. 
145. E.g., Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1991). 
146. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). 
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scheme of remedies, so understood, should not be tampered with be-
cause it can sensibly be understood to strike a balance between two 
competing policies: facilitating redress of wrongs while lirniting or 
controlling potential costs to plan sponsors. But it is obvious that 
per1nitting other kinds of claims will not necessarily upset the balance 
and the i1nplicit scheme of section 502(a), and so may not be disal-
lowed by Russell's logic. 
II. THE SOURCES OF LAW FOR ERISA PLAN ATTORNEYS 
Our concern in this article is the ERISA plan attorney. As we 
explained above, the reason for attending to the subject is that a plan 
attorney may be extremely influential in helping fiduciaries properly 
to conduct the affairs of the plan. His activities may involve in-
deed, to the extent he gives legal advice, should involve the exercise 
of discretion. 147 As explained above, while the blanket exclusion of 
plan attorneys, acting as such, from the class of ERISA fiduciaries is 
certainly consistent with the language of ERISA, it is not compelled 
by it. 148 But correct or incorrect, the i1n1nediate result is that ER-
ISA's fiduciary rules do not apply to plan attorneys. What, then, are 
the legitimate sources of rules that 1night govern the conduct of these 
important plan actors? 
A. ERISA Fiduciary Rules 
Although a plan attorney, qua plan attorney, is not an ERISA 
fiduciary, 149 he is a party in interest.150 Accordingly, his dealings with 
147. See~ e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 2.1 ("(i]n repre-
senting a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment"); L. P A TIER-
SON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY Pt. 11-4 (1982) 
(''[t]he task of lawyering ... has always required the lawyer to exercise discretion"); C. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 4.2-4 .. 3 (1986) (reviewing decisionmaking author-
ity of attorneys). 
148. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. 
149. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5, at D-1. See Yeseta v. Baima, 837 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 
1988) (attorney who reviewed plan and its compliance with ERISA was not fiduciary); 
Useden v. Acker, 721 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (law firm providing legal counsel to 
plan was not fiduciary); Anoka Orthopedic Assocs .. v. Mutschler, 709 F. Supp. 1475 (D. 
Minn. 1989), aff'd, 910 F. 2d 514 (8th Cir. 1990). 
Of course an attorney may be a fiduciary with respect to a plan by virtue of other 
non-legal responsibilities; for example, be may regularly provide investment advice for a 
fee. But that situation presents issues different from those of concern here. See generally 
Note, Attorney's Liabilities Under ERISA, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 129 (1979). 
150. ERISA § 3(14){A) & (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A) & (B). 
1990] Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys 1083 
the plan do fall within the scope of the prohibited transaction rules. 
In particular, they fall within the scope of the prohibition concenting 
a party in interest's providing legal services to a plan151 unless the 
services are "necessary for the establishment or operation of the plan" 
and the compensation paid for it is "reasonable."1s2 This is the total-
ity of ERISA's regulation of plan attorneys. 
B. State Law: Preemption 
Since ERISA provides virtually no rules to govern plan attorney 
conduct, one normally would look to state law for guidance. Under 
state law, an attorney has well-delineated fiduciary, 153 professional154 
and other obligations155 to clients, benefit plans and plan fiduciaries 
would seem perfectly capable of being clients. A central feature of 
ERISA, however, makes problematic the applicability of state attor-
ney-client law to the conduct of ERISA plan attorneys. 
1. The Expansiveness of ERISA Preemption 
The problem arises because ERISA undoubtedly contains the 
most expansive preemption clause found in any federal statute.156 
Section 514(a) provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, ER-
ISA "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."157 "State law" is de-
fined to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State 
action having the effect of law, of any State.''tss 
Because ERISA preemption arises from an express statutory pro-
151. ERISA § 406(a)(1){C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C). 
152. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2). 
153. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N.E.2d 785 (1950). 
154. See generally G. HAzARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 
1990). 
155. See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989). 
156. An express preemption provision, nearly as expansive as ERISA's is contained 
in the Federal Aviation Act, as amended, which provides that: 
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate agency or other 
political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regu-
lation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to 
rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority ... to provide air 
• transportation. 
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(l) (1985). See, e.g., Anderson v. USAir, Inc~, 818 F.2d 49, 57 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (state tort suit arising out of discourteous service would be preempted). 
157. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
158. ERISA § 514(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c). 
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• 
vision, rather than by implication, its scope is determined by the clear 
statutory language, rather than by the accommodation of state and 
federal concerns in individual cases. 159 Congress has already balanced 
state and federal interests on a wholesale basis. Thus, Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the preemption clause have made clear that this 
language must be applied literally, and that the key term, "relate to," 
must be given its "broad common sense meaning"160 of having "a 
connection with or reference to" a plan.161 Applying this literal stan-
dard, courts have found a wide variety of state laws to be preempted 
- to the extent they relate to employee benefit plans that on their 
face appear to have nothing to do with such plans. Among the sub-
jects found to be preempted have been probate law, 162 contract law,t63 
trust and fiduciary law,164 tort law,165 wrongful discharge law,166 es-
cheat law,167 bankruptcy exemption law,168 and workers compensa-
tion law.169 The result in an individual case may be counterintuitive. 
For example, in Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency,110 the Supreme 
Court was called on to deternline whether ERISA preempted a provi-
sion of a state garnishment law that expressly exempted employee 
159. As is often appropriate for the analysis of implied preemption. See, e.g., Ar-
kansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm., 461 U.S. 375 (1983). See gener-
ally L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 499-500 (2d ed. 1988). 
160. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987). See Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983). 
161. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. 
162. MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987); Board of Trustees 
of W. Conf. of Teamsters Pension Fund v. H.F. Johnson, Inc., 830 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
163. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Cefalu, 871 F.2d 
1290; Anderson v. John Morrell & Co., 830 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1987). 
164. Ingersoll-.Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990); Perry v. P*I*E Na-
tionwide, Inc., 872 F.2d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1166 (1990); 
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 425 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988). 
165. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58; Straub v. Western Union. Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262 (lOth 
Cir. 1988); Farlow v. Union. Cent. Life Ins. Co., 874 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1989). 
166. Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 800 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 888 
(1985); Sorosky v. Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 1987); Pratt v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 991, 998 (D. Md. 1987). 
167. Attorney Gen. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d 
54 (1988). Contra, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 57 (1989). 
168. Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re Dyke), 99 Bankr. 343, 352 (S.D. Tex. 1989). 
169. Pacific Bell v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1603, 1615, 231 
Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-92 (1986). 
170. 486 u.s. 825 (1988). 
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benefit plans from garnishment orders. Clearly, the state was trying 
to prevent its garnishment law from relating to employee benefit 
plans. The Supreme Court nevertheless held the exemption to be pre-
empted because, on its face, it referred to employee benefit plans, and 
as such "relate[d] to" them. 171 
Without doubt, such rampant preemption was a result intended 
by Congress: it does not stem from judicial activism172 or judicial 
mistake. The early versions of the bills that became ERISA would 
have limited the statute's preemption to state laws, only "insofar as 
they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and dis-
closure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit 
plans";173 or to state laws only "insofar as they may now or hereafter 
relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act ... ";174 or with analogous subject mat-
171. The Court's conclusion here nicely demonstrates the fallacy of mechanically 
reasoning about preemption. The state could just as well have indirectly exempted bene-
fit plans from garnishment by listing the proper subjects of garnishment orders, and fail-
ing to include benefit plans. There would be no improper reference to employee benefit 
plans and thus, it would appear, no ground for preemption. Yet, if the state can exempt 
plans from garnishment orders by omission, it surely should be able to exempt them by 
express statement as well. It is the consequences of a law that should matter; not its 
syntax. 
The Court also held in Mackey that the state's general garnishment law was not 
preempted to the extent that it related to welfare benefit plans because of evidence in the 
text of ERISA that Congress intended to permit garnishment in such cases. Four Jus-
tices dissented from this holding. See id. at 841(Kennedy, Blackmun, O'Connor, and 
Scalia, J.J., dissenting). 
172. To the contrary, judicial activism in this area generally finds expression in arti .. 
ficiallimits on preemption, devised in order to avoid an unsympathetic or undesirable 
result. See generally Hutchinson & lfshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 96 U. CHI. L. REv. 23 (1978); Kilberg 
& Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of 
ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1313 (1984). To take just one example, in Green-
blatt v. Budd Co., 666 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1987), an employee whose company was 
acquired allegedly was told by the new employer that his pension benefits would be in-
creased to the level of benefits provided to comparable employees of the acquiring com-
pany. The promise was not fulfilled, and the employee sued, inter alia, for state law 
misrepresentation. Ignoring a plethora of contrary precedent, the court held the misrep· 
resentation claim not to be preempted, mainly because the employee otherwise would be 
left without a remedy. Id. at 742. But absence of remedy is not a legitimate factor in the 
analysis, since it is clear, from other provisions of ERISA, that Congress intended there 
to be no monetary remedy in such cases. See, e.g., Cefalu, 871 F.2d at 1296. 
173. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 114 (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 51. 
174. S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 602(a) (1973), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 186. In addition to S. 4, the Senate also considered S. 1557, which 
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ter limitations.175 It was not until the Senate and House bills emerged 
from the Conference Committee that the section on preemption was 
amended. to its current sweeping form. 176 The purpose of the· atnend"" 
ment was explained as follows by one of ERISA's sponsors: 
Both House and Senate bills provided. for preemption of State law, 
but with one major exception appearing in the House bill -
defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regu-
lated by the bill. Such a fortnulation raised the possibility of end-
less litigation over the validity of State action that 1night impinge 
on Federal regulation, as well as opening the door to multiple and 
potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal with 
some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans 
not clearly connected to the Federal regulatory scheme. 
Although the desirability of further regulation at either the 
State or Federal level undoubtedly warrants further attention, 
on balance, the emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Fed-
eral interest and the interests of unifortnity with respect to inter-
state plans required · but for certain exceptions the 
displacement of State action in the field of private employee benefit 
programs.177 
Congress recognized that such a novel, sweeping provision could 
generate unexpected results, and that those results would have to be 
evaluated subsequently. Thus, the atnended bill also provided for the 
establisl}ment of a Joint Pension Task Force to study the conse-
quences of the preemption provision, as well as other provisions 
which were also deemed to warrant further consideration.178 As was 
contained preemption language identical to that in H.R. 2. See I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 22, at 319. 
175. E.g., H.R. 12906, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 514, reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE His .. 
TORY, supra note 22, at 2920--21. 
176. H. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1974), reprinted in III LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4357 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5162. 
177. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 4770-71 (remarks of Sen. Javits). See also id. at 29933, III LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4745-46 (remarks of Sen. Williams); 120 CONG. REC. 
29,197 (Aug. 20, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4670 
(remarks of Rep. Dent). 
178. H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 205-06, 360-61, 383 (1974) 
-reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4476-77, 4627-28, 4650. ER-
ISA § 3022 provides that, within 24 months of the enactment of ERISA, the Task Force 
shall "make a full study and review of . . . the effects and desirability of the Federal 
preemption of State and local law with respect to matters relating to pension and similar 
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explained to the Senate: 
The conferees recognizing the ditnensions of such a policy -
also agreed to assign the congressional Pension Task Force the re-
sponsibility of studying and evaluating preemption in connection 
with State authorities and reporting its findings to the Congress. If 
it deter1nines that the preemption policy devised has the effect of 
precluding essential legislation at either the State or Federal level, 
then appropriate modifications can be made.179 
2. Limits to ERISA Preemption 
But, even if the language and legislative history of ERISA re-
quire extremely broad preemption, beyond the statute's express sub-
jects, tso preemption still cannot be limitless. It would be impractical, 
if not absurd, to apply the ''relate to'·' language as far as semantic 
considerations alone might allow. To do so would place all persons 
connected with a plan, merely because they are connected with the 
plan, in ''a fully insulated legal world"181 where ERISA alone is the 
law and where all state regulation of them is ousted. This surely is 
not a result that a rational Congress would have intended.182 But 
plans,'' and report the results to the committees. No report of the Task Force was ever 
submitted. For a review of Congressional consideration ofthe preemption provision after 
the enactment of ERISA, see Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and 
Statutory Rigidity, 19 MICH. Jtt OF L. & REFORM 109, 114-16, 148-56 (1985). 
179. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 4771 (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
180. Some courts particularly state-courts · still fail to understand or to accept 
the fact that preemption extends beyond the subjects explicitly addressed by ERISA. See. 
e.g., Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied; 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Smith v. Crowder Jr.,-Co .. , 280 Pa. Super._ 626, 421 A.2d 
1107, 1113 (1980). 
181. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 
1008 (1985). 
182. Actually, there is an approach to preemption analysis, on the basis of which 
such limitless preemption would make sense. As we shall see below, because in much of 
the area where ERISA preempts state law whatever that area might be ERISA 
provides no rule of conduct, courts must supply rules through the common law process. 
In framing a federal common law rule, a court always has the option of incorporating the 
ousted state law rule, and making it the federal standard. Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U"S. 448 (1957); Mishkin, The Variousness o/ 1Pederal Law'~· Compe-
tence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. 
REV. 797 (1957). Thus, the "relate to" language can be construed literally, provided that 
the question of where preemption reasonably should end is replaced by the question of 
-where federal courts should begin to incorporate state law wholesale as rules of decision. 
The difference between the two approaches is that, under the current one, the applicable 
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where does one draw the line? 
In drawing the line, one must be careful not overly to limit the 
scope of preemption~ For although Congress did not intend to create 
a fully insulated legal world around a benefit plan, it surely did intend 
to insulate plans from state law within a very substantial domain, one 
broader than the subjects of ERISA alone. The task, then, is to define 
a boundary for the exclusion of state regulation, which lies beyond the 
express scope of ERISA, but only at a reasonable distance beyond 
it.183 
The Unavailability of a State-Interest Test 
The difficulty is that the boundary cannot be fixed as it is 
tempting to do at a supposed line where state interests become so 
compelling that federal regulation should not intrude. The language 
and legislative history of the statute simply will not per,1nit the courts 
to balance state and federal interests in individual cases, because Con-
gress_ has already done the balancing for them. Most courts have re-
sisted the temptation to set the bounds of preemption this way. 
Some courts, though, have unwittingly used a disguised state in-
terest test, and have upheld state laws relating to plans that should 
have been found preempted. The disguised state-interest approach 
has been used mainly in cases in which the person whose conduct is of 
concern simultaneously has both a substantial role in a benefit plan 
and a signi:fic_ant role outside it. The _approach purports to examine 
the "capacity', in which that person acts, or else his "relationship" to 
other parties in a given case. The purpose of the examination is to 
determine whether the capacity or relationship,-in that case, is, in its 
essential respects, a state or an ERISA one. 
A leading example of this approach is Sommers Drug Stores Co. 
Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc. 184 In Cor-
rigan, a plan was a minority stockholder of the employer" The plan 
alleged that the employer and one of its directors had violated ERISA 
and had breached state corporate law fiduciary duties by inducing the 
plan to sell its stock back to the employer _at an unfair price. The 
state standards are part of state law, whereas on the alternative they become part of 
federal law., Nothing in thi$ article turns on which approach is chosen. 
183. For an effort to define the boundary systematically, see Kilberg & Inman, supra 
note 172. 
184. 793 F.2d 1456 (Sth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987). 
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employer and director were ERISA fiduciaries. 185 The trial court had 
ruled that the state law fiduciary claims were preempted by ERISA. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the state corpo-
rate fiduciary law in question "centers on the relation between corpo-
rate director and shareholder" and that "the law imposes the duty 
upon [the director] in that capacity only." Since the state law duty 
was not itnposed on the defendants in their capacities as ERISA fidu-
ciaries, the court reasoned that the law did not relate to the plan so as 
to be preempted.186 Similar reasoning can be found in other cases.187 
The analysis has a superficial plausibility, but it plainly begs the 
question. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that state cor-
poration law imposed obligations on the defendants only by virtue of 
their corporate status. But making the point adds nothing to the anal-
ysis, for ERISA preemption extends to many state laws that impose 
duties on a person in some state law capacity. 188 An easy example is 
state negligence law. It" imposes liability on a person solely in his ca-
pacity as a person under a state law duty of care. But the mere fact 
that the duty of care "centers" on a purely state relationship does not 
save from preemption a state law negligence suit against a plan ad-
ministrator for malfeasance in processing a benefit claim. 189 Indeed, 
because the negligence suit does relate to a plan, ERISA not only 
preempts the suit, it preempts the state-created status (person with 
duty of care) to the same extent as well. Thus, the Corrigan court 
begged the question indeed erred by failing to realize that ER-
ISA might preempt the state corporate fiduciary status on which the 
state fiduciary duty "centered." 
b. The Remoteness Test and Practical Rules 
The Supreme Court has suggested an approach to defining the 
185. However, it was unclear whether they were fiduciaries with respect to the sale 
of the stock. The case was remanded for a determination of that issue, because of im-
proper jury instructions on the functional limitations of ERISA fiduciary responsibility. 
Corrigan, 793 F.2d at 1470. 
186. 793 F.2d at 1468. 
187. E.g., Williams v. Cypert, 708 F. Supp .. 229 (W.D. Ark. 1989). 
188. If a state imposed duties on a person or plan because of his or its ERISA status, 
the law would, of course, be preempted; indeed, that would be an easy case. But ERISA 
preemption is not limited to state laws that so explicitly affect ERISA plans. 
189. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58. See also Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1095 
(9th Cir. 1985) (since state suit "originates from the handling and disposition" of a claim 
for benefits, it is preempted, even though it is brought against defendants "in their capac-
ity as employer ... and seemingly concerns the employment relationship"). 
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limits of preemption. It has stated, albeit in dictum, that some state 
laws "may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or 
peripheral a fashion to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the 
plan."190 Unfortunately, the Court has not had occasion to apply 
those concepts to save a state law from preemption on grounds that, 
even though it related to an employee benefit plan, it did so too re-
motely. Few lower courts have had the opportunity to apply the "re-
moteness test'' either.191 Necessarily, the test must be construed as 
one that seeks to interpret congressional intent; 192 in difficult cases, 
the focus must be on whether Congress would reasonably have in-
tended preemption to extend so far. 193 
Most cases, though, do not require application of a remoteness 
standard. Whether a state law is preempted usually can be easily de-
termined, by reference to the articulated concerns of Congress or by 
application of one of the narrower tests used in cases of implied pre-
emption. It is obvious, for example, that any state law which imposes 
standards or requirements inconsistent with ERISA is preempted. 
For instance, in Alessi v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 194 the Supreme 
Court held that an ERISA method of calculating pension benefits pre-
empted a New Jersey law that proscribed the same manner of 
calculation. 
Inconsistency with ERISA, of course, is not the touchstone for 
preemption. A broader rule used by courts, but one which still does 
not exhaust the scope of preemption, is that ERISA preempts any 
state law which purports to regulate the subjects ofERISA,195 such as 
190. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21. 
19L See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 142 (state escheat statute); Quigley v. 
Unum Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd mem., 887 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 
1989); Cornell Mfg. Co. v. Mushlin, 70 A.D.2d 123, 420 N.Y .. S.2d 231 (1979) (claim 
against corporate officers for waste of assets by making improper contributions to pension 
plan; "the involvement of the pension plan .... was at most incidental"); Lynn v. Allied 
Corp., 41 Ohio App. 3d 392, 395, 536 N.E.2d 25, 30 (1987) (state law claims for emo-
tional distress resulting from telephone call to hospitalized plan participant about early 
retirement benefit: ''[t]his incident .•• affects ERISA too remotely or tenuously to be 
considered related to ERISA,). 
192. "[T]he question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is 
one of congressional intent. 'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.~ " 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 45. See also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S.Ct. 403, 407 (1990). 
193. Cefalu, 371 F.2d at 1294. 
194. 451 u.s. 504 (1981). 
195. MacLean, 831 F.2d at 727; In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1191 
(6th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1470 (llth Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987). · 
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funding, 196 adrninistration,197 vesting,198 reporting, or fiduciary du-
ties.199 Laws of this character are preempted, even if application of 
them would effectuate ERISA's policies in the subject area.200 
Another rule of preemption often used by courts is that any 
clai1n over which there is subject matter jurisdiction under ERISA 
section 502(a) is ipso facto an ERISA claim, and purported state law 
causes of action for that claim are preempted.201 As the Supreme 
Court emphasized in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux:202 
[T]he detailed provisions of § 502{a) set forth a comprehensive 
civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the 
need for prompt and fair clairns settlement procedures against the 
public interest in encouraging the for1nation of employee benefit 
plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain reme-
dies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be 
completely under1nined if ERISA-plan participants and benefi-
ciaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress 
rejected in ERISA. "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement 
provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ... 
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize 
other remedies that it siinply forgot to incorporate expressly."203 
As a result, any state law clairn alleging a wrong in the payment or 
nonpayment of benefits by a plan, or wrongful conduct by a fiduciary 
in the course of administration of the plan, is preempted. 204 This is so 
even if ERISA provides no remedy for the alleged wrong.205 For ex-
atnple, state law tort or contract actions by beneficiaries, which seek 
196. E.g., Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus. Journeyman & Appren-
tices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Canst. Co., 846 F.2d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 488 
U.S. 881 (1988) (state law requiring minimum contribution levels). 
197. Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990); Powell v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co. Va., 780 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1985). 
198. E.g., Rasmussen v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497 (W.D. La. 1987). 
199. Muscar v. Arco Chem. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1164, 1165-66 (W.D. Pa. 1986). 
200. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 
(3d Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 491 (1984). 
201. Thus, a putative state law claim seeking benefits from a plan is an ERISA 
claim, and may be removed from state to federal court. See, e.g., Taylor, 481 U.S. 58; 
Lister, 890 F.2d 941; Amos, 868 F.2d 430. 
However, ERISA does not preempt a state law claim merely because it is pendent to 
an ERISA claim. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1989). 
202. 481 u.s. 41 (1987). 
203. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 54 (citation omitted). 
204. See id. at 56; Taylor, 481 U.S. at 62-63. 
205. See Phillips, 199 F .2d at 14 70. 
• 
·-
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benefits based on an oral promise or representation, are preempted, 
even though ERISA has generally been held to bar any action to en-
force a purported oral term or oral modification of a plan. 206 
Together, these rules just described cover most cases, but not all. 
It is only in cases where a state law arguably relates to a plan, where 
there is no corresponding regulation under ERISA, where there is no 
obvious conflict with any ERISA policy, and where there is a strong 
state interest in the subject, that preemption questions become diffi-
cult and -a standard of remoteness will come into play.2o7 
3. Preemption of State Laws Governing ERISA Plan Attorneys 
No reported federal court decision has yet addressed the issue of 
whether ERISA preempts any state laws governing plan attorneys.2°8 
The case for sweeping preemption, though, is sufficiently clear that 
the remoteness test is not even required to evaluate the result. 
206!1 E.g., Lister, 890 F .. 2d 941;- Cefalu, 871 F .. 2d 1290; Straub, 851 F.2d 1262; 
Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 19·86). But see Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 
900 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1990) (estoppel principles are applicable to claims for benefits 
under unfunded single-employer welfare benefit plans). 
201. It is in these difficult cases, which the rules of analysis just discussed do not 
reach, that it may be proper to consider the intensity of the state interest in regulating the 
subject matter, as a factor bearing on "remoteness., See Aetna Lifo Ins.-Co., .869 F.2d 
142; .J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213. 
208. The Florida Supreme Court was recently presented with an argument that ER-
ISA would preempt a suggested bar regulation governing the unauthorized practice of 
pension plan law. While the court was receptive to the preemption argument, it chose to 
reject the proposed regulation on other grounds. 
In 'Florida State Bar re Advisory Opinion Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension 
Plans,- 571 So. 2d 430 (1990), a committee of the Florida State Bar had presented an 
advisory opinion to the Court for approval. The opinion sought to define the unauthor-
ized practice of law with respect to pension plans, and would have prohibited nono·law-
yer professionals (such as certified public accountants, actuaries, pension consultants, and 
insurance underwriters) from selecting and drafting plans for clients, .qualifying the plan 
before the Internal Revenue Service, and terminating a plan. Non-lawyer professional 
organizations argued that, because ERISA itself regulated some aspects of non ... Iawyer 
practice, the proposed regulation was preempted. The court reviewed the extensive fed-
eral regulation of pension plan practice by accountants and actuaries, but declined to rest 
its detet1nination on preemption grounds. Instead, it concluded that: 
[W]e find that our authority is restricted because much of the practice in this 
field of law is before administrative agencies, and we are not convinced by this 
record that there exists a public need for the protection sought in this proposed 
opinion. Consequently, at this time, we find that we should disapprove the pro-
posed opinion. 
571 So. 2d at 433. On the other hand, courts in New Jersey and New York have simply 
brushed aside the possibility of ERISA preemption .of state regulations of attorneys, after 
superficial consideration of the issue. See In re 1115 Legal Serv!' Care, 110 N.J. 344, 349 
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a. The Reasons for Preemption 
State laws that govern attorneys, in their representation of plans 
or plan fiduciaries, "relate to" employee benefit plans within the 
meaning of ERISA section 514(a). The relationship that is the focus 
of such laws has a plan or plan fiduciary as one of the two parties. 
The conduct sought to be regulated is conduct by the attorney that 
directly or indirectly affects the plan, its fiduciaries, its participants 
and others closely connected with the plan. Four major bodies of . 
state law purport to regulate that plan-related conduct: fiduciary law, 
tort law, agency law, and professional responsibility law. The first 
three are well-established and uncontroversial areas for expansive ER-
ISA preemption; the fourth area contains rules that are largely de-
rived from the first three. Application of the preemption provision to 
plan attorneys thus appears to present a straightforward case. 
Yet the case for preemption is made stronger still by several ad-
ditional considerations. One is that a plan attorney is a party in inter-
est and so his conduct is already expressly governed by ERISA under 
the prohibited transaction rules. One prohibited transaction rule that 
applies to every plan attorney is the prohibition of the "furnishing of 
[legal] services"209 unless the services are "necessary for the establish-
ment or operation of the plan"210 and unless "no more than reason-
able compensation is paid therefor."211 Since ERISA does regulate 
the furnishing of legal services to a plan, it follows from a basic rule of 
preemption that any state law which purports to regulate that same 
subject must be held to be preempted.212 It makes no difference that 
ERISA's regulation of attorney services is more limited than the body 
of state law it preempts. That is a common occurrence, since ERISA 
preemption in general is far broader than the statute's regulatory 
scope. 
n.2, 541 A.2d 673, 675 n.2 (1988); In re UAW Legal Servs. Plan, 69 A.D.2d·995, 416 
N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (1979) .. 
The only article to date that has been concerned with the law governing plan attor-
neys largely ignores the issue of preemption. See Note, Attorney's Liabilities Under ER-
ISA, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 129 (1979). 
209. ERISA § 406(a)(l)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(l){C) (1988). 
210. ERISA § 408(b)(2)lt 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1988). 
211. /d. 
212. Cf. Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (state law claims 
against non-fiduciary benefits administrator were preempted); Light v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Ala., 790 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1986); Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 
715 F. Supp 1021 (D. Kan. 1989). 
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A second consideration is that state rules and requirements for 
attorneys,- so far as they apply to plan attorneys; frequently conflict 
with ERISA's policies. For exatnple, as we shall see below,z13 ER-
ISA's policies require that plan attorneys take affirtnative steps to help 
rectify fiduciary breaches which they learn about, and that such steps 
may include, if necessary; disclosure of the wrong. This requirement 
is flatly inconsistent with standards of professional responsibility im-
posed by many states. To permit those state rules to set standards for 
plan attorneys would undermine ERISA's substantive policies. It 
would also subject attorneys for interstate plans to varying, and possi-
bly conflicting, requirements. These are precisely the results that ER-
ISA'S sweeping preemption rule was adopted to prevent. 
A third, and related, consideration is that the relationship be-
tween an attorney and his client is traditionally considered to be a 
fiduciary relationship.214 But a central purpose of ERISA was to fed-
eralize the law of fiduciary relationships_ with respect to a plan.21s In 
particular, ERISA's fiduciary policies, although derived from state 
tmst law, are to be developed and applied by federal courts with sensi-
tivity to the character of employee benefit plans. We have seen that 
plan attorneys, as persons who might well have been deemed ERISA. 
fiduciaries, may be within the ambit of ERISA's fiduciary policies. 
For the states to try to regulate the fiduciary relationship between 
plan attorneys and plans clearly threaten the full implementation of 
ERISA's fiduciary policies and purposes~216 
Finally, the legislative history of ERISA makes it clear that Con-
gress did intend to preempt some state regulation of plans in the form 
of state-enforced rules of professional responsibility. ERISA ex-
pressly includes prepaid legal services plans within the scope of its 
coverage,217 and Congress was concerned that state bar associations 
213. Section V(A), infra notes 404-441 and accompanying text. 
214. E.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989). 
215. Consistent with this result, suits alleging breach of state law fiduciary duty by 
persons connected with ERISA plans have generally been held to be preempted. E.g., 
Light v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986) (claim against 
plan administrator); Powell, 780 F.2d 419; Authier, 151 F.2d 796; Metzner, 663 F. Supp. 
716. Some courts have held such suits to be preempted even when brought against per-
sons who are not ERISA fiduciaries. See P*l*E Nationwide Inc., 872 F.2d 157; Muscar, 
647 F. Supp. 1164 (suit against employer). See also Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
915 F. 2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990)(suit against non-fiduciary claims handler for breach of duty 
of good faith). 
216. See Part IV; infra notes 357-403 and accompanying text~ 
217. ERISA § 3(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A) (1988). 
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would try (as they had been doing) to hinder the development of such 
plans through state-enforced disciplinary rules.218 Indeed, the per-
ceived need to preempt state professional rules that threatened to in-
terfere with the development of prepaid legal services plans appears to 
have been one of the main reasons that the Conference Committee 
expanded the scope of the preemption clause from the subjects of ER-
ISA alone, to all state laws which relate to plans.219 This aspect of 
ERISA preemption emerges clearly from an explanation of the new, 
broadened preemption provision, on the Senate floor: 
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in 
the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the confer-
ence substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regula-
tions, thus eliminating the threat of contlicting or inconsistent 
State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle 
is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or 
local govertunents, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the 
force or effect of law. Consistent with this principle, State profes-
sional associations acting under the guise of State-enforced profes-
sional regulation, should not be able to prevent unions and 
employers from maintaining the types of employee benefit pro-
grarns which Congress has authorized for example, prepaid 
legal services programs whether closed or open panel author-
ized by [ERISA].220 
Thus, state regulation of the practice of law was intended to be within 
the scope of ERISA's preemption provision. 
218. For a review of this legislative history, see Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Employee 
Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation, 1976 AM. B. 
FOUND. REs. J. 787, 80 l-03, 828-30. 
219. As Pfennigstorf & Kimball, supra note 218, explain: 
[W]hen in the course of the negotiations of the conference committee some par-
ticipants wanted to be sure the preemption would override the restrictive rules 
in state codes of professional responsibility that might prevent the establishment 
of closed panel legal service plans and doubts were expressed whether the 
phrase "relate to any employee benefit plan" in the preemption clause would 
cover ethical rules that were directed at lawyers and only indirectly affected 
employee benefit plans, the definitions of "state law" and "state" were added to 
the preemption section to eliminate doubt. 
/d. at 829. 
220. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,933 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in Ill LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 4745-46 (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
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b. Arguments Against Preemption 
Several reasons might be urged against preemption. None, 
though, is persuasive. 
First, it might be urged that state interest in attorney regulation 
is so intense as to preclude federal regulation. But as we have seen, 
this very form of argument is unavailable, since Congress has already 
made the policy choice to oust state laws that relate to benefit plans, 
irrespective of the intensity of state interest in the area. In any event, 
an unstated premise of the argument is false, since state interest in 
regulating attorneys is not obviously more intense than the federal 
interest in doing so. Federal courts, no less than state courts, have the 
power to regulate the conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before 
them.221 "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures 
and the federal judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct 
of ... lawyers."222 Congress itself has evinced substantial interest in 
regulating the practice of law in matters such as fees, provision of 
legal services to the poor, and other areas.223 So, too, has the execu-
tive branch, for example, through enforcement of the Sherman Act by 
the Justice Department,224 and through Federal Trade Cornmission 
enforcement activities. 225 Attorney regulation is very far from being 
the exclusive province of the states. 
Another argument that might be urged is that state laws govern 
attorneys only in their state-created status, as attorneys licensed to 
practice in the forum.226 This argutnent, too, is unavailing. As we 
221. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985); In re Com Derivatives Antitrust 
Litig., 748 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Cochrane & Bresnahan v. 
Plaintiff Class Representatives, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brew-
ing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Del. 1985). See also Grievance Comm. of United States 
Dist. Court, Dist. of Conn. v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988). 
222. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (state disbarment does not 
require federal disbarment). 
223. See generally Tunney & Frank, Federal Roles in Lawyer Reform, 27 STAN. L. 
REv. 333 (1975). 
224. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. American Bar Ass•n, (D.D.C. 1976) No. 
76 .. 1182, reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 980 (1976); DOJ Bids to Block ABA Rule Change, 
Legal Times, Feb. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1. 
225. E.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers' Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (con-
certed refusal to deal in order to raise hourly rates for services); FTC v. American Legal 
Distribs., Inc .. , 890 F.2d 363 (11th Cir. 1989) (fraudulent legal services program); FTC v. 
Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1980) (violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act). 
226. Cf. Feinstein v. Attorney General, 36 N.Y.2d 199, 206, 326 N.E.2d 288, 292, 
366 N.Y.S.2d 613, 618 (1975) (ERISA "may, perhaps, preempt the regulation of union 
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saw when analyzing the analogous reasoning of the Corrigan case, the 
argument shows only that if the state laws regulating attorneys do 
relate to the plan under the language of the preemption provision, the 
state laws creating the status may pro tanto be ousted as well. And as 
we shall see from the later discussion, ERISA may indeed be con-
strued to oust the state-law status of attorney (so far as the attorney 
represents the plan) and create a new status of plan attorney that is 
wholly federal in character. 
Another argument that might be raised is based on legislative 
history. When the final preemption provision emerged from the Con-
ference Conunittee, and it was made clear that the changes were 
adopted, in part, to prevent state interference with prepaid legal plans 
through standards of professional conduct, some concern was ex-
pressed on the Senate floor that ERISA might preempt general state 
rules of professional conduct for those attorneys who provide legal 
services through the prepaid plan. 227 The Senate sponsors made it 
clear that there would not be preemption in such cases. That conclu-
prepaid legal services plans, qua plans, but does not reach the professional licensure and 
regulation of lawyers, qua lawyers, who would render legal services under the plans."). 
227. The colloquy on the senate floor was as follows: 
MR. TAFT .... 
[W]hile there is preemption under section 514 of the substance of the pen-
sion legislation including the matter of provisions relating to attorneys 
services under employee benefit plans does this section 514 of the act seek 
to preempt State bar associations from adopting ethical rules or guidelines 
generally and/ or from disciplining its members? 
Some question arises in regard to that because of the remarks made indi-
cating that the preemption doctrine extended to rules of professional 
• • 
organtzattons. 
MR. JAVITS .... 
My answer to that is no. Section 514 of the act does not preempt State bar 
associations from adopting and enforcing ethical rules or guidelines gener-
ally and/ or from disciplining its members or acting to discipline members 
of the bar, which bar associations often do. 
Section 514 does preempt State law with respect to any employee benefit 
plan described in section 4(a) and not exempted in section 4(b). 
Since the plans subject to Federal supervision would include plans provid-
ing prepaid legal services, it is intended that State regulation but not bar 
association ethical rules, guidelines or disciplinary actions in regard to 
such plans be preempted. But the State, directly or indirectly through the 
bar, is preempted from regulating the fonn and content of a legal service 
plan, for example, open versus closed panels, in the guise of disciplinary or 
ethical rules or proceedings. 
120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,949 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 22, at 4789. 
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sion seems right, and from it, one Inight argue that state regulation of 
plan attorneys should also be saved from preemption. 
Such an argument would be incorrect. Merely because state 
rules governing attorneys are not generally preempted insofar as they 
govern attorneys who provide their services through a plan, it does 
not follow that those rules are not preempted insofar as they purport 
to regulate attorneys who provide services to ERISA plans. Plan at-
torneys have a very different relationship to a plan than do attorneys 
who perfortn ordinary legal services to ordinary clients, but through a 
prepaid legal services plan. The latter are either employees of a plan 
or persons with a contractual relationship to it.228 Rules of profes-
sional responsibility, as well as other state laws governing attorneys, 
are mainly concerned with attorneys' dealings with their clients, not 
with the attorneys' dealings with their employers. Accordingly, in the 
case of an attorney associated with a prepaid legal plan, the state rules 
may fairly be said to relate to the plan only tenuously.229 By contrast, 
the plan attorney is intitnately involved in the plan; indeed, he treats 
the plan or a plan fiduciary as his client. Thus, state rules and regula-
tions which govern his conduct as an attorney do govern his relation-
ship with the plan in a very direct way and, as we have seen, present a 
strong case for preemption. 
A final argument against preemption points to its consequences. 
An argument sometimes advanced against ERISA preemption is that 
it would leave a gap in the law: an unregulated area or a wrong with-
out a remedy.230 That argument might be thought to apply here, for 
if ERISA preempts all state laws gover11ing benefit plan attorneys, 
there would appear to remain a regulatory gap, ERISA itself estab-
lishing few relevant rules. The argument, however, ignores the proper 
role of federal common law. 
C. Federal Common Law as a Source of Law for ERISA Plan 
Attorneys 
Federal coxnmon law is law of the United States to the same ex-
228. See, e.g., F. MARKS, R. HALLAUER & R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: 
AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES 2-3 (1974). 
229. Of course, as the legislative history shows, where the state regulation does not 
relate to the plan only tenuously for example, where it would have the effect of 
preventing an attorney from providing services through a closed panel plan it is 
preempted. 
230. See~ e.g., Lister, 890 F.2d 941; Phillips, 199 F.2d at 1470. 
, 
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tent as is statutory law. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the 
Constitution,231 it is_ the "supreme law of the Land," applicable in all 
courts and governing all persons to the same extent as federal statu-
tory law.232 It preempts all inconsistent state laws, just as does federal 
statutory law.233 So .much is uncontroversial. Yet federal common 
law is misleadingly named234 and difficult to define.235 It is also an 
object of suspicion by some judges236 and academians.237 To under-
stand how federal coinJnon law may properly supply rules concerning 
plan attorneys, we must briefly examine what it is and what authority 
courts have to develop it. 
1. Federal Comm_on Law: An Overview 
a. Th_e Heterogeneity of Federal Common Law 
Federal common law is not easy to describe or to explain, pri-
marily because it forms such a motley assemblage. Some portions of 
federal common law closely resemble traditional common law, and 
warrant the "common law" appellation, for they constitute dynamic 
bodies of rules that emerge from judicial development of a few basic 
principles and policies. There are, for example, expansive, continually 
developing bodies of federal cotnmon law that deal respectively with 
_admiralty,23'8 Indian affairs,239 and collectively bargained labor con-
231. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution; and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 'fhing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding~"). 
232. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L~ REv. 381, 405, 407 (1964). 
233. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). However, in 
framing rules of decision, federal courts exercising their common lawmaking power may 
decide to follow the rules of the forum state, and not create a uniform, nationwide rule. 
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally Mishkin, 
The Variousness of 'Pederal Law'': Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National 
and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. R.Bv. 797 (1957). 
234. The Supreme Court once proposed that it might more accurately be called 
''law of independent federal judicial decision.', United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 
u.s. 301, 308 (1947). 
235. For efforts to do $0, seeP. BATOR, P~ MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, 
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSI"EM 770 (2d 
ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L .. REv. 881, 890-96 (1986). 
236. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
237. E.g., Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and Jhe Interpretive 
Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U .. L. REv. 761 (1989) .. 
238. See Moragne v. States Marine-Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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tracts;240 and each has been developed substantially through the tradi-
tional connnon law process,.241 But there are limits to this genre of 
federal common law. Courts have not developed bodies of federal 
conunon law whose rules systematically deal with fundamental and 
widely applicable topics such as contracts, torts, or agency.242 
Although there is federal common law covering, for example, certain 
collective bargaining agreements, government contracts, and oral set-
tlement agreements, there is no general federal c.ommon law of con-
tracts as exists in the states. The result, as the Supreme Court stated 
in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins., is that "[t]here is no federal general 
common law.,243 There are only areas where discrete topics of fed-
eral interest have been more or less broadly developed. 
Although these bodies of law governing specific topics of federal 
interest are the parts of federal common law best known and most 
discussed in the academic literature,244 the great bulk of federal com-
mon law actually consists of isolated rules, or groups of rules, devel-
239. See County of Oneida v .. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (198'5). 
240~ See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.,S, 448. 
241 ~ This list of such areas is not exhaustive. There are also, for example, well-
developed bodies of federal common law for oral settlement agreements, Mid-South Tow-
ing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc.1 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1984); Casey v. Illinois Cent. Gulf 
R.R., 687 F. Supp. 1112, 1114 (W.D. Ky. 1988); conversion of goods in international 
transport, Lerakoli, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 783 F.2d 33, 3'8 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 419 u.s. 827 (1986); fiduciary duties or officers and directors of federally 
chartered savings and loans, Eureka Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kidwell, 672 F. Supp. 436 
(N.D. Cal. 1987); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 
(N.D. Ill. 1975); and a wide variety of other matters. See generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. 
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 4514 (1982 & Supp. 1989). 
242. For a review of the failure of courts to unify the various subject-specific federal 
common law rules of alter-ego liability into a coherent set ofprinciples of general applica-
bility, see Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal 
Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1982}. 
243. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
244. Even more specifically, the bulk of academic discussion of federal common law 
centers on the few areas where the topic ofbroad lawmaking-is not clearly suggested by a 
statute or constitutional provision. SeeSI e.g., M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TEN-
SIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 79-107 (2d ed. 1989). 
It is true that the existence of these few areas raises interesting questions about the 
power and competence of federal courts to make "common law." But it is also true that 
these areas of common lawmaking are-only a very small part of the assemblage of federal 
common law. To let the analysis of them drive the analysis of the general authority and 
competence of courts to make federal common law is to invite distortion into the analysis. 
Even if it were agreed that federal common lawmaking in the areas as to which there 
is controversy were improper, there would be little; if any, impact on the issue of the 
propriety of courts to develop federal -common law of the far more common type dis-
cussed in this article. 
• 
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oped by courts to supplement or clarify a statute or statutory 
scheme.245 No statute can comprehend all the rules needed to regu-
late a given subject area. Gaps, oversights, and ambiguities are inevi-
table. Indeed, there are certain questions .· usually of a procedural 
character that Congress persistently neglects to attend to.246 
Courts must deal with these statutorily neglected questions. This "in-
terstitial" cornmon lawmaking is extremely cotninon and is essential 
to the successful implementation of many statutory programs.247 Yet 
the fact that courts engage in this form of comrnon lawmaking is so 
uncontroversial that little attention is ever paid to it. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to be aware that federal com-
mon law is a collection of rules, groups of rules, and bodies of rules, 
each part of which deals with a discrete area of federal interest. 
Although denominated "common law," it substantially lacks the col-
lections of rules of universal applicability that are the core concerns of 
traditional comtnon law. It also differs from traditional common law 
by so largely consisting of fragmentary sets of rules. It is heterogene-
ous in the subjects addressed and is heterogeneous in the degrees to 
which its parts resemble traditional cotnmon law. 
b._ The Written Bases for Federal Common Law 
The practical reason that federal cotnmon law has this heteroge-
neous character, and substantially omits systematic treatment of basic 
legal topics, is quite easy to diagnose. It lies in the jurisdictional de-
pendence of federal co1nmon law on federal written law. 
In principle, federal common law may be created by either a fed-
eral or state court. In practice, though, the overwhelming portion of 
it is developed by the federal courts.248 Even more specifically, the 
245. Little of the recent commentary on federal common law has anything to say 
about this extensive collection of discrete rules. Redish, supra note 244, ignores it as do 
Field, supra note 235, Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 805 (1989), 
and Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, ,52 U. CHI. L. REv.-1 (1985). 
The only extensive discussion of it appears to be the one contained in WRIGHT, MILLER 
& COOPER, supra note 241. 
246. Thus, for example, federal courts are often called on to determine the legal 
effect of a statutory prohibition, e.g., Deitrick v~ Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940); In re 
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp._ 22 (D. Mass. 1987), 
to supply limitations periods for a statutory cause of action, or even to supply claims, 
defenses; and procedural rules that are missing from a statutory framework, e.g., Sola 
Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). 
247. See Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U .. L. R.Bv. 1, 6-7 (1990). 
248.. This is not a necessary state of affairs. If state court lawyers and judges had 
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overwhelming portion of federal comrnon law is developed on occa-
sions where a federal court decides a case or controversy under its 
federal question jurisdiction. 249 Most cases "arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States,"250 and thus falling 
within the courts' federal question jurisdiction, arise under written 
federal law. As a result, federal common lawmaking is usually con-
tingent on there being a statute or other written provision that opens 
the door to federal court jurisdiction and federal court decision-mak-
ing.251 Thus, the subjects federal cotnmon law may address are 
largely confined to the subjects Congress chooses to enact legislation 
on. If not for ERISA, for exatnple, a federal common law of benefit 
plans probably would be impossible. 
The upshot of the present state of affairs is that written federal 
law is antecedent to federal common law: it is the precondition to 
most of federal common law and is the preexisting background 
against which it is developed. By contrast, in state legal systems, it is 
been trained to be more sensitive to the federal concerns involved in cases brought in state 
courts, they might by now have produced an expansive, state-court created, federal com-
mon law. For example, they might have created a federal common law of interstate 
transactions, of the kind the Supreme Court once hoped would be developed in diversity 
actions. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). But matters are otherwise. In the 
absence of a controlling federal statute, state courts invariably apply state law without 
giving much thought to the potential federal interest in the subject or the possibility of 
developing and applying federal common law. 
And if it is at least possible that state courts could have taken the initiative in creat-
ing federal common law, it is also possible that federal courts could have done so, as state 
court surrogates, in the course of deciding controversies under the grant of diversity juris-
diction. But again, matters are otherwise. Federal common law is rarely created in di-
versity cases. For cases where it has been, see~ e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
249. The federal common law of interstate relations is developed in cases as to 
which there is jurisdiction under the Constitution's grant of power to federal courts to 
hear ''Controversies between two or more States," U.S. CoNST. art. Ill,§ 2; and in these 
cases the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. Federal admiralty law which is 
almost exclusively common law is created in cases brought pursuant to the Constitu-
tion's grant of power to federal courts to hear "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction." U.S. CoNST. art. Ill,§ 2. And the common law of the rights and obligations of 
the United States is developed in cases brought pursuant to the Constitution's grant of 
power to federal courts to hear "Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
250. 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988). 
251. It is because of this critical dependence on codified law that there is no clear 
demarcation between federal common law and statutory construction. HART & WECHS-
LER, supra note 235, at 771; Field, supra note 235, at 893-94; Merrill, supra note 245, at 
3-7. 
1990] Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys 1103 
state comtnon law that is the preexisting background against which 
the state legislature legislates.252 Thus, state and federal comtnon law 
differ in this basic respect, that state and federal legal systems have 
foreground and background reversed. 
2. Preconditions to Development of Bodies of Federal Common Law 
This jurisdictional explanation of federal common law ultimately 
serves only to point to a deeper question: Why does federal cotntnon 
lawmaking in an area usually depend on prior congressional lawmak-
ing in the area? Why shouldn't federal common lawmaking more 
often proceed independently, or even in advance, of legislation, as is 
the case with state common lawmaking? After all, the Constitution 
does not expressly limit federal court common lawmaking, and it is 
doubtful that the Rules of Decision Act253 can be read as posing a 
significant litnitation, either.254 
The answer is far from clear. The most plausible explanation, 
though, is that the effective limitation of federal common lawmaking 
to areas of congressional lawmaking is an institutional, rather than a 
Constitutionallixnitation. That is to say, while federal courts, in prin-
ciple, have extensive cotninon lawmaking power arguably as exten-
sive as Congress's legislative power they have nonetheless evolved 
a pragmatic reluctance to develop federal common law, which has 
become an integral aspect of the federal judicial approach to deciding 
cases and controversies. This reluctance, in its application, yields the 
prevailing limitation. 
There are two aspects to this institutional reluctance. One in-
volves considerations of federalism. Federal courts conduct their Ar-
ticle III activities within the constraints of a political model in which 
state law (both statutory and cotnmon law)255 is taken as the preexist-
ing background against which all federal law both statutory and 
judicial is made.256 Federal lawmaking, whether legislative or judi-
252. See Field, supra note 235, at 885 n.ll. 
.. 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). The Act states, in pertinent part: "[T]he laws of the 
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of 
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil ac-
tions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." /d. 
254. See Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks 
Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 860 (1989). 
255. See Erie R.R., 304 U.S. 64. 
256. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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cial, often constitutes an invasien of this background legal corpus. 
Because of the supremacy clause, any such invasion necessarily ousts 
portions of state law. Now, it is taken as a principle of federalism that 
state interests, as reflected in state law, are not lightly to be invaded 
and ousted by federal lawmaking. In the case of legislation, there are 
safeguards to protect against ill-considered invasions. In particular, 
the representation of state interests in Congress serves as an internal 
restraint on excessive or objectionable federalization of an area. But 
there are no such internal restraints that govern federal courts. How, 
then, can federal courts respect the principle of federalism?257 
They can do so through self-restraint. One aspect of such re-
straint is institutional reluctance to develop federal common law. 
Formally, the reluctance manifests itself as a presumption against de-
veloping_ common law rules, particularly where such rules would 
trench on the state law background. Sometimes, this presumption is 
said to be more· than institutionally compelled, and to be a necessary 
result of the tenth .amendment258 or the Rules of Decision Act.259 But 
it is more accurate to say that those constitutional and statutory pro-
visions simply reflect the very satne principle of federalism, in further-
. ·. 
ance of which federal courts have devised their presumption. The 
provisions reflect the concerns underlying the presumption, but do 
not themselves demand it. 
Yet as the pervasiveness of federal common law makes plain, the 
presumption is not absolute. To overcome it, so as to be able to deem 
itself authorized to announce a rule of federal common law, a federal 
court need only find a proper justification for exercising its already 
existing lawmaking power in that instance. A meta-common law of 
federal common lawmaking has developed to deal with the question 
of what constitutes an acceptable justification. The basic rule is no 
more than distilled comtnon sense: to overcome the presumption 
against creating federal common law in an area, a necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition is a showing of preexisting federal interest in that 
area;260 and proof of such preexisting interest may most straightfor-
257. See generally Merrill, supra note_ 245, at 13-19. 
258. U~S. CONST. amend. X (''The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.''). 
259. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 {1988). 
260. See REDISH, supra note244, at 121 ("federal common law will be applied in a 
case only if there is an affirmative showing that federal interests are in some manner 
affected by the substantive legal principles that are to be employed."). 
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wardly be found in Congress's decision to legislate in the area.261 This 
is very much a pragmatic rule. If Congress has already legislated with 
respect to a subject, the states have already had the opportunity to 
protect their interests against invasion and displacement, and have 
failed to do so. Thus, the effect of the rule is that the internal restraint 
on congressional lawmaking is borrowed as an external restraint on 
the courts. A corollary is that the stronger the federal interest ex-
pressed through the statute, the more thoroughly the presumption is 
overcome and the more extensive is the authority of the courts to de-
velop federal corntnon law in the statute's wake.262 
Considerations of federalism are not the only ones underlying the 
federal courts' self-itnposed limitation on their common lawmaking 
activity. A second consideration derives from the notion of separa-
tion of federal powers.263 The Constitution vests all legislative power 
in the Congress.264 Now, it is true that common lawmaking is not the 
exercise of legislative power, and so the provision does not of its own 
force limit corntnon lawmaking by federal courts. Nonetheless, the 
Constitution's express allocation of legislative power to Congress is 
widely regarded as a reflection of the broader, unexpressed principle 
that Congress has the primary responsibility and authority to deter-
261. E.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 102 
(1972). See generally HART & WECHSLE~, supra note 235, at 800-06; REDISH, supra note 
244, at 122. 
Preexisting federal interest may also be shown from non-statutory sources, but these 
cases are less unequivocal. Compare Boyle, 481 U.S. at 500 (majority opinion), with 
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("federal common law cannot super-
sede state law in vacuo out of no more than an idiosyncratic determination by five Justices 
that a particular area is 'uniquely federal.'"). The few areas in which there have been 
non-statutory federal common law are those where other considerations show federal 
interest to be so intense, and federal regulation so necessary that displacement of state 
law by federal common law is compelled. They are substantially limited to the areas of 
the rights and duties of the United States, West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305 
(1987); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973); 
Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. 363; the rights and duties of government contractors, 
Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; interstate rights and obligations, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & 
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); foreign relations, Sabbatino, 316 U.S. 398; 
admiralty and maritime law, Moragne, 398 U.S. 375; and Indian affairs, Oneida Indian 
Nation, 470 U.S. 226. 
262. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448; City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 336 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). 
263. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304; Northwest Airlines, Inc., 451 U.S. at 
95. 
264. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
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mine national policy.26s 
Common lawmaking is itnpossible without reference to selected 
policies. Indeed, common lawmaking, like legislative lawmaking, is 
simply a method of implementing preselected policies. Because of the 
institutional principle that Congress should be the primary source of 
national policy, courts deem themselves generally not free to make 
policy choices on their own and generally obligated to adhere to Con-
gress's policy choices instead. This reluctance of ,courts to choose im-
portant policy becomes most important when courts are presented 
with Congress's failure to legislate as to an issue i.e., precisely 
when the occasion arises to develop a rule of federal common law. 
For, in those cases, the court must deter1nine whether congressional 
silence reflects a policy choice that there should be no federal regula-
tion at all.2·66 Thus, while congressional silence is, on the one hand, a 
predicate for making federal cotnmon law, on closer examination it 
might actually demand abstinence from the court's actually doing so. 
These considerations of federalism and separation of power have, 
led federal courts to the general principle that they ordinarily should 
not make comrnon law in an area unless they have been "authorized" 
by Congress to do so.267 Courts, therefore, proceed cautiously in de-
veloping federal common law. 
It should be obvious that the tertn "authorized''. is misleading, 
because authorization to engage in. common lawmaking has nothing 
to do with judicial competence or power. Nor does "authorized'' nec-
essarily mean expressly permitted, or even implicitly permitted. Per-
mission is not the issue. "Authorized," here, means only that the 
exercise of common lawmaking power would not trench upon the 
state or congressional prerogatives that are thought to be threatened 
by federal common lawmaking.26s 
Isolated rulemaking to supplement or cl -~ · a statute is usually 
uncontroversial. The very process of legislating demands as a con-
comitant this so-called interstitial lawmaking, and it generally is easy 
265. See City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313-14; Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 38'8 
(1983). 
266. See;. e.g., Farmers Educ~ & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 
531-33 (1959) (legislative silence too equivocal to be taken as bar to common law rule). 
267. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 
(1981); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 451. 
268. Cf. Friendly, supra note 232, at 407 ("state courts must confonn to federal 
decisions in an area where Congress, acting within the powers granted to it, has mani-
fested, be it ever so slightly, an intention to that end.")., 
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for the courts to recognize the difference between filling in an over-
sight and contravening congressional intent. Disagreements over "au-
thorization'' in these cases are less common than in situations 
involving the development of expansive bodies of federal comtnon 
law,. It is in these latter cases that uncertainty about "authorization" 
is likely to arise and it is here that common lawmaking usually de-
mands strong and articulate justification. 
One accepted circumstance where courts may properly develop a 
comprehensive body of federal common law is where Congress, in the 
statute, expressly or impliedly delegates such comtnon lawmaking 
power to the courts.269 Cotnmon lawmaking in such circumstances 
obviously creates no problem, either of federalism or separation of 
powers, since Congress has already made the determination that com-
mon lawmaking is proper. 
Probably the most straightforward example of such delegation is 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a 
witness, person, govern1nent, State, or political subdivision thereof 
shall be governed by the principles· of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of 
reason and experience. . . . 21o 
This rule substantially provides that rules of privilege shall be 
whatever the federal courts detertnine they should be. Rarely, 
though, is the delegation so express. More often it has to be inferred 
from the language of the statute or its legislative history. 
Use of open-ended language language that must be invested. 
with clarity and meaning .,, .. in a standard or prohibition is good evi-
dence of congressional intent to delegate lawmaking power. It is par-
ticularly good evidence where the language repeats, or draws upon, a 
cotnmon law standard that has already been developed by the 
courts.271 A well-known case of such implicit delegation is Section 1 
269. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642. Merrill, supra note 245, at 40, has called this 
form of common lawmaking "delegated lawmaking,'' and we use the term here. 
270. FED. R. EVID. SO 1. 
271. See, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 64345. See generally Merrill, supra note 
245, at 43-45. 
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of the Sherman Act,272 which specifies that "[e]very contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce a•n.ong the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal. " 273 The legislative history does support the 
conclusion that the courts should develop a cornmon law of restraints 
of trade to implement the general prohibition expressed in the stat-
ute.274 Yet one need not appeal to the legislative history for this con-
clusion, since the statute's use of a very general standard, derived 
from the common law, itself justifies the courts in developing this 
common law.275 
Another circumstance where broad common lawmaking may be 
justified by a statute is where the federal interests identified in the 
statute are so intense, and the need for displacing state law so great, 
that preemption of state law extends beyond the express provisions of 
the statute.276 In cases of this kind, courts themselves may have to 
supply a panoply of federal rules of conduct and federal rules of deci-
sion. Otherwise, there would be a regulatory void.27' 
Common lawmaking of this latter sort is eminently proper under 
the guidelines discussed above. Since state law has already been dis-
placed by Congress, creation of federal common law in the area of 
displacement does not invade state interests, and so does not trans-
gress principles of federalism. Nor does it infringe on congressional 
policy-making prerogative, at least to the extent courts fill in regula-
tory gaps in a manner consistent with the intent of the legislation. 
Rather, development of federal common law in those circumstances 
272. 15 U.S. C. -§ 1 (1988). The scope of delegated common lawmaking power under 
this statute is delineated in Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 642-46. 
273. 15 u.s.c. § 1. 
274. E.g., 21 CoNG. REc. 4089 (May 1, 1890) ("Now, I take it, with all due defer-
ence to what the Supreme Court may ultimately decide, that that is a contract in restraint 
of trade within the meaning of the bill.'') (remarks of Rep. Culberson). 
275. Other similar examples of implicit delegation are the prohibition of ''deceptive" 
and "misleading" practices in the various securities laws and regulations, e.g., 15 U.S. C. 
§§ 771(2) & 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990); "unfair'' and "deceptive" prac~ 
tices under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1988); "unfair methods of competition'' 
under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988); and "deprivation of any rights ... 
secured by the Constitution and laws,'' under the civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1982). 
276. Merrill, supra note 245, at 36, calls this form of lawmaking "preemptive law-
makingjl" We shall use that term here. 
277. Or else there would be regulation by default, where failure ofcourts to make a 
rule de facto makes one. 
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simply carries out congressional aims.27S 
Preemptive and delegating are not the only sources of authority 
for large-scale federal comtnon lawmaking. But they are the most 
cotnmon ones. Nor are they always sharply distinguished. For exam-
ple, where preemption is accompanied by congressional expectation of 
com1non lawmaking in the preemptive domain, the resultant comtnon 
lawmaking may partake of both preemptive and delegated character-
istics. Nonetheless, the differences are sometimes obvious and, as we 
shall see, the categories have value as a tool for analysis. 
3. Federal Common Law of ERISA Plans 
.. 
a. Authority for Common Lawmaking 
ERISA authorizes federal courts indeed, charges them "to 
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ER-
ISA-regulated plans."279 Supreme Court pronouncements have 
placed the matter beyond dispute.280 However, neither the Supreme 
Court nor any other federal court has carefully examined the source 
and scope of federal common lawmaking authority concerning benefit 
plans, presumably because most of the exercises of that power have 
been uncontroversial. 281 
278. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456. 
In these latter circumstances, the aim of common lawmaking is to devise rules that 
best carry out the purpose of the statute. As the Supreme Court described the process 
under the Taft-Hartley Act: 
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under§ 30l(a) is federal 
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. 
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive 
law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. 
Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some 
will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of 
the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The 
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. 
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. But state 
law, if compatible with the purpose of§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find 
the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy. Any state law applied, how-
ever, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of 
private rights. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57 (citations omitted). 
279. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 110. 
280. See, e.g., Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 56; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Ar-
eas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559 (1985); Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983). 
281. For example, courts have exercised their common lawmaking power to de-
velop: standards for judicial review of benefit determinations by plans, Firestone Tire & 
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There are, in fact, several sources of authority for courts to de-
velop a body of common law for benefit plans, and it is essential to see 
what they are and to understand their scope. 
i. The Two Primary Sources of Authority for a Benefits Plan 
Common Law 
The two major sources of authority for courts to develop federal 
comtnon law for benefit plans are the two important ones identified 
above: preemption and delegation. 
ERISA's expansive preemption provision is one basis of common 
lawmaking authority. It is obvious, in light of the prior discussion, 
that courts are authorized to develop rules to carry out the congres-
sional purposes underlying ERISA in areas not addressed by the stat-
ute, but which, because of preemption, cannot be fille,d in by state 
law.282 This area is extensive.283 Broad ERISA preemption calls for 
broad common lawmaking in its wake. 
Preemption, as a basis for common lawmaking, was, in fact, fore-
seen in the legislative history. Congress expected courts to develop 
federal common law under ERISA, on the model of the federal com-
mon law developed under the Labor Management Relations Act, 
Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101; rules for exhaustion ofintra~plan remedies before challenges to 
benefit detern1inations are brought in court, e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 
458, 466 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1066 (1987); rules concerning the validity 
and enforceability of plan provisions in light of the policies underlying ERISA, Northeast 
Dep't ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare 
Fund, 764 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 19'85); Victor v. Home Sav. of Amer .. , 645 F. Supp. 1486, 
1496-97 (E.D. Mo. 1986); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 
1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978); rules to govern disputes over contracts 
relating to plans, Kinek v. Gulf & W., Inc., 720 F. Supp 275, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (third 
party beneficiary standards); Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring Co. v. Cormier, 675 F. Supp. 337 
(B.D. La. 1987); rules of liability for non-fiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary's 
breach, see section VI(A)(l), infra notes 360-362 and accompanying text; rules for alter-
ego liability, Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986); rules pennitting restitution to 
employers who mistakenly over-contribute to plans, Airco Indus. Gases v. Teamsters 
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 618 F. Supp. 943, 949-50 (D. Del. 1985); and rules for 
preemption of state laws that "relate to'' employee benefit plans, see section II(B)(l ), 
supra notes 156-179 and accompanying text. 
282. Seei e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d at 1191-94; Landro v. Glen-
denning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1351-56 (8th Cir. 1980); Victor, 645 F. Supp. at 
1495-96. 
283. See, e.g., Sherrnan, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of 
Creditors' Rights, SS IND~ L.J. 247 (1980) (developing federal common law of' creditors' 
rights, made necessary by preemption). 
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which itself implicitly preempts a large area of state law.284 This ex-
pectation emerges clearly, for example, in Senator Javits'' explanation 
of the effect of preemption: ''It is ... intended that a body of Federal 
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues 
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension 
plans.-"285 
The other major source of authority is delegation by Congress. 
Congressional intent that courts should have broad common lawmak-
ing authority in certain areas relating to plans is reflected in the gen-
eral and often discretionary language of basic ERISA provisions: in 
particular, the provisions govertting fiduciary duties and the provi-
sions governing remedies for violations.286 It also emerges from the 
legislative history, which reflects congressional intent that specific ar-
eas again, rules governing fiduciary conduct and liability in partic-
ular should largely be left to the courts for development. 287 
The existence of these two sources is quite clear, and generally 
recognized by .courts. But confusion sometimes arises because courts 
do not always appreciate the si · · cance of the fact that there are two 
distinct sources of authority to develop federal common law. Yet the 
character of the common lawmaking power differs in the two grants 
of authority, and so it is important for courts to understand the basis. 
on which they might proceed in a given case. 
Preemptive common lawmaking under ERISA has an extensive 
subject matter s.cope: in principle, it extends to any subject not ex-
284. As the Supreme Court explained in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux; 481 U.S. 41, 
.56 (1987): "The expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire comparison of ERISA'S 
§ 502(a) to § 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies available to 
ERISA participants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) could be supplemented or sup-
planted by varying state laws." 
The analogy between ERISA § 502(a) and section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act is specifically noted by Congress at 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,933 {Aug. 22, 
1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4745 (remarks of Sen. 
Williams). For a brief discussion of labor-contract common lawmaking as preemptive 
lawmaking, see Merrill, supra note 245, at 43 n.188. 
285. 120 CONG. R.Ec. 29,942 (Aug. 22, 1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 22, at 4771 (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
286. ERISA §§ 404(a), 502(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1109(a), 1132(a) (1988). 
287. E.g., H. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974),-reprinted in Ill 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4569 and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5083 ("[t]he conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule 
(and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of 
employee benefit plans .. "). 
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pressly regulated by ERISA, but within the scope of the preemption 
provision. However, preemptive common lawmaking is supplemen-
tary lawmaking, a prograrn of carrying out the purposes of Congress 
in areas Congress could have addressed, but did not. Ordinarily, 
courts will have limited discretion to make policy choices in develop-
ing this law. 
Delegated lawmaking, on the other hand, is narrower, in that it 
is limited to the specific subjects for which there has been delegation. 
But delegated lawmaking is more discretionary than preemptive law-
making, since courts are authorized to make policy choices in place of 
Congress, so long as the result is consistent with the mandate of the 
delegation. All ERISA-related corntnon lawmaking may be treated as 
preemptive common lawmaking, as a program to fill in the gaps and 
supplement the program of federal regulation, consistent with Con-
gress's intent. But some of it is also authorized as delegated common 
lawmaking, and, where it is, courts have substantial discretion to 
make policy choices in developing the law. It thus may be important 
to identify the areas in which Congress delegated such authority to 
create comtnon law. 
ii. A Note About Inherent Judicial Power 
In seeking to understand the scope and character of ERISA-re-
lated common lawmaking, it helps to examine the impact of one of 
the inherent powers of courts. 
Courts have many so-called "inherent powers." These powers 
"consist of all powers reasonably required to enable a court to per-
form efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, indepen-
dence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. These 
powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court ex-
ists. " 288 They are also "inherent" in the sense that they exist even 
without specific constitutional or statutory authorization. They in-
clude, among many others, the fatniliar powers of courts to punish 
contempt,289 to regulate their proceedings,290 to regulate their own fi-
288. J. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE CoURTS 2 (1980). See C. WOLF-
RAM, supra note 147, § 2.2; Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 
635 (1935). 
289. Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook, & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in 
the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 169 (1955). 
290. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288, 
at 37-39. 
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nancial affairs,291 and to regulate the practice of law.292 The inherent 
powers are sometimes deemed to be a source of common lawmaking 
authority.293 However, exercise of inherent power is not necessarily 
the exercise of cotnJnon lawmaking power, since an inherent power 
need not be exercised through the usual dispute resolution process. 
Inherent power may, for example, be exercised through promulgation 
of rules or issuance of orders on the court,s own initiative. 
One inherent judicial power, albeit a power not well recognized, 
is the power of courts over the administration of trusts. Like other 
inherent powers, this one is often exercised in proceedings that are not 
necessarily adversarial in character. For example, the inherent power 
over trusts includes the power to give instructions, on request, to 
trustees regarding trust administration;294 to accept the resignation of 
a trustee;295 to appoint a trustee;296 and to authorize leases and sales 
not permitted by the trust instrument.297 
Courts have substantial discretion in the exercise of this power, 
just as they do with any other inherent power. The power, moreover, 
may be exercised sua sponte. Thus, a court with jurisdiction over a 
trust may, on its own initiative, compel a trustee to carry out his re-
sponsibilities under the trust.298 As Scott on Trusts explains: 
As a general rule, of course, a court does not act on its own initia-
tive in protecting rights or enforcing duties. It is the function of 
the court to deternline controversies brought before it by the par-
ties .... There is, however, a modem tendency ... for a court that 
has supervision over the administration of trust estates to enforce 
the duties of trustees even though not called upon by the benefi-
ciaries to do so. The notion seems to be, although it is never very 
explicitly stated, that it is the function of the court to see that the 
directions of the settlor are carried out, even though no one com-
291. J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288, at 27, 29-37. 
292. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § 2.2.2; J. CRATSLEY, supra note 288, at 39-40. 
293. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 245, at 18, 46-47 •. 
294. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 259 (1959). In several pre-ERISA cases involving pension plans, the employer-
sponsor petitioned for instructions as to the resolution of employee claims. See Stein v. 
National Bank of Commerce, 181 S.W. 1072 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916); Wallace v. Northern 
Ohio Traction & Light Co., 57 Ohio App. 203, 13 N.E.2d 139 (1937). 
295. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 106. 
296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 108; In re Parker's Trust Estate, 
228 Mo. App. 400, 67 S.W.2d 114, 119 (1934) ("authority inheres in the court"). 
297. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSI'S §§ 189 comment d, 190 comment f. 
298. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 200 comment h. 
.. 
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plains to the court of the failure of the trustee to carry them out; 
that the court has administrative powers as distinguished from 
strictly judicial powers; that once the court acquires jurisdiction 
over the administration of the trust, it is the function of the court 
to see that the trust is adtninistered in accordance with the direc-
tions of the settlor . ~ . . 299 
This inherent power derives from the courts' role as creator of 
the system of trusts. Unlike other institutions such as partner-
ships, corporations, or bailments with trusts, courts did not simply 
take a pre-existing arrangement or an arrangement created by another 
branch of govertrment and develop rules for deciding disputes about 
it. To the contrary, courts themselves developed the institution of 
trusts, and did so in the face of substantial opposition by the British 
King and, to a lesser extent, Parliament.300 Trusts exist only because 
courts exist, and because courts consistently exercised their powers as 
a politically independent part of goverrunent to protect and enforce 
them.301 The inherent power that courts now have over trusts reca-
pitulates their power to create the institution. 
This inherent power is one that properly may be exercised with 
respect to benefit plans. 302 Many ERISA plans use a trust as the vehi-
cle for holding assets. 303 The traditional judicial power just described 
should apply unproblematically to these trusts and plans, since the 
use made of the trust device is irrelevant to the exercise of judicial 
power. The power should also apply with respect to those plans 
whose assets are not held in trust. All plans are trust-like in their 
299. III A. Scorr & W. FRA TCHER, supra note 111, § 200.4. 
300. On the development of the system of trusts, see F. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO 
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 23-42 (1929); I A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, 
supra note 111, § 1; Ames, The Origin of Uses and Trusts, 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 (1908); 
Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 LAW Q. REv. 162 (1885). 
301. Trusts are largely unknown outside the legal systems based on British law, 
except to the extent consciously borrowed from those systems. See G. BOGERT, supra 
note 111, § 9. 
302. Ct Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051 
(7th Cir. 1987) (courts' traditional, broad supervisory power over trustees explains cur-
rent standard for review of benefit claim denials). For a case expressly applying such 
inherent power in connection with a pre-ERISA pension plan, see Ball v. Victor Adding 
Machine Co., 236 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1956). See also the pre-ERISA cases cited supra 
note 294. 
303. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), provides that "[e]xcept as provided in 
subsection (b), all assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust. .... " How-
ever, ERISA itself contains no statutory mechanism for the formation of the trust, and, in 
practice, state law generally is followed. 
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material aspects, having settlors (i.e., the sponsor), fiduciaries and 
beneficiaries. They lack only the trust res. But the power in question 
relates to administration, not to the trust res,-and it mainly involves 
regulation of the conduct of fiduciaries. It loses none of its rationale 
through absence of trust funds, and can be adapted to non-trusteed 
plans with little, if any, modification. 
The legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress intended 
this traditional power to apply to plans. 304 In fact, Congress intended 
that a great deal of trust law should apply to benefit plans, including 
the part of trust law that results from, and involves discretionary ex-
ercise of, judicial power over trusts. For example, under ERISA 
courts have been expressly granted the power to remove plan fiducia-
ries one of their traditional inherent powers over trusts. 305 More 
generally, courts have been given great discretion to issue "remedial" 
orders and to "enforce" the terms of the plan, whenever jurisdiction 
over a plan has -attached. 306 This delegation would appear to invoke 
the traditional power of courts over trust administration. Additional 
evidence of congressional intent that courts should have discretionary 
power over plan administration is found in the express statement in 
the legislative history that fiduciaries may petition a court for instruc~ 
tions when in doubt over how to proceed on a matter of substantial 
concern. 307 
Yet, in the context of plans, this inherent power does not really 
304. When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibi-
tions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cogni-
zant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of 
statutory purposes. As this Court long ago recognized, ''there is inherent in the 
Courts of Equity a jurisdiction to -.... give effect to the policy of the legislature." 
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) (citation omitted). See 
also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless otherwise provided 
by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the 
proper and complete exercise of [its] jurisdiction .... [T]he comprehensiveness of this 
equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied in the absence of a clear and valid legislative 
command"); Cumings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 390 (7th 
Cir.). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986) (stating that principle was inapplicable in actions 
relating to benefit plans). 
305. See ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). On the other hand, they are denied 
the traditional power to authorize deviations from the plan document. See supra text 
accompanying notes 83-90 and 126. 
306. See ERISA §§ 409(a), 502{a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(3). 
307. See H.R .. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong_~ll 2d Sess. 300 (1974)~ reprinted in 
Ill LEGISLATIVE HISFORY, supra note 22, at 4567, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG .. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5080. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 112. 
1116 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 41:1049 
constitute an additional source ofcomJnon lawmaking authority. Af-
ter all, as we have just seen, ERISA may be understood to have dele-
gated much of the very same authority to the courts. Instead, the 
power is better understood as a source of added judicial discretion in 
the creation and enforcement of federal common law rules relating to 
plans. In delegating this lawmaking power to courts, ERISA recog-
nizes the courts' traditional responsibility for trusts, as well as their 
institutional competence in trust~related cotnmon lawmaking and in 
oversight of trust adtninistration._ The upshot is to undermine _argu-
ments for limiting courts' power and discretion in developing a com-
mon law for plans. 
b. Two Fallacies to be Avoided 
Recognition that preemption is an independent source of federal 
common lawmaking power helps expose a fallacy to which federal 
courts have sometimes fallen prey. At times, courts have been reluc-
tant to develop federal conunon law as to a matter concerning benefit 
plans, because they find no delegated authority to do so. 308 This re-
luctance is unfounded, since it ignores preemption as a source of au-
thority not dependent on express and itnplied delegations._ 
Another fallacy to be avoided would also place unjustified limits 
on preemptive common lawmaking. Obviously, a proper limitation 
on preemptive lawmaking is negative legislative intent: the failure of 
ERISA to regulate an area may evince congressional intent to leave 
the matter unregulated. For example, there i~ currently wide agree-
ment that the doctrine of estoppel has a limited place, if any, in the 
cotntnon law of benefit plans because of ERISA's central requirement 
that plans be in writing. 309 A common law of oral plan modifications 
arguably would contravene this policy.310 
But it by no means follows that the failure of Congress to regu-
late an aspect of benefit plans necessarily means that Congress wanted 
the matter left unregulated, and that cotntnon lawmaking is im-
308. Seei e.g., Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to 
recognize federal common law claim "[a]bsent an explicit directive from Congress',). 
309. See ERISA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a). 
310. See Cefalu, 871 F.2d at 1296 .. 97. But see TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112 (rules of 
estoppel apply to unfunded, single-employer welfare plans); McNabb v. Michigan Con-
sol. Gas Co., 656 F. Supp. 866, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (applying principles of estoppel to 
claim f. or benefits, but finding no liability). 
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proper.311 That conclusion would follow only if ERISA were thor-
oughly comprehensive, which, as we have seen, it is not. Thus, to 
take a simple example, although Congress has exempted welfare bene-
fit plans from the mandatory vesting standards imposed on pension 
plans, it does not necessarily follow that courts may not develop fed-
eral common law rules to govern vesting by agreement of the parties 
to a plan.312 
c. Examples of Delegated and Preemptive Common Lawmaking 
One important aspect of benefit plans with respect to which 
courts have unquestionably been delegated coininon lawmaking 
power is that of fiduciary responsibility. Here, Congress adopted · 
broad, general standards derived from the cointnon law, and left it to 
the courts to fill in the details.313 As the legislative history explains: 
''The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes 
applicable to ... fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolu-
tion of the law oftrusts."314 Si · cantly, it is the "principles," rather 
than specific rules, that have been codified in ERISA, and this is re-
flected in the extreme generality of the basic fiduciary standards. 
Another important area of delegated common lawmaking power 
is that of remedies. ERISA expressly gives courts broad power to 
grant "such . . . equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate"315 for breaches of fiduciary duty, and to grant "appro-
priate equitable relief"316 to redress violations of ERISA or the tertns 
of a plan. This language, like that of the fiduciary provisions, on its 
311. See~ e.g., Soft Drink Indus. Pension Fund v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 679 F. 
Supp. 743 (N.D. lll. 1988) (restitution for mistaken over-contribution by employer). 
312. See In re White Fann Equip. Co., 788 F.2d at 1192 (exclusion of welfare plans 
from mandatory vesting standards tells in favor of courts not imposing absolute vesting 
requirement, but does not preclude development of common law rules for vesting by 
agreement); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 616 F. Supp. 409, 414 (D.C. Tenn. 
1985), modified, 822 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Omission of welfare benefit plans from 
the vesting provisions of ERISA does not reflect Congressional intent that welfare benefit 
rights are entitled to no protection under federal law"); In re Reading Co., 72 Bankr. 258 
(B.D. Pa. 1987). See generally Note, Retiree Welfare Benefits: ERISA, LMRA and the 
Federal Common Law, 20 AKRON L. REv. 455 (1987); Note, Hansen v. White Farm 
Equipment Co.: Does Federal Common Law Require that Welfare Benefit Plans Vest 
Upon Retirement?, 17 U. ToL. L. REv. 479 (1986). 
313. See Central States, 472 U.S. at 570. 
314. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 29 (1973), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 22, at 615 and in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4865. 
315. ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
316. ERISA§ 502(a)(3)(B) & (5)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) & (S)(B). 
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face delegates to the courts authority to develop a body of remedial 
common law.317 
Congress's delegation of conrmon lawmaking power as to both 
the substance of fiduciary obligations and remedies for their breach 
makes for an unusually broad delegation of lawmaking power.3ts It is 
significantly broader than the delegation of comtnon lawmaking 
power under the Sherman Act, for while the Shertnan Act does dele-
gate authority for courts to create a federal common law of violations, 
the Supreme Court has held that there is no accompanying delegation 
of authority to develop a common law of remedies.3t9 
There are other subjects as to which courts have been delegated 
authority under ERISA to make common Iaw.320 However, for most 
317. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26; Amalgamated Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1988) (constructive trust on breach-
ing fiduciary's gains, in favor of participants who had already received full distribution of 
benefits); Kineck v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marshall&: 
!Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629. 
318. This was pointed out by one of ERISA's sponsors: 
ERISA's substantive standards and its remedial relief provisions were thought 
to be, at the time of their enactment, exceedingly comprehensive and broad, 
pennitting courts to fashion virtually any type of civil relief n to redress 
violations of the statute. 
125 CoNG. REc. 930 (Jan. 24, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
319. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 643-46. For this reason, the Supreme Court has 
refused to recognize a federal common law remedy of contribution among antitrust viola-
tors. /d. By contrast, federal courts have developed a federal common law of restitution 
with respect to plans, see, e.g., Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 
985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 512 (1990); Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Em .. 
ployees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957, 966 (1st Cir. 1989); Airco Indus. Gases, 618 F. Supp. 
at 950; Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas 
Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Wong v. Ba-
con, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Soft Drink Indus. Pension Fund, 679 F. 
Supp. 743, which arguably includes rules of contribution and indemnity. Free v. Briody, 
732 F.2d 1331, 1336-38 (7th Cir. 1984); Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170,1183-84 
(7th Cir. 1985) (Coffey, J., concurring); Alton Memorial Hasp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
656 F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Marshall & /Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp .. at 635 
n.l; Schaffier v. McDowell Nat'l Bank, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. 2485 (W.D. Pa. 1985). 
Contra McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 7 Employee Benefits Cas. 2403 (D. N.J. 
1986) (no-third party claim against non-fiduciary); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. 
Yampol, 706 F. Supp. 596, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1989); McLaughlin v. Biasucci, 688 F. Supp. 
965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no third-party claim against non-fiduciary). 
320. The preemption provision appears to command development of a body of com-
mon law that gives substance to the "relate to'' language. Many of the definitions do, as 
well. Of particular note are the definitions of "employer'' and "employee" (ERISA 
§ 3(5), 3(6)), see, e.g., Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 
1986); "plan" (ERISA § 3(3)), see, e.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367; Brundage-Peterson, 
877 F.2d 509; James v. National Business Sys., 721 F. Supp. 169, 175 (N.D. Ind. 1989); 
1990] Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys 1119 
areas relating to employee benefit plans, common lawmaking must be 
considered preemptive only. For example, because of the preemption 
of all state laws concerning plan content and the dearth of ERISA 
regulation, courts have had to develop a "contract law" of plan docu-
ments,321 an important part of which deals with the validity of plan 
provisions in light of ERISA's basic policies.322 Another such 3-!ea is 
the fi.eld of benefit claims. The statutory requirements are minimal, 
and development has been left to the Secretary of Labor.323 Even the 
regulations, though, impose only minimal requirements conc,erning a 
few aspects of benefit claims.324 Thus, courts have supplemented ER-
·. 
ISA and the Department of Labor regulations with a common law of 
benefit claims, which includes. rules for review of claims, 325 rules for 
exhausting_ plan remedies prior to bringing suit,326 and .rules concern-
ing the effect of a fiduciary's failure to follow a proper claims 
procedure. 327 
III. THE GENERAL CHARACTER oF PLAN AFI·roRNEY COMMON 
LAW 
We have seen that ERISA broadly preempts state laws that pur-
port to reg:ulate plan attorneys. to the extent needed to fill the regula-
tory gap. Such preemption authorizes federal courts to develop rules 
which carry out the purposes of ERISA.328 There is really no differ-
ence between this preemption--based authority to develop a common 
and "fiduciary" (ERISA§ 3(21)(A)), see, e.g~, Munoz, 633 F. Supp. at 567-69 (D. Colo. 
1986). 
321. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26 (meaning and enforceability of anti-
alienation provision); In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 11.86; Teamsters Local 
Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147; Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 
752 F.2d 923, 937 (3d Cir. 1985); Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert~ denied 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Sav. Bank, 692 F. 
Supp .. 587, 592 (D. Md. 1988); McNabb, 656 F. Supp. 866. 
322. See, e.g.; Teamsters Local Union No. 229 Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147; In re 
C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (B.D. Pa. 1977). 
323. See ERISA§ 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133. 
324 .. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. 
325. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101. 
326. See,-e.g., Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F .. 2d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 19.86). 
327. See, e.g., Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir .. 1987); 
Ellenburg, 763 F.2d 1091; Blau v. Del Monte- Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Henne v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D. Wis. 1987). 
328. The conclusion is in accord with the one reached earlier, on other grounds, that 
plan attorneys should be subject to ERISA's fiduciary-related policies. See supra text 
accompanying notes 91-109. 
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law of plan attorneys and the preemption~based authority to develop, 
say, a c_omtnon law of plan-related restitution329 or a comrnon law of 
plan-related contracts·. 33° Courts_ simply have not yet recognized that 
they have this quite conventional .authority. 
In principle, we could now end our examination of the authority 
of courts to develop plan attorney common law and proceed to a dis-
cussion of the substantive content of a plan attorney common law that 
would carry out the purposes of ERISA. We will not do so. It will 
prove to be more valuable for us to stop and look even more closely at 
the sources of authority for plan attorney common law, including au-
thority other than preemptive authority, and to consider also the ra-
tionales for developing such a body of law. 
There are three reasons for taking a closer look at the sources of 
authority for a plan attorney common law. One reason is practical. 
Courts may have common lawmaking power with respect to plan at-
torneys, but it does not necessarily follow that they will exercise it, or 
exercise it as fully as they could. We have already noted the institu-
tional reluctance of courts to develop federal common law and ex-
plained how that reluctance limits the areas in which courts will make 
federal common law. But reluctance of another sort can also, at 
times, be detected in the cases. Decisions not to announce common 
law rules are sometimes based not so much on concerns for federalism 
or separation of powers as on a generalized discomfort with common 
lawmaking. This discomfort may cause a court to decline to act on 
lawmaking authority that clearly exists.331 If the conclusions reached 
s_o far are to be accepted and put to practical use, we need to see why 
judicial reluctance to exercise common lawmaking power would be 
abdication of an important responsibility. 
Another reason for a closer look at the foundations of plan attor-
ney common law is that, before one begins to develop substantive 
rules, one ought to be clear about what the ultimate purposes of the 
rules should be. It is not enough to say that the rules governing plan 
attorneys should further ERISA's policies, and leave it at that. 
Which policies and purposes, in particular, should guide the substan-
tive rule development? To answer this question, we need to give some 
329.: See, e.g., Whitworth Bros. Storage Co., 794 F.2d· 221. 
330. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1. 
331. See, e.g .. , Nieto, 845 F.2d 868; Pappas, 923 F.2d 549. 
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thought to the question of why plan attorneys should be singled out as 
a discrete subject for consideration. 
A final reason for taking a closer look is that preemption is not 
the only source of lawmaking authority. Another one is the delegated 
authority to develop common law rules. Indeed, we shall see that 
there is delegated authority with respect to some of the most funda-
mental and most important aspects of the plan attorney's relationship 
with the plan, with the fiduciaries, and with the participants and bene-
ficiaries. We shall also see that the inherent judicial power over attor-
neys makes proper the exercise of great discretion in these areas. 
Thus, as we explained above, it is i1nportant to understand the scope 
of this delegated lawmaking power, since it affects the proper charac-
ter of rulemaking on the part of courts. 
A. The Rationale for Plan Attorney Common Law 
Why should courts single out plan attorneys for special common 
law treatment? Why should courts bother to exercise their-conunon 
lawmaking power with respect to plan attorneys? The basic reason is 
that, even though plan attorneys are not one of the central concerns of 
ERISA, as a practical matter they are integral to the world of benefit 
plans. They have tremendous capacity to do good, by promoting the 
purpose of ERISA, as well as tremendous capacity to do harm, by 
undermining the purposes of ERISA. Their conduct must be regu-
lated, and regulated in a systematic way that recognizes their special 
role. 
Of all the non-fiduciaries connected with plans, plan attorneys 
probably have the most responsibility and influence. They counsel 
plan fiduciaries on the propriety of contemplated transactions. They 
counsel the plan in cases of benefit disputes. They represent the plan 
and its fiduciaries in litigation. They represent the plan and its fiduci-
aries in dealings with regulators, such as the Department of Labor. 
Their constant guidance is necessary, because plans and their fiducia-
ries must adhere strictly to plan documents and must comply with a 
regulatory regime backed by heavy sanctions including civil and crim-
inalliability. Their normal role has been deemed not to give rise to 
plan fiduciary status.. Yet, in actual practice, they may have great 
discretion and substantial influence with respect to plans enough to 
justify extension of ERISA's policies (if not its express standards) to 
the regulation of their plan-related activities. In this regard they dif~ 
fer from other important non-fiduciaries, such as auditors -and actua-
ries, whose roles are less discretionary and more limited in scope. 
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Because of this infl1.1:ence, rules to guide the conduct of plan at-
torneys may serve as ,an important prophylactic for implementing 
ERISA's fiduciary principles. ERISA itself has prophylactic sets of 
express auxiliary rules. As we have seen, ERISA's disclosure rules 
and writing requirement are designed largely to complement and fa-
cilitate enforcement of ERISA,s fiduciary rules. In much the same 
way can rules to guide plan attorney conduct complement ERISA's 
fiduciary rules and help induce proper conduct by plan fiduciaries. 
They can do it in two ways,. One way is for plan attorney com-
mon law to invest plan attorneys with responsibility, comtnensurate 
with influence, to help induce proper fiduciary conduct. 'Since plan 
attorneys are in a critical position to be able to deter and correct fidu-
ciary wrongdoing, federal common law should provide them with ap-
propriate standards for exercising that capacity. This is exactly the 
same rationale that has underlain efforts by the SEC to regulate the 
professional conduct of securities lawyers. Thus, the SEC's com-
ments on the "public implications" of the securities lawyer's role can 
be applied, with obvious modifications, to benefit plan attorneys: 
We have previously noted the peculiarly (sic) strategic and ,espe-
cially central place of the private practicing lawyer in the invest-
ment process and in the enforcement of the body of federal law 
aimed at keeping that process fair ..... [T]he task of enforcing the 
securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoul-
ders. . . . Very little of a securities lawyer's work is adversary in 
character. He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of 
diligent adversaries and alert judges checks him. He works in his 
office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy statements, opinions 
of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial 
community and the investing public must take on faith. This is a 
field where unscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on 
those who rely on the disclosure documents that they produce .. 
Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately rigor-
ous standards of professional honor.332 
Development of rules to guide plan attorney influence and con-
duct may help to induce proper fiduciary conduct in yet another way. 
Plan attorney common law may be developed to help ensure that the 
plan attorney,s conduct serves as a guide for the conduct of fiducia-
332. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at ,84, 
ISO n.21 (quoting In re Fields, 45 S.E.C .. 262, 266 n.20 (1973), a.lf'd mem~, 495 F.2d 1085 
(D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
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ries. If the plan attorney is influential, and his guidance respected, 
exemplary conduct by hiin that is motivated to further the goals of 
ERISA may demonstrate to plan fiduciaries how they should act in 
order to further the purposes of ERISA. Again, this consideration is 
one that has been recognized as important in the context of corporate 
finance. As foriner Chief Justice Stone explained in his well-known, 
Depression-era speech about the public responsibilities of corporate 
attorneys: 
[T]he very conditions which have caused specialization, which 
have drawn so heavily upon the technical proficiency of the Bar, 
have likewise placed it in a position where the possibilities of its 
influence are almost beyond calculation. The intricacies of busi-
ness organization are built upon a legal frarnework which the cur-
rent growth of administrative law is still further elaborating. 
Without the constant advice and guidance of lawyers business 
would come to an abrupt halt. And whatever standards of conduct 
in the performance of its function the Bar consciously adopts must 
at once be reflected in the character of the world of business and 
finance. 333 
What these considerations suggest is that the common law of 
plan attorneys should be rooted in the actual role and practical influ-
ence of plan attorneys, to the extent that that role and influence itself 
can promote the main purposes of ERISA. 
But the federal comtnon law of plan attorneys should not be only 
a body of hortatory standards with no enforcement mechanisms, or 
only weak ones. The power of plan attorneys to influence fiduciary 
conduct to the better is also power to influence it to the worse. And 
the power to deter fiduciary wrongdoing is the power also to facilitate 
it. As Chief Justice Stone also emphasized in the speech just quoted, 
"departures from the fiduciary principle do not usually occur without 
the active assistance of some member of our profession. . . . " 334 A 
plan attorney comtnon law must also be remedial, with provisions for 
civil liability to back up its rules. 
Indeed, this remedial component is essential, not merely desira-
ble; for what exacerbates the threat of hartn by plan attorneys is the 
prevalence of a practice which, while convenient, tends to muddle the 
plan attorney's sense of loyalty: the practice of functioning simultane-
333. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1934). 
334. /d. at 9. 
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ously as both plan attorney and as attorney for the employer or fiduci-
ary with respect to non-plan matters. 335 An attorney who does this 
tnight be tempted to advance the employer's or fiduciary's non-plan 
interests, to the possible detriment of plan interests, while he is acting 
in his role as plan attorney. He might be so tempted because of habit-
ual identification with the employer's or fiduciary's interest, because 
of the natural desire to retain the employer or fiduciary as client, or 
because of venality. But whatever the reason, unless there are stan-
dards of conduct, backed up by the threat of liability, plan attorneys 
would face no deterrent to causing or assisting in hartn, and partici-
pants and beneficiaries would lack a remedy against this source of 
potential wrongdoing. 
B. The Sources of Judicial Discretion 
In implementing these purposes through the development of plan 
attorney-related common law, courts will carry out the congressional 
policies reflected in ERISA. They also have substantial discretion in 
determining how best to do so. There are two sources of such discre-
tion: delegation by Congress and inherent judicial power. 
1. Common Law from Delegation 
Two main areas exist of delegated corn1non lawmaking authority 
with respect to plan attorneys. One area of delegated lawmaking con-
cerning plan attorneys we have already discussed: fiduciary responsi-
bility and remedies. As we have seen, the delegation of cotntnon 
lawmaking authority with respect to those areas is extraordinarily 
sweeping, and it is generally agreed that the resultant authority ex-
tends beyond the mere authority to develop rules for plan fiduciaries. 
Just how far beyond it does extend remains an unsettled issue, but on 
any plausible view it encompasses at least some areas of plan attorney 
conduct. 
A parsitnonious approach to the scope of the delegation would 
go only as far as to allow courts to develop rules of liability for per-
sons (perhaps, only for parties in interest) who participate in a fiduci-
ary's breach of duty. Traditional trust law contains rules goventing 
this kind of non-fiduciary conduct as an integral remedial compo-
335. See Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc. 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 
1516, 1532 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3155, rek denied, 110 S. Ct. 12 (1989) 
(upholding plan reliance on advice of corporate counsel). 
... 
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nent.336 It is not difficult to find authorization in ERISA for courts to 
develop a common law goven1ing participation in a breach, based on 
principles si1nilar to those found in trust law.337 This understanding 
of delegated, fiduciary,..related lawmaking would bring much of the 
remedial component of plan attorney common law within the ambit 
of the courts' delegated and discretionary lawmaking authority. 
But a more expansive approach to delegated, fiduciary-related 
lawmaking is possible. ERISA's .fiduciary rules are designed to be 
general expressions of basic principles; they are not framed narrowly. 
As general guidelines meant to be judicially developed, they could 
easily serve as a set of principles from which the courts could derive 
common law rules applicable to those persons who, in some, but not 
all material respects, are like plan fiduciaries. This would be a 
method of rule development analogous to the traditional process by 
which principles of trust law, which were initially developed to gov~ 
em trustees, functioned as the source for laws governing fiduciaries 
other than trustees. 338 Under this approach to the courts' delegated 
lawmaking authority, courts would be deemed authorized to proceed 
by analogy to develop rules for persons such as plan attorneys whose 
level of discretion and influence, while substantial, is not quite enough 
to confer ERISA fiduciary status on them. This approach goes be-
yond the parsimonious one, and would bring much of the prophylac-
tic component of plan attorney common law within the ambit of 
delegated lawmaking. 
At least in the case of plan attorneys, the latter, more expansive 
approach, is the better one, and the parsimonious approach is unnec-
essarily limited. The latter approach more realistically deals with the 
fact that plan attorneys share many of the characteristics of plan fidu-
ciaries; the fact that ERISA'S fiduciary policies necessarily must con-
stitute the proper source of principles for rules of plan attorney 
regulation; and the fact that much of plan attorney law should be 
336. See RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (''[a] third person who ... has 
notice that the trustee is committing a breach of trust and participates therein is liable to 
the beneficiary for any loss caused by the breach of trust"). 
337. See infra text accompanying notes 472-478. In 1989, Section 5020) was added 
to ERISA to require the Secretary to impose a civil penalty on persons who participate in 
a fiduciary's breach of duty or violation of the statute. See Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1989, Pub~L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat 2123. 
338. Such as is the case with executors, administrators, guardians, receivers, and, to 
a lesser extent, corporate directors and officers. See generally G. BoGERT, supra note 
111, §§ 12-16. 
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auxiliary to ERISA fiduciary law and designed to promote it. Courts 
unquestionably have substantial discretion in the implementation of 
ERISA's fiduciary policies, and there is no sound reason for limiting 
the exercise of discretion only to the development of rules for 
fiduciaries~ 
Discretion regarding plan attorney comtnon law emerges also 
from the other itnportant delegated lawmaking authority concerning 
attorneys. ERISA recognizes that there will be ~'counsel'' for em-
ployee benefit plans339 who provide "legal" services to them.340 In 
this way, ERISA implicitly recognizes the existence of a certain role 
to be played with respect to plans: that of benefit plan attorney. But 
the role is not defined anywhere in the statute. What, then, does it 
mean for someone to be legal counsel for a plan? 
Congress left it up to the courts to supply the answer. The insti-
tution of "attorney" is idiosyncratic, and Congress's failure to define 
the role has very different consequences than its failure to define, say, 
"auditor'' or "employer." An attorney cannot be an "attorney" and 
cannot provide "legal" services independently of any system of laws. 
A person cannot become an attorney simply by diligence and hard 
work. A person is an attorney only to the extent he is recognized as 
one by some authority and only to the extent that the authority places 
him within a network of duties and responsibilities to individuals, the 
public, and the courts. 341 ERISA recognizes the institution of "plan 
attorney," but does no more. Since some authority must develop the 
network of duties and responsibilities in which plan attorneys are lo-
cated, and since it cannot be the states, ERISA must be read as dele-
gating the responsibility to the federal courts. At the very least, 
federal courts must be understood to be authorized (and obligated) to 
develop rules governing the fundamental relationships between the 
plan attorney and the plan, the .fiduciaries, the participants and benefi-
ciaries, the public, and the courts. 342 
2. Common Law and Inherent Judicial Power 
We have already discussed the respect in which the inherent 
339. See ERISA § 3(14)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A). 
340. See ERISA§ 408(b)(2}, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2). 
341. See Hazard, Rectification ofC/ient Fraud: Death and Revival of a Professional 
Norm, 33 EMORY L. J. 271, 291 (1984). 
342. Cf. Sperry v. Florida ex rel Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (regulation of 
patent practice by Patent Office, to exclusion of States). 
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power of courts over trusts is a source of discretion in plan-related 
common lawmaking. Let us now consider the impact of the inherent 
power of courts to regulate attorneys on judicial discretion to make 
plan-attorney common law._ 
Judicial authority over attorneys is wide-ranging.343 It includes 
broad power to set standards of conduct, even outside the process of 
litigation, 344 and to issue penalties, sanctions, and remedies for viola-
tions of those standards. It includes the power to regulate all aspects 
of the attorney-client relationship, the attorney-court relationship, at-
torney-attorney relationships, and even attorney conduct that is not 
itself the practice of law.J4s 
The rationale for some source of extensive regulation of attorneys 
is based on the position of power and influence that attorneys nor-
mally assume in a legal system. It is essentially a refrain of the ration-
ale for regulation of plan attorneys that we discussed above, and, 
succinctly stated, is as follows: A responsible attorney has great ca-
pacity to promote justice and law-abiding conduct through his influ-
ence and example, far more than any other kind of citizen. As one 
court articulately explained: 
Few vocations offer as great a spectrum for good and honorable 
works as does the legal profession. The attorney is entrusted with 
the life savings and investments of his clients. He becomes the 
guardian of the mentally deficient, and potential savior for the ac-
cused. He is a fiduciary, a confidant, an advisor, and an advocate. 
However, the great privilege of serving in all of these capacities 
does not come without the concomitant responsibilities of truth, 
343. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 643; Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 
(1824). See generally Wolfram, supra note 147, § 2.2 (1986); Note; The Inherent Power of 
the Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. 
REv. 783 (1976); Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635 (1935). 
344. See Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129-30, 357 S.E~2d 694, 696 (1987). 
345. See, e.g., In re Imming, 131 Ill. 2d 239,-255, 545 N.E.2d 715, 722 (1989).- In 
Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Agnew; the court stated: 
The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as he remains a 
member of the bar, are not affected by a decision to pursue his livelihood by 
practicing law, entering the business world, becoming a public servant, or em-
barking upon any other endeavor;. If a lawyer, elects to become a business man, 
he brings to his merchantry the professional requirements of honesty, upright-
ness, and fair dealing. Equally, a lawyer who enters public life does not leave 
behind the canons of legal ethics. A willful and serious malefaction committed 
by a lawyer-public servant brings dishonor to both the bar and the democratic 
institutions or our nation, and its destructive effect is thereby magnified. 
271 Md. 543, 550-51, 318 A.2d 811,-815 (1974). 
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candor and honesty. In fact, it can be said that the presence of 
these virtues in members of the bar comprises a large portion of the 
fulcrum upon which the scales of justice rest. 346 
But on the other hand, power to do good is also power to do bad, and 
attorneys have the capacity to wreak extensive harm: 
Every attorney occupies a position in our society of particular trust 
and confidence. A client comes to an attorney with the expecta-
tions that the resources of our legal and judicial system that are at 
the attorney's disposal will be used to insure the client's fair treat-
ment. It is not merely money that is at stake when an attorney 
embarks on the representation of a client. Livelihood, professions, 
reputations, familial relations and even physical and mental health 
can all be affected by the actions of an attomey.347 
Because of the power, influence, and importance of attorneys in so 
many respects, it is essential that attorneys should be very carefully 
regulated by some branch of gover111nent. But still, why should that 
branch be the judiciary?J4s 
Much of the answer to this question is historical: the institution 
of attorney developed as that of an "officer" of the court, a person 
whose main responsibility in that office was to represent individuals in 
litigation. Thus, as courts are wont to explain, regulation naturally 
falls to them: 
The primary duty of courts is the proper and efficient administra-
tion of justice. Attorneys are officers of the court and the authori-
ties holding them to be such are legion. They are in effect an 
important part of the judicial system. . . . It is their duty honestly 
and ably to aid the courts in securing an efficient administration of 
justice. The practice of law is so intimately connected and bound 
up with the exercise of judicial power in the administration of jus-
tice that the right to define and regulate its practice naturally and 
logically belongs to the judicial department of our . . . 
government. 349 
This historical explanation has important application to common 
346. Agnew, 271 Md. at 549, 318 A.2d at 814. 
347. McLaughlin v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 603 F. Supp. 978, 980-1 (S.D. Ala. 
1985). 
348. Some state courts acknowledge coordinate legislative authority as well. See, 
e.g., State Bar of Okla. v. McGhee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580 (1931). 
349. In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 268 
(1937). 
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lawmaking regarding plan attorneys, even though, as we have empha-
sized, plan attorneys are not principally litigators. For the fact that 
there is a long history of judicial regulation of attorneys puts cotntnon 
lawmaking concerning plan attorneys in a broader context: it shows 
the plan-related comtnon lawmaking to be only a specialized case of 
the kind of regulatory activity that courts have traditionally engaged 
in without legislative authorization. Making law to govern attorneys 
is a nor1nal judicial function, and is one in which courts, by tradition, 
have great discretion. Courts are the most experienced regulators of 
attorney conduct, and there is no reason that they should not con-
tinue exercising discretion when making law to govern plan attorneys. 
Tradition, though, is not the sole or even best justification for 
discretionary judicial regulation of attorneys. To better understand 
the rationale for judicial regulation, one must realize that courts are 
not the only non-legislative regulators of attorney conduct. The SEC 
has been held to possess irnplied power to regulate attorneys who ap-
pear before it,350 as has the ICC,351 the Board of Tax Appeals,352 and 
many other federal agencies.353 The principle underlying the deci-
sions to such effect is that, where an administrative agency is dele-
gated power to develop rules to carry out the purpose of a statute, and 
where attorneys play an essential role in the system regulated, the 
agency has i1nplied power to regulate the conduct of those attorneys 
so as to help the agency discharge its duties. 354 The reasoning was 
quite clearly explained in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 355 where the 
power of the SEC to regulate attorneys was justified as follows: 
In the general rulemaking provisions of the federal securities laws, 
Congress has provided the Com1nission with "broad authority" to 
adopt those rules and regulations necessary for carrying out the 
agency's designated functions. . . . 
The chief purpose of the 1933 Act was to "provide investors 
with full disclosure of material inforrnation concerning public of-
ferings of securities in commerce.'' . . . The role of the ... legal 
350. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979); Davy v. SEC, 792 
F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1986). 
351. See Polydoroff v. ICC, 773 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
352. See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). 
353. See, e.g., Koden v. United States Dep't of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(Immigration and Naturalization Service); Hemtan v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 
1953) (International Claims Commission). 
354. See Goldsmith, 270 U.S. at 121. 
355. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979). 
" 
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[profession] in itnplementing the objectives of the disclosure policy 
has increased in importance as the number and complexity of se-
curities transactions has increased. By the very nature of its opera-
tions, the Commission, with its small staff and limited resources, 
cannot possibly examine, with the degree of close scrutiny required 
for full dis·closure, each of the many financial statements which are 
filed. Recognizing this, the Commission necessarily must rely 
heavily on both the accounting and legal professions to perform 
their tasks diligently and responsibly. Breaches of professional re-
sponsibility jeopardize the achievement of the objectives of the se-
curities laws and can inflict great damage on public investors. As 
our Court observed in United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), "In our complex society 
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instru-
ments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or 
the crowbar." 
Rule 2(e) thus represents an attempt by the SEC essentially to 
protect the integrity of its own processes. If incompetent or uneth ... 
ical accountants should be permitted to certify financial state-
ments, the reliability of the disclosure process would be 
impaired. 356 
This consideration has obvious bearing on benefit plans. Courts 
have special responsibility for such plans, both delegated and inher-
ent. They have been delegated substantial authority to develop rules 
to help further the policies of ERISA. As we have seen, attorneys 
play a pervasive and essential role in this judicially-guided benefit plan 
system, analogous, in some respects, to the role played by securities 
attorneys in the securities law system. Thus, for the purpose of help-
ing the courts fulfill their own roles with respect to plans, discretion-
ary judicial regulation of plan attorneys is as necessary and proper as 
is discretionary administrative regulation of attorneys in any adminis-
trative system where attorneys play an essential role. 
IV. PLAN-ATTORNEY RELATIONSHIPS 
Now that we have seen, in overview, why a federal cotntnon law 
of plan attorneys is necessary, what it can accomplish, and what dis-
cretion courts have in developing it, let us turn to some of the sub-
stantive topics and problems that any such body of law must address. 
Common law rules are best worked out by the courts as they test 
356. 609 F.2d at 580-81. 
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policies to see whether and how well they work in concrete cases. 357 
Our principal task here is to identify and explain relevant policies and 
general principles for use by the courts, rather than develop a corpus 
of rules ourselves. Some specific rules will, of course, emerge as ap-
propriate ones, and some specific rules (in particular, ones that have 
no grounding in ERISA's policies) will be found unacceptable. But in 
the main, what will be developed in the remainder of this article are 
approaches and principles to be used in developing plan attorney 
common law. 
We start, in this section, with some basic principles governing the 
plan attomey;s relationships with the plan, with fiduciaries, and with 
participants and beneficiaries. It is important to start here for, ,as we 
have seen, ERISA's preemption of state attorney law and .ERISA's 
delegation to courts of discretionary lawmaking power concerning 
plan attorneys re,quires courts to start from scratch and to define the 
plan attorney's relationships in a manner consistent with ERISA. 
A. The Client 
Rules that govern attorneys invariably presuppose the existence 
of a limited number of individuals to whom the attorney has special 
responsibilities.358 Where the attorney represents a plan it is obvious 
that the individuals with whom he might have special relationships 
are the plan, the fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries. 
The plan and its fiduciaries are the individuals with whom the plan 
attorney will have direct and continuing contact, and to whom he will 
give legal advice and assistance. The participants and beneficiaries are 
the ones whose interest the plan and its fiduciaries and thus; argua-
bly, the plan attorney must ultimately serve. The task in develop-
ing a common law of plan attorneys, then, is largely the task of 
develo,ping rules to clarify and guide the relationships between the 
plan attorney and members of those three classes. 
In developing any new area of law it is always tempting to start 
with an analogy to a more familiar, more established body of law -
tempting because it is a familiar, indeed, perhaps the most common, 
method of legal reasoning, and because it is a method that can elimi-
• 
357. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OFTHgJUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (quoting 
M. SMITH, JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909). "Every new case is an experiment; and if the 
accepted rule which seems applicable yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is 
reconsidered.''). 
358. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 3 (1978). 
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nate the need for reasoning from principles to rules. 3s9 The tradi-
tional law govertting attorneys is based on a special relationship called 
the "attorney-client relationship." It would seem that, by assuming 
the plan attorney to have a client in one or more of those three classes, 
one could rely on the traditional rules of the attorney-client relation-
ship by analogy, in which case the task of developing the new area of 
law would become so much easier. 
At first glance, use of the analogical approach seems reasonable. 
After all, ERISA adtnits the role of plan attorney. Since it does so, 
one might suppose that it necessarily recognizes the role of plan client 
as well. But that supposition would be incorrect. As we shall see, the 
traditional concept of client cannot be applied in cases of plan 
representation. 
1. The Paradigm of Client 
Let us consider first whether a plan can be a client. 
To begin the analysis, we need to understand what a client is. 
We immediately face difficulty, though, because there is no generally 
applicable definition of "client." Since they build on the concept, the 
sources that one would naturally consult for such a definition are pro-
fessional codes such as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
and Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Yet these codes contain no 
such definition. 360 Instead, they rely on an implicit paradigm, and 
frame rules appropriate to that paradigm. Such an approach raises 
the question of whether the implicit paradigm can properly be applied 
to plans. 
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules presuppose, as the 
paradigm of a client, an individual seeking legal representation for 
himself in a lawsuit.361 This is a very narrow conception of client. 
The problems involved in extrapolating it to other entities such as 
359. B. CARDOZO, supra note 357, at 9-50. See Conison, Restrictive Lease Cove-
nants and the Law of Monopoly, 9 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (Winter 1990) (misuse of analogy in 
antitrust law). 
360. For example, the "Scope" section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
states that "principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a 
client-lawyer relationship exists." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope 
(1983). 
361. It is true that the Model Rules, to a greater extent than the Model Code, recog-
nize that lawyers have roles other than that of advocate, and that clients have needs for 
lawyers other than in litigation. However, the Model Rules emphasize the advocacy role 
of lawyers, and even where they do not deal with advocacy issues, they suppose that the 
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corporations and to non-adversarial contexts such as non-litiga-
tion counseling are well-known and have been much discussed in 
the literature.362 Yet to try to apply this paradigm to plans is not 
merely problematic; it is incoherent. One must avoid being misled by 
the fact that plans are legal entities under ERISA. They are essen-
tially programs or activities. An unfunded severance plan for a small 
business, for example, is likely to be a regular, but sporadic, practice; 
and it may a1nount to little more than the payment of benefits to the 
rare, laid-off employee in an amount subject to the employer's reason-
able discretion. A program such as this no more fits the traditional 
paradigm of client than does a lottery. A plan may be an entity but it 
is nothing at all like a person. 
2. The Functional Approach to Client Identity 
A more sophisticated approach to the concept of client is avail-
able. Consider why one should ever need to define or explain the con-
cept of "client." After all, in both law and everyday life we usually 
get by perfectly well without worrying about the meaning of such ba-
sic concepts. We need careful definitions only when some problem 
arises whose resolution turns on the concept's careful application. 
What, then, is the kind of problem that might ever require us to un-
derstand exactly what "client" means? 
A definition of "client" is needed when there is uncertainty over 
who the client is, and thus uncertainty over with whom the lawyer has 
a special relationship. 363 This suggests that any workable definition of 
"client" should mainly concern itself with client identity, and that 
what one really needs is not some type of dictionary definition, but a 
lawyer is at work advancing an interest of the client that is in conflict with interests of 
others. 
Moreover, although the Model Rules try to expand the concept of client, they really 
do not stray far from the paradigm of the client as individual person. For example, Rule 
1.13, labelled "Organization As Client," in effect makes_ the lawyer for a corporation or 
other enterprise the lawyer for the enterprise's managers. The commentary to the rule 
states that, "[s]ince an organization can act only through its constituents, generally the 
lawyer's duty to the 'entity' is indistinguishable from the lawyer's duty to those agents 
acting on behalf of the organization." ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT [hereinafter ANNOTATED RULES] 143 (1984). Thus, under the Model Rules, 
representation of the enterpris_e is simply a specialized form of representation _of 
individuals. 
362. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § 6.7; G. HAzARD, supra note 358, 
at ch. 2. 
363. See G. HAZARD, supra note 358, at cb. 3. 
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practical test that allows one to detertnine who the client is in any 
representation on any occasion on which a lawyer is taken to be 
acting as such in a given situation. 364 What we need, then, is a func-
tional approach that lays down criteria for identifying who plays the 
role of client in a given situation. The approach need not presume 
anything about the nature of the client; it merely presupposes that 
there must be one. 36s 
In the traditional view, there are two essential characteristics had 
by a client in a representation. One is the characteristic of being the 
person or entity whose interest the lawyer is obligated to advance, to 
the exclusion of others, in the representation. 366 The other is that of 
being the person or entity who controls the representation, as a princi-
pal controls an agent. 367 Those two characteristics are counterparts 
364. See id. Thus, the operative concept is "client in the representation,, rather 
than "client." This approach to defining the concept of client requires, at the least, some 
rudimentary concept of "lawyer." On a chicken-and-egg analysis, the concept of "law-
yer" comes first. 
365. An example of such a functional definition is the one contained in proposed 
FED. R. EVID. 503. That definition was to be used in framing rules of client .. attomey 
privilege, and defined "client" as: 
[A] person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or 
entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a 
lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal 
services from him. 
Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235 (1973). The operative functional concept here is 
that of being "rendered professional legal services": to identify the client the holder of 
the privilege one need only detern1ine who it is that is rendered the legal services. (At 
one place, the Model Rules similarly identify the client as the most comprehensive legal 
entity that is a recognized entity rather than a mere collection of individuals for 
which the attorney is performing services in the representation. See ANNOTATED 
RULES, supra note 361, at 154-55.) 
Unfortunately, a definition such as that contained in FED. R. EVID. 503 (or the 
Model Rules) has only limited utility, and cannot be used as a general rule for identifying 
the client. The reason for this is that one often needs a rule for identifying the client 
precisely in order to detern1ine who receives, or is entitled to receive, the lawyer's serv-
ices. Thus, the test presupposes the identification to have been accomplished. Any useful 
definition must be broader than this. 
366. See G. HAZARD, supra note 358, at 3, 37. This aspect of the client is what gives 
rise to problems of conflict of interest. See ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 73. 
367. "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a). Cf. MODEL CODE 
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 to 7-8. See also ANNOTATED RULES, supra 
note 361, at 157 ("The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that 
the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about im-
portant matters"). 
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of the two major kinds of uncertainty over who the client is: uncer-
tainty over whose interest should be advanced, and uncertainty over 
whose directions the attorney should follow. Thus, we combine the 
two characteristics into a two-part functional definition of "client in 
the representation/' 
It is not difficult to see that this functional concept breaks down 
in the plan context. Prima facie, the plan would seem capable of be-
ing the client under this test. In a routine representation, the plan's 
immediate interest·--· for example, that of obtaining the most advan-
tageous contract terms or winning the lawsuit is usually clear and 
may be treated as the sole interest to be advanced by the attorney. 
And, where the plan engages the attorney, it controls the 
representation. 368 
But this model of the plan as functional client works only in the 
simple case, where neither of the uncertainties relating to client identi-
fication arises. That is to say, it works only when the test is not 
needed. For suppose that the representation is not routine, and the 
interest of the plan on an issue for example, whether to accept a 
settlement proposal is uncertain. The client, rather than the attor-
ney, controls the representation, and must decide what to do.369 To 
whom does the plan attorney tum for guidance? • 
At first sight, the answer seems obvious. The Model Rules of 
Professional Con,duct provides that: "A lawyer employed or retained 
by an organization represents the organization acting_ through its duly 
authorize,d constituents. " 370 This rule seems only common sense. If 
one follows it, the plan attorney should tum to the plan fiduciaries. 
Indeed, there would seem to be no plausible alternative. 
But turning to the plan fiduciaries for guidance has curious con-
sequences. As we have seen, ERISA fiduciaries must be loyal to the 
ongoing activity of paying benefits to participants and beneficiaries, 
and are required to act ''solely in the interest of the participants and 
368. The Model Code would even seem to encompass this kind of relationship, for it 
provides that: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes 
his allegiance to the entity and not to a ... person connected with the entity. In advising 
the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests .... " MoDEL CoDE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILJTY EC 5-18. 
369 .. The Model Rules provide that "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT Rule 1..2(a). 
370. Id~ Rule l.13(a). 
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beneficiaries .. . . " 371 Thus, when a fiduciary, in his capacity as the 
representative of the plan, consults with or gives directions to an at-
torney, the fiduciary can be acting properly only if he is acting to 
further the interest of the participants and beneficiaries in receiving 
their benefits. Accordingly, the interest which the attorney ultimately 
must advance is not some interest of the plan entity the presump-
tive client but that of the participants and beneficiaries in receiving 
their benefits. Indeed, there is no ''plan interest" to be advanced by the 
plan attorney separate and differing from the participants' and benefi-
ciaries, interest in receiving benefits. 
But this means that the functional test for the client leads to a 
bifurcation. The participants and beneficiaries, as those whose inter-
est is to be advanced, have one of the functional characteristics of the 
client. And the fiduciaries, as the persons who control the representa-. 
tion, have the other functional characteristic of the client. The plan 
itself has neither. 
Such a bifurcation can arise in other settings . for example, in 
representation of incompetents. But bifurcation is not the end of the 
difficulties in the attempt to apply the concept of client in the plan 
context. For the fiduciaries cannot always fulfill the role of persons 
directing the representation. Trouble arises because the fiduciaries are 
not managers in the way corporate officers are and they are not 
ranked hierarchically. Suppose that the plan fiduciaries disagree as to 
' 
whether a proposed course of conduct is in the best interest of the 
participants and beneficiaries. Suppose, for example, they cannot de~ 
cide whether to settle or continue a lawsuit. The attorney knows that 
the participants' and beneficiaries' interest is to be advanced; but 
whose instructions does he heed on how to do so? The natned fiduci-
ary? The fiduciary who has been allocated dis_cretion for the matter 
- if there is only one? 
And even if there is a single fiduciary who is authorized to act 
and speak with respect to the matter, suppose that that fiduciary 
wishes to pursue a course which the attorney knows is not in the best 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries. Because the attorney 
must advance their interest, may he disregard the fiduciary's wishes? 
Indeed, must he disregard them? And if he may (or must) do so, 
what happens if he cannot tum to the other plan fiduciaries for gui-
dance? Who, then, speaks for the plan and ultimately for the partici-
371. ERISA§ 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l). 
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pants and beneficiaries? Should the attorney consult the participants? 
If so, which ones? Should he decide hirnself1 
We reach exactly the same set of problems and questions in the 
related case, where a_ fiduciary engages an attorney for the purpose of 
representing him solely in his capacity as a fiduciary. The attorney 
may presumptively treat the fiduciary as the client, but he must do so 
with caution, for there is no genuine interest of the fiduciary to be 
furthered by the attomey .. 372 For if the fiduciary is acting as a fiduci-
ary, he must act solely in the interest of the participants and benefi-
ciaries. As in the case of direct plan representation, the attorney's 
ultimate obligation is to advance the participants' and beneficiaries' 
interest. But again, what if other fiduciaries disagree with the fiduci-
ary who engaged the attorney about the proper course of conduct? 
The attorney cannot take refuge in any supposed obligation of loyalty 
to the first fiduciary. Or what if the fiduciary seeks to act in away the 
attorney knows not to be in the best interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries? There plainly is no i1nportant difference between an at-
torney who represents the plan and an attorney who represents the 
fiduciary. 
To salvage the concept of client in the plan context, one might be 
tempted to treat the participants and beneficiaries as the collective 
client. 373 After all, they do have one of the attributes_ of a client. But 
this would be a mistake. Although the plan attorney may have duties 
to the participants and beneficiaries and must act to further their in-
terest, the participants and beneficiaries generally lack autho.rity to 
make decisions as to how their interest is to be furthered. ERISA not 
only reposes discretionary responsibility for the plan in the plan fidu .. 
ciaries; it divests the participants and beneficiaries of such responsibil-
ities. Even in those special cases in which participants retain some 
control over investment or management of their aliquot interest in 
plan assets, they are expressly not made fiduciaries with respect to the 
plan and have no discretionary authority or responsibility with re-
372. This is not the case where an attorney represents, for example, a plan sponsor 
in a non·fiduciary capacity. The sponsor may act in its own interest with respect to the 
plan, and the sponsor's attorney may work to advance it. For this reason we limit the 
subject of this article to attorneys who represent plans and plan fiduciaries~ 
373. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 
F. Supp~ 906 (D.D.C. 1982). Cj Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Pincus, Verlin, Hahn, 
Reich & Goldstein P.C., 42 Bankr., 960 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (counsel for creditors' committee 
had relationship like that of attorney-client with individual creditor, at least to extent of 
owing duty of care). 
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spect to the plan. 374 In those circumstances, the plan fiduciaries re-
main obligated to exercise independent judgment and may override a 
participant's choice, if it is a proper exercise of fiduciary responsibility 
to do so.375 ERISA compels a separation of the two essential charac-
teristics that of the person whose interest is to be advanced and 
. . 
that of the person with authority to give direction to the lawyer -
which the paradigm of client fuses in a single person. 
3. Why Plan Attorneys Do Not Have Clients 
The concept of client in the plan context does not work, and the 
question of who the client is leads quickly to questions about the rela-
tionship between the plan attorney and the fiduciaries, participants, 
and beneficiaries. A plan is an activity carried out for the sole pur-
pose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries, and the 
plan attorney must ultimately serve the participants' and beneficiaries' 
interest. But what does this mean? Does the attorney have a fiduci-
ary-like duty of loyalty to them? If so, what is its scope? Does he 
have a duty of disclosure? A duty of care? A duty tg keep confi-
dences? Does he have any duties or responsibilities to the plan fiduci-
aries? If so, how are those duties reconciled with the duties to the 
participants and beneficiaries? These are the kinds of questions that 
the federal common law of attorneys must answer. The concept of 
client simply does not contribute to their resolution. 
Proposing at the outset of analysis that the plan attorney neces-
sarily lacks a client may seem to be a drastic step. After all, problems 
with the concept of client always arise in the representation of an or-
ganization, yet no one has suggested that the· concept of client be dis· 
pensed within those other areas. Why, then, should it be dispensed 
with here? The reason lies in two essential differences between a plan 
and a corporation or other business entity to which the concept of 
client is still comfortably applied. 
First, the duty of corporate managers is not narrowly focused on 
serving the common shareholders alone or any other single group. 
Officers and directors have obligations to preferred shareholders, 
bondholders, creditors, and employees as well. When a corporate of-
374. See ERISA § 404(c)(l), 29 'U.S.C. § 1104(c)(l). 
375. See; e.g., Department of Labor Opinion Letter re Profit-Sharing Retirement 
Income Plan for the Employees of Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. (April 30, 1984 ); 
Labor Department Proposed Regulations on Participant Directed Individual Account 
Plans~ 52 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (September 3, 1987). 
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ficer consults with an attorney on behalf of the corporation, he speaks 
on behalf of an adtnixture of interests whose proper balancing is his 
continual responsibility~ The corporation is a complex enterprise 
whose goals are broad and which has an interest separate from those 
of the shareholders or any other constituent. The resolution of the 
competing interests is the corporate interest;376 and only because there 
is a corporate interest distinct from the interests of the shareholders377 
and others it is useful, or even intelligible, to say that there is a corpo-
rate client distinct from the shareholders or any other group. 378 
By contrast, a plan is simply a prograzn for paying benefits; it is 
not an entity to which we may ascribe interests. But, even if it were 
intelligible to do so, there still could be no plan interest to be ad-
vanced distinct from that of the participants and_ beneficiaries . 
• 
Second, the kinds of repres_entations engaged in by attorneys for 
corporations and other business enterprises tend to have a strong ad-
versarial character. The business attorney may be advocate, negotia-
tor, or counselor. Those roles generally involve dealings with persons 
outside the enterprise; presume that the outsider's interest is adverse 
to that of the enterpris_e; and involve assisting the client to gain an 
advantage over (or avoid being_ disadvantaged by) the adverse inter-
est. 379 Certainly plan attorneys will advocate, negotiate and counsel. 
But these activities are not exhaustive and are not the most important 
plan attorney functions. Plans and plan fiduciaries transact business 
with outsiders only as an incident of their main purpose of providing 
benefits to participants and beneficiaries. Unlike business enterprises 
and their managers, plans and their fiduciaries are not intrinsically 
adversarial to anyone; and they will not necessarily engage _an attor-
ney to help disadvantage someone else. Indeed, a plan attorney's 
most useful role may be that of assisting the plan fiduciaries to carry 
out their duties of serving the participants and beneficiaries. Because 
376. Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate World: An Ab-
dication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 350, 358 (1973). 
377.: Shareholder interests are not always the primary ones. The Bankruptcy Code, 
for example, requires subordination of-shareholder interests to those of creditors, and this 
in tum affects the corporation-attorney relationship in bankruptcy proceedings. See 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub~ 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985). 
378. Significantly, "when a close corporation is indistinguishable from its owners, 
lawyers have been held to represent the owner, in disregard of the entity fortn." ANNo-
TATED RULES, supra note 346, at 148. 
379. See Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud The Law-
yer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw~ 1389; 1389 n.2 (1978). 
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the plan attorney's principal responsibility is not to represent the plan 
. . 
or a fiduciary against someone else, it is less important that the attor-
ney have a working concept of client as emboditnent of the interest he 
represents against all others. 
B. Privilege 
Our conclusion about the plan attorney's having no client ilnme-
diately suggests another important question. The existence of the at-
torney-client privilege is usually thought to depend on the client-
status of the person who communicates with the attomey.380 Because 
the concept of client has no place in the world of plan attorneys, does 
it follow that the attorney-client privilege must be absent as well? 
1. The Current State of the Law 
Interestingly, in some cases, federal courts have concluded that 
the answer is yes. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence delegates 
to the federal courts plenary power to develop rules of privilege,381 
including rules to govern the attorney-client privilege. One rule that 
has been developed is that, when an attorney renders legal services to 
a plan fiduciary which relate to matters within the fiduciary's area of 
responsibility, the fiduciary cannot shield his communications with 
the plan attorney from disclosure to plan participants and benefi-
ciaries in subsequent litigation brought by them. 382 At least in these 
circumstances, there is no attorney-client privilege. 383 
In developing this rule, courts have not relied on the policies un-
derlying ERISA, or even considered the question of the rule's consis-
tency with those policies. Instead, courts have relied on supposed 
analogies between the plan fiduciary /plan participant relationship and 
more familiar relationships involving corporations and trusts. 
380. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub 
nom. Garner v. First Am. Life Ins. Co., 401 U.S. 974 (1971); United States v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950). 
381. See supra text accompanying notes 313-327. 
382. See 'Petz v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 494, 497 (D. Conn. 1985); See also 
Washington--Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 543 F~ Supp. 906; Mioni v~ Bessemer Cement 
-Co., 4 Employee Benefits Cas. 2392 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 
F.R.D. 583 (N.D. ill. 19'81) (no privilege in suit by Secretary of Labor). 
383. This rule does not itself prevent there from being a privilege between the fiduci-
.ary and litigation counsel which shields communications during the litigation. Cf. Panter 
v. ·Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D~ 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (com.parable rule in share-
holder derivative suits). That issue of privilege must be dealt with separately. 
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One justification for finding no privilege, or at least a greatly con-
stricted privilege, in the plan context is the corresponding rule in the 
shareholder litigation context. In Gamer v. Wolfinbarger, 384 the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that where a corporation or its manage-
ment is sued by shareholders, allegedly for "acting inimically to 
stockholder interests," the privilege of the corporation and its man· 
agement to refuse to disclose comtnunications with attorneys for the 
corporation is "subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause 
why it should not be invoked in the particular instance."385 
The rule of Gamer is designed to help resolve competing inter-
ests. On the one hand, as the court there recognized, "management 
does not manage for itself and ... the beneficiaries of its action are the 
stockholders."386 More specifically, the shareholders may be the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the communications with the attorney, and so 
may have a legitimate interest in knowing the contents of them. 
Thus, there is no basis for the absolute withholding of management-
corporate attorney communications from the shareholders. But on 
the other hand, shareholders are not the only persons with a legiti-
mate stake in the corporation, and corporate management must bal-
ance all the competing interests. The decision1naking process of 
corporate management is often one in need of privacy. There are 
times when management cornmunications with attorneys should be 
protected, even though the conduct to which the communications re-
lates is alleged to be wrongful: "[I]t is difficult to envision the man-
agement of any sizeable corporation pleasing all of its stockholders all 
of the time, and management desires protection from those who tnight 
second-guess or even harass in matters purely of judgment."387 To 
resolve these competing considerations for and against disclosure to 
shareholders, the court in Garner laid down criteria for detertnining 
whether there existed, in a given case, good cause sufficient to defeat 
the privilege.388 The upshot is that, in the shareholder litigation con-
384. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). 
385. Gamer at 1103-4. 
386. Id. at 1101. 
387. Id. 
388. The Court identified the criteria as follows: 
There are many indicia that may contribute to a decision of presence or absence 
of good cause, among them the number of shareholders and the percentage of 
stock they represent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the share-
holders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or 
desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it 
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text, the corporation-attorney privilege is qualified. 389 
The first case to consider the availability of the attorney-client 
privilege in the context of plan fiduciary litigation closely followed 
Garner, and by analogy held that the attorney-plan privilege is simi-
larly qualified.390 Subsequent cases, though, have generally gone fur-
ther and concluded that plan fiduciaries should never be able to assert 
an attorney-client privilege against participants and beneficiaries. 
Drawing on the common law of trusts, these courts have held that 
'"[w]hen an attorney advises a fiduciary about a matter dealing with 
the . . . plan, the attorney's client is not the fiduciary personally but, 
rather, the . . . beneficiaries.''391 As the leading state comxnon law 
case on the subject explains: 
As a representative for the beneficiaries of the trust which he is 
administering, the trustee is not the real client in the sense that he 
is personally being served. And, the beneficiaries are not simply 
incidental beneficiaries who chance to gain from the professional 
services rendered. The very intention of the com1nunication is to 
aid the beneficiaries. The trustees . . . cannot subordinate the fidu-
ciary obligations owed to the beneficiaries to their own private in-
terests under the guise of attorney-client privilege. The policy of 
from other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by 
the corporation it is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful 
legality; whether the. communication related to past or to prospective actions; 
whether the communication is of advice concerning the litigation itself; the ex-
tent to which the communication is: identified versus the extent to which the 
shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other 
inforn1ation in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for in-
dependent reasons. 
Id. at 1104. 
389. The rule has been applied to relationships other than that between shareholders 
and corporate management. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., JS Bankr. 802 (Bankr. S.D., 
Ohio 1984) (creditors' committee creditor); Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co.,. 112 
F.R.D~ 671, 681 (D. Kan. 1986) (union member); Boswell v. IBEW, Local 164, 106 
LRRM 2713 (D.N.J. 19'81) (union member); Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., S67 F. 
Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (agency relationship). 
390. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D,. 583, 586 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Fitzsimmons did go beyond 
Garner in one respect,. in that it held that the privilege was similarly qualified in suits 
brought under ERISA by the Secretary of Labor. A case that antedated Donovan, United 
States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp. 840, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), contains dictum that "the 
'client' may be viewed as the pension and retirement benefit fund, or possibly its board of 
trustees,', and so "[a]n individual trustee would seem to have no proper personal interest 
in protecting against disclosure of communications which pertain to the fund's business.'' 
/d. 
391. Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 543, F. Supp. at 909. See also Petz, 
113 F.R.D. 494. 
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preserving the full disclosure necessary in the trustee-beneficiary 
relationship is . . . ultitnately more itnportant than the protection 
of the trustees' confidence in the attorney for the trust. 392 
And on the basis of this principle, that the participants and benefi-
ciaries are the true clients, the attomey•plan privilege has been held 
unavailable, not only in fiduciary litigation, but in benefit claim and 
other non-fiduciary litigation as well. 393 
It is unfortunate that these approaches to the attorney-plan privi-
lege have been developed without any regard for the policies of ER-
ISA and without attention to the distinctive characteristics of 
employee benefit plans. Both the qualified-privilege and the no-privi-
lege approaches are certainly plausible, and are superficially consis-
tent with ERISA. But they are each based on freewheeling 
analogizing that is analytically suspect and that is useless in the hard 
cases. 
Reliance on Garner's qualified privilege approach is flawed analo-
gizing because, as we have seen, benefit plans differ materially from 
corporations. Plan fiduciaries, unlike corporate officers and directors, 
are required to be loyal to only one interest group the participants 
and beneficiaries- and they are not ordinarily called upon to exer-
cise judgment in order to balance competing interests. Thus, the fea-
tures of managerial decision1naking that the Gamer court relied on to 
sustain the privilege at all are much less prominent in the context of 
benefit plans. Hence, the scope of the privilege in the plan context (if 
it exists at all) is .necessarily more limited than in the corporate 
context. 
Yet the alternative approach equally involves flawed analogizing. 
Whatever sense it makes to call a trust beneficiary the client of the 
trustee's attorney, it makes no sense to .call the plan participants and 
. beneficiaries the client of the plan attorney. They lack the very attri-
bute of a client decisionmaking authority that underlies the 
rules govertting cotntttunications with an attomey.394 Hence, conclu-
392 .. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 713-14 (Del. Ch. 1976). See also 
Estate of Torian v. Smith, 263 Ark. 304, 564 S .. W.2d 521 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
88~ (1978) (no privilege could be asserted by executor of estate against beneficiaries). 
393. Helt v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 113 F.R.D. 7 (D. Conn. 1986). See also 
United States. v. Evans, 796 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1986) (criminal prosecution for embezzle-
ment from pension fund). 
394. Developments in the Law Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REv. 
1450, 1472-80 (1985); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 2291 
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). 
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sions drawn from categorizing the participants and beneficiaries as the 
client are based on a demonstrably false prernise. An especially sus-
pect conclusion reached under this approach is the facile extension of 
the rule of no privilege beyond the context of fiduciary litigation to all 
suits brought by a participant against a fiduciary. 
Let us then examine the attorney-plan privilege, not as an iso-
lated rule of evidence, but as a part of the common law of plan attor-
neys, and in light of ERISA's policies, to see what should be the 
appropriate rules. 
2. Should There be a Privilege? 
Any testirnonial privilege is an exception to the general duty of 
all persons to provide testimony when called on to do so, and must be 
limited to the narrowest scope consistent with the policies that legiti-
mate it.395 Let us consider when, if ever, communications between 
plan fiduciaries and plan attorneys should be privileged. To do so, it 
is useful to make some distinctions. 
a. Intra-Plan and Extra-Plan Litigation 
The first, and broadest, distinction to be made is between intra-
plan litigation and extra-plan litigation. 
Intra-plan litigation is between plan actors fiduciaries, partici-
pants, beneficiaries, parties-in-interest, the Secretary of Labor in 
their capacities as such. It includes clairns under ERISA section 
502(a) or any other civil remedy provision in ERISA; claiins involv-
ing a plan that arise under section 302(c)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act; 
and certain claims arising under the federal comtnon law of benefit 
plans. The specific kinds of claims in this category will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
Extra-plan litigation, on the other hand, is litigation between a 
plan or plan fiduciaries on the one side of the suit and persons not 
involved in the establishment or operation of the plan on the other 
side of the suit. It includes connnercial and tort litigation with plan 
outsiders, and will normally arise from the plan's incidental business 
activities. Extra-plan suits usually will have nothing to do with the 
internal management, administration, or operation of a benefit plan. 
This distinction is obviously rough, and it is easy to envisage bor-
395. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 394, § 2291, at 554. 
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derline cases. 396 Refinement of the distinction, though, is not possible 
until it has begun to be put to use in real cases. Still, the distinction is 
useful for making the key point, that plan privilege issues will arise in 
two very different kinds of suits: those arising from a plan's activities 
as a plan, potentially implicating ERISA's fiduciary and disclosure 
policies; and those arising from a plan's incidental activities. The 
point is important, because the factors · g upon the existence and 
scope of any attorney-plan privilege are very different in the two kinds 
of cases. 
b. The Privilege in Extra-Plan Litigation 
In general, the question of the availability of the attorney-plan 
privilege in extra-plan litigation is an easy one. The paradigm for this 
category is litigation concerning a plan's business activities; a breach 
of contract action, for example. Ordinarily, there will be no special, 
ERISA-based duties running from the plan or its fiduciaries to the 
other party, which might justify modifying or elirninating the privi-
lege. Nor are the issues in this kind of litigation likely to be governed 
by any ERISA policies that might affect the existence of the privilege. 
Thus, extra-plan litigation presumptively should be treated just like 
any other case of business litigation involving an organization. The 
rationale for according a privilege to attorney-corporation cotnlnuni-
cations397 should apply equally to attorney-plan communications, and 
yield the same scope for the privilege. 
c. Three Varieties of Intra-Plan Litigation 
Intra-plan litigation presents more complex issues. To analyze 
this category properly, some further distinctions are needed. 
As a first approxitnation, one may distinguish three main kinds 
of intra-plan litigation: fiduciary litigation, suits for benefits, and non-
ERISA claims. These three classes are obviously not mutually exclu-
sive: lawsuits often involve claims from two, or all three, classes. Nor 
are the three classes fully comprehensive: ERISA section 502(a) 
shows on its face that there may be ERISA suits that are neither fidu-
ciary claims nor benefit claims.398 Nor are the boundaries between 
396. For example, an adversary proceeding by the trustee of a participant's bank-
ruptcy estate for turnover of the participant's benefits or vested plan interest. 
397. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). 
398. For example, a suit to compel an administrator to supply information. ERISA 
§ 502(a)(l)(A) & (c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(A) & (c) (1974). 
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the classes sharp. Still, it is convenient to begin with this classification 
scheme, for it helps to isolate the plan characteristics and the ERISA 
policies most si . · cant for assessing privilege clairns. 
i. Fiduciary Litigation 
Let us begin with the case of fiduciary litigation. The paradigm 
for this category is. a suit against a fiduciary, under ERISA sections 
502(a)(2) and 409(a), alleging a violation of ERISA sections 404, 405, 
or 406. 
The prevailing view, discussed above, seems correct: there 
should be no attorney-plan privilege at all for pre-lawsuit communica-
tions relating to the challenged fiduciary conduct. However, this con-
clusion is not reached (as it is in current case law) through a 
formalistic labelling of the participants and beneficiaries as the clients. 
Instead, it is based on factors derived from ERISA; in particular, on 
the duty of loyalty of the plan fiduciary, and on ERISA's strong pol-
icy of full disclosure. 
The analysis is not complicated. To begin, all fiduciaries, of 
whatever kind, owe a duty of loyalty. Otherwise, they would not be 
fiduciaries. 399 The reasoning of Garner shows that, because of this 
duty of loyalty, any attorney-client privilege involving a fiduciary .as 
client or client representative must be qualified with respect to the 
persons to whom the loyalty is owed. In the case of plans, in particu-
lar, the fiduciary's duty of loyalty requires that the attorney-plan priv-
ilege be qualified with respect to participants and beneficiaries. It 
should also be qualified with respect to other fiduciaries and the Sec-
retary of Labor, at least when they sue on participants' and benefi-
ciaries' behalf~ But, as the reasoning of Garner also shows, a 
fiduciary's duty of loyalty is not a sufficient reason to nullify the privi-
lege entirely. 
In the case of ERISA plans, there is an additional factor that 
bears upon the privilege question: the disclosure policy. As explained 
above, ERISA requires plans to make extensive disclosures about fi-
duciary conduct.400 The disclosure policy is an adjunct to the fiduci-
ary policies, designed to afford participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, 
and the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to review fiduciary con-
duct, and designed to facilitate the correction of wrongs when neces-
399. J. SHEPHERD, supra note 102, at 48., 
400" See supra notes. 69-82 and accom.panying text. 
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s,ary. It also provides a strong incentive for fiduciaries to ,act properly. 
All secrecy about fiduciary conduct is inimical to this policy, espe-
cially secrecy that would interfere with oversight and correction of 
fiduciary wrongs by participants and beneficiaries. Because, of this 
central policy, a fiduciary's conduct or decisionmaking, to the extent 
it might represent a breach of fiduciary duty, is not entitled to any 
privacy. Neither the fiduciary nor anyone else has any legitimate in-
terest in maintaining that conduct or decisiontnaking in secrecy from 
the participants and beneficiaries. As corollary, a fiduciary's commu-
nications with a plan attorney about matters challenged as a fiduciary 
breach are not entitled to privacy from the participants and benefi-
ciaries (or their surrogate$) in litigation about that conduct. 
Thus, it is ERISA;s disclosure policy, rather than any supposed 
status of the participants as clients, that requires the privilege to be 
unavailable. And, as a result, the scope of the disclosure policy must 
determine the scope of the region of no privilege. 
ii. Benefit Claims 
Very different considerations are involved in benefit claims. The 
paradigm for this category is a suit under ERISA section 
502(a)(l)(B), by a participant or beneficiary who claims that his bene-
fits were incorrectly computed. 
In such cases, the participant or beneficiary sues on his own be-
half; and seeks relief accruing only to himself. His claim is that a 
.fiduciary was mistaken or acted outside his discretion; not that he 
breached a fiduciary duty to the detriment of the plan. Because fidu-
ciary wrongdoing is not the crux of the claitn, the strong policy of 
disclosure is not so compelling a reason against the privilege as it is in 
fiduciary claims. Yet the general considerations of fiduciary loyalty 
still militate in favor of qualification of the privilege under the Garner 
rationale. What, then, should be the appropriate rule? 
The key is the fact that the result of the s,uit, unlike as in a fiduci-
ary suit, will not necessarily benefit the entire plan or a large group of 
participants and beneficiaries. In fact, a decision in favor of the claim-
ant may threaten to harm the interests of others, by leaving fewer 
assets, or fewer liquid assets, in the plan for payment of benefits to 
them. In benefit cases, the interest of the complaining participant 
may be in conflict with the interests of other participants and benefi-
ciaries; perhaps, in conflict with all of them. 
As a result, in deciding benefit claims, fiduciaries may have to 
balance legitimate, but conflicting interests. By doing so,-the fiduciary 
' 
1148 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 41:1049 
acts in a manner-analogous to that of a corporate manager. A balanc-
ing rule of the type announced by Garner, which is designed precisely 
for fiduciaries who must resolve competing interests, seems appropri-
ate for deterrnining the availability of the privilege in these cases.401 
However, the factors identified by the court in Gamer, as si . · cant 
for corporate misconduct claims, are not necessarily appropriate ones 
in the context of benefit claims. The factors courts should consider in 
determining whether to hold communications privileged in these 
cases must be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Clearly, though, 
they should be concerned largely with the presence or absence of in-
tra-plan conflicts and the extent to which the fiduciary,s claitned error 
in deterntining benefits is alleged to result from something other than 
honest misjudgment. 
iii. Non-ERISA Litigation 
If an instance of intra-plan litigation should happen not to arise 
under ERISA or the federal common law of benefit plans, it would be 
unlikely to involve considerations of fiduciary loyalty, fiduciary dis-
cretion, or disclosure. If so, there would be little, if any, reason to 
qualify or eliminate the privilege. Individual cases might present spe-
cialized issues; but, in the main, litigation in this category should be 
treated just like extra-plan litigation for purposes of the attorney-plan 
privilege. 
3. Difficult Cases 
The categories just discussed are only a starting point for analy-
sis, but they do suggest how to deal with mixed, intermediate and 
difficult cases. 
Consider, for exatnple, a conunon case, where a person is sued 
for breach of fiduciary duty and defends on the ground that he is not a 
fiduciary. Since either the allegation or denial of fiduciary status 
might be specious, how should one proceed? To give full effect to the 
traditional attorney-client privilege in this case, or even to recog11ize it 
401. There is another important similarity between corporate managerial decisions 
and fiduciary determinations of benefit claims that results from their both being commit-
ted to the officer's or fiduciary's discretion. Both corporate officers and fiduciaries are 
protected from having their discretionary decisions second-guessed. In the corporate 
context, these decisions are insulated by the business judgment rule, see, e.g., Shamrock 
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 269 (Del. Ch. 1989), and in the ERISA 
context by the abuse of discretion standard, see Bruch, 489 U.S. 101. 
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pending a preliminary deterntination of fiduciary status, tnight en-. 
courage this defense in cases where its justification is weak. Encour-
aging avoidance of fiduciary obligations is not consistent with ERISA. 
But simply to treat the case as a straightforward fiduciary breach 
case, and apply the no-privilege rule, might lead to invasion of the 
privacy of comtnunications that legitirnately warrant protection. The 
problem becomes one of resolving these competing concerns. 
A practical way to handle cases of this type, consistent with ER-
ISA's policies, would be to start with a presumption that there is no 
privilege that the case truly involves a fiduciary claim but allow 
the presumption to be rebutted by a strong and early showing that the 
defendant is not a fiduciary. The reason for starting with a presump-
tion in favor of no privilege is that ERISA fiduciary status is a matter 
of degree. Merely because a person's discretionary authority falls 
short of the amount needed to bring him within the fiduciary rules, it 
does not follow that he fully escapes the reach of ERISA's policies -
including those that justify qualification or elimination of the privi-
lege. 402 It is fair to suppose, as a general principle, that the greater the 
defendant's difficulty in establishing that he fell short of the requisite 
degree of discretionary authority needed to make him a fiduciary, the 
more intimately he must have been involved in the management and 
operation of the plan, and the more he is arguably subject to ERISA's 
fiduciary and disclosure policies. Since this approach is a pragmatic 
one, it may, of course, result in disclosure of comtnunications in some 
cases where a trial subsequently shows that the communicant was not 
a fiduciary. But ERISA's policies rnilitate in favor of erring on the 
side of disclosure. 
It is interesting to note that the arguments advanced here also 
suggest that the attorney-client privilege may properly be qualified 
even when the attorney in question is not a plan attorney. Consider 
the case where a person who is unequivocally not a fiduciary is sued 
for participation in a fiduciary's breach of duty.403 In most cases, the 
non-fiduciary will owe no duty of loyalty to the plan participants. 
Thus, the normal privilege attaching to communications with his at-
torney cannot be qualified on the Garner rationale. But the non-fidu-
ciary allegedly did bring himself within the ambit ofERISA's policies, 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 91-109. 
403. This kind of federal common law claim is discussed in Section VI(A), infra 
notes 460-483, and accompanying text. 
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including its fiduciary and disclosure policies, by assisting the fiduci-
ary to violate his duty of loyalty to participants. If pre-litigation com-
munications with the non-fiduciary's attorney relate to the fiduciary's 
breach of fiduciary duty, ERISA's disclosure policies may tell against 
recognition of the privilege. A further consideration is that the non-
fiduciary who participated in the breach arguably should be in no bet-
ter position than the fiduciary to withhold infor1nation about it. 
As in the prior case, a workable approach to dealing with this 
situation would involve be · · g with a strong presu1nption against 
application of the attorney-client privilege. Again, case-by-case devel-
opment would be needed to work out the contours of this rule. 
V. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OF THE PLAN ATTORNEY 
Our discussion to this point, concerning the substance of plan-
attorney common law, has provided some insight into the character of 
the relationships that the plan attorney has with the fiduciaries and 
with the participants and beneficiaries. Our goal, though, is to de-
velop principles and rules that might govern plan attorney conduct 
within the context of those relationships. We begin that development 
here. 
A. Disclosure and Cofiduciary Duties 
The discussion of compelled, testiinonial disclosure of communi-
cations with a plan attorney suggests a closely-related question: the 
extent, if any, to which a plan attorney is permitted or required to 
disclose information, on her own initiative, about a possible breach of 
duty or violation of ERISA. This is the so-called "client fraud"404 
problem as applied to the plan "client." 
The client fraud problem arises in any comprehensive body of 
attorney law. It does so because a duty of loyalty is an essential part 
of any acceptable concept of attorney. 405 That duty of loyalty invaria-
bly is understood to encompass a sub-duty on the part of the attorney 
not to use information gained in the representation adversely to the 
interests represented. 406 Prima facie, the duty of non-disclosure in-
404. Hazard, supra note 341, at 291. 
405. On the duty of loyalty in the federal common law of attorneys, see, e.g., In re 
Com Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d at 161; In re "Agent Orange" Product Liab. 
Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1986); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977). 
406. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395. 
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eludes a duty not to disclose frauds and wrongs of the client; but that 
creates a very serious problem, for an attorney also has duties to per~ 
sons and interests other than those to whom and to which his duty of 
loyalty runs. In particular, he has a duty to promote the administra-
tion of justice and to maintain the integrity of the judicial system; and 
this duty, arguably, encompasses a duty to prevent the perpetration of 
frauds in connection with his representation. Because of this latter 
obligation, an attorney's duty of confidentiality arguably should not 
be absolute.407 But its proper scope - ... the determination of which is 
the "client fraud problem" is a matter of some disagreement. 
The plan attorney, as an attorney, surely has some duty or duties 
of loyalty with respect to the plan.408 What does the interaction be-
tween this duty or those duties of loyalty and the plan attorney's du-
ties to the. public and to other interests entail about confidentiality and 
disclosure in the plan context? Specifically, what is a plan attorney to 
do when he has reason to believe. that a fiduciary has committed .a 
breach of duty? 
To answer this question, we must first determine what sources to 
draw on for guidance. 
1. The ABA Codes and the Emphasis on Confidentiality 
Two sources that should not be relied on uncritically are the 
ABA's Model Code of Profession.al Conduct and Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. 409 
407. For an argument that the duty of confidentiality should be absolute, see Freed-
man, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defonse Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966). 
408. We defer discussion of the contours of the duties until Section B, infra notes 
442-459 and accompanying text. 
409. One reason is that their provisions were designed to reflect only minimum stan~ 
dards ofconduct, compliance with which is sufficient to allow an attorney to avoid pro-
fessional censure~. They do not purport to reflect fiduciary standards or any standards of 
conduct; violation of which may result in civil liability. Tew v. Arky, Freed, Stearns, 
Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, P.A., 655 F. Supp. 1573, 1575 (S.D. Fla. 1987), ajf'd 
mem., 846 F.2d 753 (11th Cir. 1988); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. 
Iowa 1978), ajf'd mem., 590 F.2d 341 (8th Cir~ 1978); ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 
361, at 10. But see Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of 
Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979) (arguing for use as stan-
dards far civil liability). · 
This consideration, though, has not prevented some courts from relying on the pro-
fessional rules to help identify appropriate standards of fiduciary conduct. E.g., Avianca, 
Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989); Financial Ger.. Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1981), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 680 F.2d 76.8 
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The original Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, in-
structed that: 
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been 
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, 
he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if 
his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he 
should promptly infortn the injured person or his counsel, so that 
they may take appropriate steps.4to 
The guidelines for professional conduct have greatly changed.411 
While the Canons subordinated the lawyer's obligation of confidenti-
ality to his responsibility to the public, the Model Code and Model 
Rules treat as virtually paramount the obligation of an attorney to 
keep confidential the information disclosed in the course of a repre-
sentation.412 The elevation of this duty to such preeminent status is 
inconsistent with the policies of ERISA and the purposes of plan at-
torney common law-. 
Consider, for example, Model Rule 1.6, the _prevailing, basic rule 
of confidentiality. It gives a very simple answer to the client fraud 
question, by providing, in relevant part, that: "A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the cli-
ent consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation."413 This 
sweeping rule, which imposes confidentiality on any "information re-
lating to representation,''414 would clearly prohibit disclosure of any 
breach of fiduciary duty. The rule is purportedly based on the law of 
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Gomez v. Hawkins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. 
Fla. 1985). 
410~ CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 41 (1908) .. 
411. The change is described in detail in Nahstoll, The Lawyer's Allegiance: Priori-
ties Regarding Confidentiality, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 421, 429-38 (1984). 
412. On the central place of confidentiality in the codes, see, e.g., Schneyer, Profes-
sionalism as Bar Politics:- The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 L. 
& Soc. INQUIRY 677 (1989); Patterson, Legal Ethics & The Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 
EMORY L.J. 909 (1980). 
413. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.6(a). The permissive (but 
not mandatory) exceptions have no substantial relevance to plan representation. 
414. MODEL CoDE DR 4-101, by comparison, prohibits disclosure only ·of privi-
leged, ''embarrassing'; or ''detrimental" information: 
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege under applicable law, and "secret'' refers to other information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the 
disclosure-of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental 
to the client. 
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attorney-client privilege and on the law of agency.415 However, 
neither putative source justifies so sweeping a rule of silence in the 
plan context. 
Consider the first justification: the attorney-client privilege. As 
we have seen, no privilege attaches to com1nunications with a plan 
attorney regarding fiduciary breaches, and many other coJnmunica-
tions with hitn are subject to only a qualified privilege. To the extent 
the rule of confidentiality is based on the law of privilege or its poli-
cies, it must be lirnited when sought to be applied to plan attorneys. 
Consider next the other justification: principles of agency. That 
rationale also fails to justify any sweeping rule of confidentiality in the 
plan context. The common law rule, fo11nd in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency, and expressly relied on by Rule 1.6, is that: 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the princi-
pal not to use or to comtnunicate infor1nation confidentially given 
him by the principal or acquired by hiin during the course of or on 
account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in com-
petition with or to the injury of the principal, on his own account or 
on behalf of another, although such information does not relate to 
the transaction in which he is then employed, unless the informa-
tion is a matter of general knowledge.416 
The thrust of the rule is not to blanket in secrecy all infortnation ob-
tained by an attorney or other agent. Rather, its main purpose is to 
protect the client's or principal's confidential business information 
against misuse by the agent. That purpose has nothing to do with a 
lawyer's knowledge of fiduciary breaches, and has little relevance to 
benefit plans, which do not normally have confidential business 
information. 
Rule 1.6 is not an isolated idiosyncrasy, for the Model Rules as a 
whole is structured so as to prevent disclosure of any non-public in-
(B) Except when per1nitted under DR 4-101(c), a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. 
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. 
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or 
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. On the reason for the 
broadening of the anti-disclosure provision in the Model Rules, see Schneyer, supra note 
412. 
415. ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 61; see also id. at 65 (legal background 
to Rule 1.6). 
416. RES,.,.,.I'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395 (emphasis supplied). 
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formation known to an attomey.417 The Model Rules · in particular, 
the confidentiality provisions represents the outlook of attorneys 
for whom representation is predo1ninantly adversarial.418 It also rep-
resents the outlook of those attorneys who strongly identify with, if 
not adopt as their own, the interests of their clients.419 The result is 
an us-against-them outlook that inexorably leads to a de--emphasis of 
the lawyer's duties to the public. As one commentator 'has observed, 
the ABA codes invert the proper ordering of interests to be served by 
a lawyer, placing lawyer self..;interest first and the interest of the public 
in the proper functioning of the legal system last.420 The Model Code 
and the Model Rules recognize few, if any, instances where a lawyer is 
even pernrltted, let alone required, to disclose client violations of 
laws.421 
But as we have seen already, plans are not businesses, plan ,attor-
neys do not play an essentially adversarial role, and ERISA an-
nounces a clear and protninent public interest in full disclosure of 
fiduciary wrongs as a prophylactic means to facilitate benefit ·plans' 
proper functioning. The law of plan attorneys cannot ignore these 
important facts. In framing rules of conduct for plan attorneys, one 
cannot impose on plan attorneys any duty of confidentiality so strin-
gent as to absolutely bar them from disclosing fiduciary breaches. 
2. The Cojiduciary Obligation of Plan Attorneys 
What, then, do ERISA's policies require and permit of a plan 
attorney when he learns of a breach? 
417. See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(c), 1.16, 
4.1(b). 
418. See Nahstoll, supra note 411, at 438. On the dependence of the strict duty of 
confidentiality on a strict adversarial view of representation, :see Noonan, The Purposes of 
Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1485 (1966). 
419. In particular, criminal defendants and corporations. See Schneyer, supra note 
412, at 718-21;-Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 17 GA. L. REv. 891, 898-903 (1983). 
420. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. 
REv. 702 (1977). 
421.. Indeed, the only substantial exceptions to the confidentiality rule are for cases 
of lawyer self .. interest: collection of fees and protection against claims of malpractice and 
other wrongdoing. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR ·~l01(c)(4); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2). 
' 
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a. The Obligation to Take Action 
There can be no doubt the plan attorney must do something; he 
cannot simply ignore the wrong. 
Consider plan fiduciaries, by analogy. ERISA makes them re-
sponsible for the proper conduct of each other, imposing liability on a 
fiduciary whenever "he has knowledge of a breach by such other fidu-
ciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to 
remedy the breach."422 As we have seen, for many reasons ERISA's 
disclosure and fiduciary policies should apply to plan attorneys, and 
ERISA's fiduciary rules may serve as the starting point for comtnon 
law development. With respect to knowledge of fiduciary wrongdo-
ing, the saxne fiduciary and disclosure policies that underlie ERISA's 
rule of co-fiduciary liability tnilitate in favor of a rule requiring the 
attorney to take reasonable steps either to bring about a cure of the 
breach hitnself or to cause a fiduciary, or some other authorized per-
son, to do so. Such a rule would help plan attorney comtnon law 
fulfill its prophylactic function. 
Si · cantly, another body of federal law that relies on disclosure 
as a means of protection and enforcement imposes similar remedial 
and disclosure obligations on attorneys. In the field of securities law, 
the SEC has taken the lead in compelling action by securities counsel 
who learn of client wrongs.423 As the SEC explicated its chosen stan-
dard in the leading case of In re Carter:424 
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation 
of a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the 
federal securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a 
substantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure re-
quirements, his continued participation violates professional stan-
dards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's non-
compliance .... 
• • • • 
Initially, counselling accurate disclosure is sufficient, even if 
his advice is not accepted. But there comes a point at which a 
reasonable lawyer must conclude that his advice is not being fol-
lowed, or even sought in good faith, and that his client is involved 
422. ERISA § 405(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3) (1974). 
423. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847 (1981). 
See generally Kaplan, Some Ruminations on the Role of Counsel for a Corporation, 56 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 873 (1981). 
424. [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,172 (1981). 
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in a continuing course of violating the securities laws. At this criti-
cal juncture, the lawyer must take further, more affirmative steps 
in order to avoid the inference that he has been co-opted, willingly 
or unwillingly, into the scheme of non-disclosure. 
The lawyer is in the best position to choose his next step. Res-
ignation is one option, although we recognize that other considera-
tions, including the protection of the client against foreseeable 
prejudice, must be taken into account in the case of withdrawal. A 
direct approach to the board of directors or one or more individual 
directors or officers may be appropriate; or he may choose to try to 
enlist the aid of other members of the fir1n's management. What is 
required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclu-
sion that the lawyer is engaged in efforts to correct the underlying 
problem, rather than having capitulated to the desires of a strong-
willed, but tnisguided client.42S 
On other occasions, the SEC has gone so far as to impose on attorneys 
a duty to make public disclosure of corporate wrongs. 426 The ration-
ale is that lawyers have a duty to the public to protect the integrity of 
the legal system; a duty that may supersede the lawyer's duty to an 
individual client. 427 
Yet there is really nothing peculiar to ERISA or the securities 
laws in the position that a lawyer's duty to the public may supersede 
the duty of confidentiality. For example, in reaction to Model Rule 
1.6, the Senate considered a bill that would have made it a misde-
meanor for an attorney not to disclose certain client crimes and 
frauds.428 The proposed Restatement of the Law The Law Gov-
425. Id. 
426. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 
1978). 
427 .. See Kaplan, supra note 423, at 881. 
428. The proposed Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Actt S. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983), provided that: 
Sec. 2. Chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting im-
mediately following section 1343 the following new -section: 
"SEC. 1344. An attorney · . 
"(a)(l) who has in the course of representing a client placed in any post 
office or authorized depository for mail documents that the attorney pre-
pared or any other matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered that 
could enable or assist the client to commit a -criminal or fraudulent act, or 
''(2) who has prepared documents for or who has otherwise been instru-
mental in assisting a client who has placed in any post office or authorized 
depository for mail any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered in 
furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent scheme, and who 
''(b )(1) upon discovering that his client intends to commit a criminal or 
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erning Lawyers includes black-letter statements. of such obligation.429 
Many states that have adopted the Model Rules have modified them 
so as to require or per1nit disclosure of-crimes or frauds, at least in 
certain circumstances.43o 
Indeed, the Model Rules themselves recognize some obligation of 
disclosure. Geoffrey Ha7~rd, the Reporter for the Model Rules, has 
argued that, notwithstanding Rule 1.6's seemingly absolute require-
ment of confidentiality, the Comment to it invites an attorney who 
resigns because of his client's wrong to do so in a way that signals to 
affected parties that a wrong is being committed.431 More clearly, 
Rule 1.13 provides, in. relevant part, that: 
I d. 
{b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee 
or other person associated with the organization is engaged in ac-
fraudulent act fails to make timely disclosure to Federal law enforcement 
authorities of such intended conduct in order to prevent such conduct, or 
(2) upon discovering that his client has committed a criminal or fraudulent 
act fails to make timely disclosure to Federal law enforcement authorities 
of his knowledge regarding such conduct in order to mitigate the conse-
quences of hi$ client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of 
which the attorney's services were used, shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both." Hearings on the 
bill elicited comments favoring an obligation of attorneys to correct or dis .. 
close crimes and frauds. 
Much of the testimony at the hearings on the bill were in favor of imposing some 
remedial obligations on attorneys, even if not through critninal sanctions. See generally 
Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure: Hearing on S. 485 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of 
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
429. RFSI"ATEMENT OF THE LAW THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS [Report-
ers' Proposal] ll7B (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1989) provides that: 
I d. 
Following an attempt by the lawyer, if feasible, to dissuade the client, a lawyer 
may use or disclose confidential client information if and to the extent the law ... 
yer reasonably believes: 
( 1) The client intends to commit a crime or fraud that threatens to cause_ 
substantial financial loss; and 
(2) The lawyer's use or disclosure is: 
(a) Reasonably appropriate to prevent the act; and 
(b) Necessary in view of the imminence of the substantial financial 
loss. 
430. See generally 2 G. HAzARD & W. HODES, supra note 154, at 1259-61 (discuss-
ing state modifications). 
431. Hazard, supra note 341, at 301-08. The Comment in question states that 
"Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.,8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving 
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any 
opinion, document,. affirmation, or the like/' ANNOTATED RULES, supra note 361, at 62. 
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tion, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the repre-
sentation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the 
organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be im-
puted to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial in-
jury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization. In deter1nining 
how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seri-
ousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature 
of the lawyer'~ representation, the responsibility in the organiza-
tion and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the poli-
cies of the organization concerning such matters and any other 
relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to 
minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing 
infor1nation relating to the representation to persons outside the 
organization. Such measures may include among others: 
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter; 
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be 
sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organiza-
tion; and 
(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organiza-
tion, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, refer-
ral to the: highest authority that can act in behalf of the 
organization as determined by applicable law. (c) If, despite the 
lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest au-
thority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon ac-
tion, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is 
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer 
may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.432 
Thus, notwithstanding Model Rule 1.6, there is wide agreement 
that ,an attorney who learns of a wrong in connection with a represen"" 
tation should not be required, or even permitted, to sit silently by. He 
has an obligation to use his knowledge and his authority to deal with 
the wrongdoing. Both ERISA's co-fiduciary rules and corresponding 
rules in other contexts suggest that the conduct required of a plan 
432. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13. Cf. Los Angeles 
County Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm.,, Informal Op. 1981·1 (1981), reprinted in Law. Man. on 
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1703 (1984) (attorney who learns of breach of fiduciary 
duty by clients ''must attempt to persuade the clients to avoid the activity"); San Diego 
County Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics & Unlawful Practices Comm., Op. 1983-10 (1983), re-
printed in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1803 (1984) ("when represent-
fig a client who as a fiduciary fails to perform his duties or act properly, an attorney must 
urge his client to file an accurate account of the facts',). 
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attorney in such case must be conduct that is reasonable under the 
circumstances. The standard for reasonability, of course, must be 
shaped by ERISA's fiduciary and disclosure policies. 
b. The Contours of the Obligation 
Under ERISA there are few specific rules for deter1nining what 
remedial efforts by a plan fiduciary are to be deemed "reasonable" 
under the circumstances. The legislative history -·-· the main gui-
dance for case law development along with the common law of trusts 
- says only that if a fiduciary cannot correct the breach hi1nself: 
[T]he most appropriate steps in the circutnstances may be to notify 
the plan sponsor of the breach, or to proceed to an appropriate 
Federal court for instructions, or bring the matter to the attention 
of the Secretary of Labor. The proper remedy is to be determined 
by the facts_ and circumstances of the particular case, and it may be 
affected by the relationship of the fiduciary to_ the plan-and to the 
co-fiduciary, the duties and responsibilities of the fiduciary in ques-
tion, and the nature of the breach. 433 
This general standard for plan fiduciaries obviously may be an 
important source of guidance. However, it clearly must be modified 
in order properly to be adapted to plan attorneys. Plan attorneys 
have powers and responsibilities different from those of plan fiducia-
ries, _and one cannot mechanically require them to do what it might be 
appropriate for a plan fiduciary to do. A plan attorney, for example, 
has no standing under ERISA section 502(a) to bring suit against a 
wrongdoing fiduciary, and so cannot himself bring about court inter-
vention to cure the problem. One must develop guidelines responsive 
to the powers and responsibilities of plan attorneys. 
Co-fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is triggered when a fi-
duciary ''knew or should have known" of a breach.434 This should be 
433. H.R. CoNF. REP. No~ 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 29-9-300 (1974), reprinted in 
Ill LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 22, at 4566-67, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5080. 
434. Hendershott, 840 F.2d at 342 (''knowledge of the breach can be inferred from 
surrounding circumstances raising a reasonable inference of knowledge''). The standard 
is derived from the common law of torts, G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 565; Whitney v. 
Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1986) (fiduciary held liable where "on notice'' of 
breach); and is generally consistent with the ABA Codes. See MoDEL RULES OF PRo-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT, Terminology, paras. 5, 8 (1983); Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to 
Report Another Lawyer's Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 977, 986. 
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the trigger for plan attorney responsibility as well, and cases purport-
edly based on rules of professional responsibility, that require actual 
knowledge of a wrong in order to trigger a disclosure obligation,435 
must be rejected as inconsistent with the policies of ERISA. Note, 
however, that this standard is only a trigger to do something; it is not 
necessarily a trigger to make disclosure about the apparent breach. 
Privilege considerations do not litnit disclosure of wrongs to 
other fiduciaries to the Secretary of Labor or the participants as 
a pertnissible course of action.436 If a plan attorney reasonably be-
lieves that disclosure of a wrong to such a person is reasonable under 
the circutnstances, there is no extrinsic rule to prevent his doing so. 
But it does not follow that disclosure is always appropriate as a 
first step. Opponents of rules that permit or require disclosure of cli-
ent wrongs invariably raise the argument that a rule affording strict 
protection for client information will induce clients to confide wrongs, 
and thus give the attorney an opportunity to convince the client to 
remedy them.437 As an empirical assertion, the claitn is 11ntested and 
probably untestable; but as a piece of coxntnon sense, it has obvious 
validity.438 A plan attorney may be an extremely influential coun-
selor, and a rule always requiring disclosure xnight be counterproduc-
tive. Disclosure may be unnecessary, for example, where a breach has 
resulted from mistake or negligence, and the breaching fiduciary 
heeds the attorney's advice to cure it. The plan attorney may reason-
ably determine that no further steps for example, an effort to seek 
removal of the fiduciary are necessary. A strict rule always requir-
ing further disclosure might encourage fiduciaries to engage compli-
ant attorneys, and xnight reduce the incentives for fiduciaries to 
consult with attorneys about questionable conduct. If the plan attor-
ney is to be able to fulfill his proper and needed function, he should 
have some discretion to treat knowledge of wrongdoing as confiden-
435. E.g., In re Grievance Comm. of United States Dist. Ct., Dist. of Conn., 847 
F.2d 57, 62-3 (2d Cir. 1988). 
I d. 
436. Cj. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILfl'Y DR 7-102(B)(l): 
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client has, in the 
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall 
promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is 
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, 
except when the infortnation is protected as a privileged communication. 
437. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 412, at 719. 
438. See 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 154, at 128-29. 
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tial, even if the knowledge is not ultitnately privileged against disclo-
sure in litigation. Possession of discretion in this regard is consistent 
with the plan attorney's fiduciary-like role in the affairs of the plan.439 
Of course, there will be tirnes when disclosure of a fiduciary's 
wrong is appropriate, either because the breaching fiduciary will not 
remedy the wrong or because the fiduciary, through the breach, has 
demonstrated unfitness for his role. For the protection of the plan, 
disclosure may be necessary so that further steps can be taken by 
those with power to do so. Nortnally, another fiduciary should be the 
first choice as the person to whom the disclosure is made. The fiduci-
aries are the persons with primary responsibility to manage the plan 
and to protect the interests of the participants. If that step fails, it 
may be appropriate to bring the breach to the attention of the Depart-
ment of Labor or the participants and beneficiaries. 
One further point is important. A plan attorney who learns of a 
breach, and who cannot convince the wrongdoer to rectify it, cannot 
be allowed the easy escape of resignation, as he is under the Model 
Rules. 440 To do so would be inconsistent with ERISA's fiduciary poli-
cies, which prohibit resignation by fiduciaries in such circum-
stances;441 inconsistent with the plan attorney's obligations to the 
ongoing activity of the plan and to the participants and beneficiaries; 
and would defeat the function of plan attorney common law as auxil-
iary to ERISA's fiduciary rules. A plan attorney is not a hired gun, a 
fungible who mechanically does the bidding of a plan fiduciary. He is 
439. See ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1974); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSIS 187 comment a. 
440. Resignation is easy under the Model Rules. Rule 1.16(b) provides that: 
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a 
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the 
interests of the client, or if: 
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services 
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 
(2) the client bas used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers 
repugnant or imprudent; 
( 4) the client fails substantially to fu1fill an obligation to the lawyer regard-
ing the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the 
lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on 
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or 
( 6) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b). 
441. Chambers, 650 F. Supp. 369; Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. at 635. 
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a person who may well be intitnately involved in the workings of the 
plan; who is likely to be extensively relied on; who has responsibilities 
to the plan and its constituents; and who may be, in effect, a fiduciary 
with respect to the legal affairs of the plan. His obligations to the plan 
cannot be brought to an end at will, and his co-fiduciary obligations 
require no less than reasonable efforts to stop wrongs to the plan or to 
enlist the efforts of someone with power to do so. 
B. General Fiduciary Standards 
In our discussion above of the purpose and general character of 
plan attorney common law, we explained how ERISA's fiduciary 
rules could be used analogically, to determine rules of conduct for 
attorneys, and perhaps other persons who are functionally similar to 
plan fiduciaries, in the same way that trust law standards may be used 
as a basis for rules governing other kinds of fiduciaries.442 We now 
make use of this approach for purposes of developing plan attorney 
fiduciary rules in the following way. As a working hypothesis, we 
treat plan attorneys as if they were a new kind of plan fiduciary. In 
particular, we begin our analysis of plan attorney fiduciary obligations 
by treating plan attorneys as if they were fiduciaries with respect to 
the legal affairs of the plan. This approach is particularly appropriate 
for an attorney who serves as general counsel for a plan. 
The "legal affairs" of a plan consist mainly of the fiduciaries' 
compliance with the plan document and with ERISA and its attend-
ant regulations. Accordingly, to say that a plan attorney is a fiduciary 
with respect to the legal affairs of a plan is to assign bitn responsibility 
for such compliance. This perspective on the plan attorney's status in 
a plan, and on his obligations, merely generalizes the principles, dis-
cussed above, that plan attorneys have obligations to take reasonable 
steps to help remedy a fiduciary's non-compliance with the plan and 
ERISA, and that they have discretion in detertnining how best to try 
to accomplish this. This provides reassurance that the working hy-
pothesis we use is not arbitrary, but is consistent with the conclusions 
already reached. 
To detertnine the general fiduciary responsibilities of plan attor-
neys, let us start by examining ERISA's rules of fiduciary responsibil-
ity. ERISA section 404(a) is the fundatnental statement of such 
fiduciary rules. It provides that: 
442. See supra text accompanying notes 336-342. 
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[An ERISA] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a 
plan solely in the interest of the pai"ticipants and beneficiaries and 
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
. . 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the cir-
cumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like ca-
pacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of a like character and with like airns; 
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to mini-
mize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is 
clearly prudent not to do so; and 
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments .gov-
erning the plan insofar as such docurnents and instruments are 
consistent with the provisions of this title. 443 
This standard cannot uncritically be applied to plan attorneys. 
Indeed, it cannot be applied without modification to anyone but a 
plan fiduciary. ERISA carefully specifies who shall be the fiduciaries 
with respect to plans, and imposes the network of specialized duties 
on them. The duties, in effect, functionally define an ERISA fiduci-
ary. If some person other than a named fiduciary, trustee, administra-
tor, investment advisor, or section 3(21) fiduciary could be made 
subject to these precise obligations, the definition of ERISA fiduciary 
would impermissibly be expanded beyond what Congress chose. 
'How, then, should the duties be modified to take into account the 
special characteristics of plan attorneys? 
1. The Plan Attorney's Duty of Loyalty 
The analogical approach of treating the plan attorney as essen-
tially a fiduciary with respect to the plan's legal affairs can be used to 
derive some basic conclusions about his duty of loyalty. As we have 
already seen, the interests he must advance and to which he must be 
loyal are, derivatively, the sarne as those which the plan fiduciaries 
must advance and to which they must be loyal.444 Thus, the plan 
attorney's duty of loyalty with respect to the plan, like that of the plan 
fiduciaries, may be understood as a duty to the activity that is the 
plan. The duty may also be treated as parallel that of a plan fiduciary, 
443. ERISA § 404(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a){l). 
444 .. See supra text accompanying notes 358-379 .. 
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and be construed to include the nor1nal incidents and corollaries, such 
as the prohibition on self-dealing, 44s the duty not to act on behalf of 
others with adverse446 or conflicting447 interests, and the duty of im-
partiality.448 This is consistent, in any event, with an attorney's tradi-
tional duties of loyalty to a client. 
However, the analogy cannot be pushed much further. There are 
important and inescapable factors that necessitate differences between 
the duty of loyalty of the plan fiduciary and the duty of loyalty of the 
plan attorney. One factor is that plan attorneys like all attorneys 
- owe a substantial duty to the public and to the administration of 
the legal system.449 A plan attorney, unlike a plan fiduciary, cannot 
be required to act "solely in the interest of the participants and benefi-
ciaries" and cannot be required or per1nitted to act "for the exclusive 
purpose of providing benefits" and defraying plan expenses. Indeed, 
when duties with respect to the plan conflict with public obligations, 
the duties with respect to the plan may have to be subordinated.450 
Another factor is that the plan attorney must be understood to 
have obligations to the plan fiduciaries. Plan fiduciaries, to the extent 
they may be deemed to have duties to individuals connected with the 
plan, owe them only to participants and beneficiaries, and not to other 
fiduciaries. That is not the case with plan attorneys. Often, a plan 
attorney is hired to represent a fiduciary in his capacity as such. Even 
where he is hired by the plan, it is the fiduciaries with whom he deals. 
The plan attorney's legal advice is given to the plan fiduciaries, and it 
is given mainly to assist the fiduciaries rather than the plan451 to 
comply with the law and fulfill their responsibilities. The advice is 
given from the perspective of the attorney's superior knowledge and is 
445. II A. SCOTT & W. FRATCHER, supra note 111, 170. 
446. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 389. 
447. Id. § 399. 
448. II A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 111, at 183; Winpisinger v. Aurora 
Corp. of Ill., Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp. 559, 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978). 
449. See supra text accompanying notes 343-356. 
450. An illustrative statement of this point is as follows: 
Attorneys are officers of the court and their first duty is to the administration of 
justice. Whenever an attorney's duties to his client conflict with those he owes 
to the public as an officer of the court, he must give precedence to his duty to 
the public. Any other view would run counter to a principled system of justice. 
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984). 
451. By contrast, the corporate attorney's advice is mainly to assist the corporation, 
rather than the corporate managers individually, to comply with the law. This is another 
important cillference between corporate attorneys and plan attorneys. 
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given with the understanding and intent that it will be followed. Fur-
thermore, as we saw above, the fiduciaries have one of the essential 
attributes of a client (or principal) in that they have authority to di-
rect the plan attorney. A relationship of this kind, with these charac-
teristics, is naturally considered a fiduciary relationship, with 
attendant duties of loyalty and care on the part of the plan attor-
ney.4s2 Of course, in cases of conflict, the lawyer's duty to the plan 
activity must take precedence over his duty to the fiduciaries, but in 
the routine case, where there is no conflict, obligations to the fiducia-
ries must be recogttized and acted upon. 
The plan attorney's obligations are thus responsive to multiple 
interests albeit ones that nortnally should be in harmony. The de-
tails of the plan attorney's duties of loyalty can only be worked out 
through experience in balancing the influences and through case by 
case development. Still, a few general points can be made here to 
indicate how future development can and should proceed. 
First, while liability litigation will surely be a setting for develop-
ment of law on the subject, the litigation is likely to be, for the most 
part, suits claitning liability for participation in a plan fiduciary's 
breach of duty. Plan attorneys, since they are not plan fiduciaries, 
have no si · cant control over plan assets, plan management, or plan 
administration. They are largely unable to profit si · cantly from 
wrongs to the plan committed alone. For that reason, wrongs done to 
plans by attorneys, which cause substantial monetary losses, are usu-
ally wrongs done as part of a plan fiduciary's breach. In such cases, 
ERISA's express fiduciary rules compel a view of the wrong as one in 
which the fiduciary is the principal malefactor and the attorney is 
only secondarily liable as a participant in the breach. 453 This perspec-
tive is not likely to be changed by taking a more stringent view of the 
plan attorney's duty of loyalty to the plan, because the plan fiduciaries 
still remain the ones primarily subject to ERISA's fiduciary policies 
and expressly subject to the fiduciary rules. Hence, attorney liability 
cases generally do not and will not require substantial elaboration of 
452. See, e.g., Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150, 152 
(Ct. App. 1987); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (marriage 
counselor). 
453. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied 
sub nom. K.lepak v. Dole 109 S. Ct. 2428 (1989) (fiduciary, rather than attorney who 
participated in the breach, was the one who "owed the primary responsibility to the 
Plan,). 
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, the plan attorney's duty of loyalty, except so far as is required to clar-
ify their co-fiduciary responsibilities for plan fiduciaries' breaches.454 
Correlatively, a likely focus for development of the law of plan 
attorney loyalty will be the area of conflicts of interest. This is the 
other significant area in which attorney duties of loyalty are regulated 
and clarified by the courts. There already is a small at110unt of law on 
the subject of conflicts in the representation of a plan and its fiducia-
ries. It is clear, for exarnple, that a plan attorney who has represented 
a fiduciary in his fiduciary capacity generally cannot represent the fi-
duciary when he is sued for breach of fiduciary duty.455 His loyalty 
with respect to the plan must prevail. On the other hand, there nor-
mally should be no obstacle to the attorney representing the interest 
of the plan, or its participants and beneficiaries, against the fiduciary. 
In this area of law, confidentiality concerns - -- which nortnally might 
be an objection to such representation are less important than in 
the traditional law of conflicts of interest, for the reasons discussed 
above.456 
An especially important area of development here should be that 
of conflicts problems involving interests of the plan and interests of 
the plan sponsor. As we have noted, it is comtnon for a plan attorney 
also to be the attorney for the plan sponsor or the attorney for a fidu-
ciary with respect to non-plan matters. But just as it is not necessarily 
an impermissible conflict for a fiduciary to be an officer or employee 
of the sponsor, it is not necessarily an impermissible conflict for the 
plan attorney also to have the sponsor as a client. Nonetheless, a situ-
ation of this kind certainly has the potential for trouble, and case by 
case development will be needed to work out guidelines for when the 
plan attorney's loyalty to the plan has been or too easily may be un-
dermined. The emerging law of conflicts on the part of employee-fidu-
ciaries in benefit claim cases should have obvious relevance to these 
issues.457 
2. Other Plan Attorney Duties 
Loyalty may be the most important duty of the plan attorney, 
but there clearly are others. A plan attorney should be subject to the 
454. See infra text accompanying notes 460483. 
455. E.g., Frank v .. Ducy, 7 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2374 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
456. See supra text accompanying notes 398401. 
457. E.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Lister v. Stark, 11 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1611 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
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same duty as a plan fiduciary to act -~'with the care, skill, prudence, 
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
man _acting in a like capacity and farniliar with such matters would 
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims.''4S8 This is substantially a statement of the trust law duties of 
care and prudence, which have always been held to apply to attor-
neys.459 In practice,: it states the rule for a federal common law of 
plan attorney malpractice. This duty, unlike that for loyalty, is one 
whose contours are likely to be substantially worked out in litigation 
concertling breaches. An obvious issue is how the standard of care 
should be construed. Should the standard be that for attorneys in 
general, or should it be a specialized, higher standard for plan 
attorneys? 
The other ERISA duties specified in section 404(a) do not di-
rectly relate to plan attorneys. The duty to diversify investments is 
obviously not ger1nane. Nor is the duty to act in accordance with 
• 
plan documents. The conduct of plan attorneys ordinarily is not gov-
erned by the plan document. Conceivably, this duty, along withER-
ISA'S writing requirement, might suggest, by analogy, that there 
should be an obligation on the part of plan attorneys to reduce their 
engagement agreements to writing and act in accordance with them. 
Any such requirement, though, would have to be responsive to con-
crete problems, as they are presented in litigation, or otherwise. 
VI. PLAN A'I*fORNEY LIABILITY 
Thus far, we have dealt with what we previously called the pro-
·phylactic aspect of plan attorney common law. We now turn to its 
remedial aspect. Our task here will be easier. Plan attorney liability, 
as a subcategory of general non-fiduciary liability for participation in 
a fiduciary's breach, is already a well-developed area of ERISA-re-
lated law. In the main, our task is only to determine what modifica-
tions of existing rules might be appropriate in order to bring the law 
into accord with the main principles we have found to govern plan 
attorneys. 
458. ERISA § 404(a)(l)(B), 29 U~S.C. § 1104(a)(l){B) (1974). 
459. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983); C. 
WOLFRAM, supra note 147, § S.6. 
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Any non-fiduciary who knowingly participates in a breach of 
duty committed by an ERISA fiduciary may be held liable to the plan 
for damages resulting from the breach.460 Among the non-fiduciaries 
who have been held so liable are attorneys. Indeed, a substantial 
number of the reported decisions concerning participation in a breach 
have involved attomeys.46t 
In framing rules for liability, courts have expressly drawn on the 
existing rules of the common law oftrusts,462 and have adapted them, 
to the extent necessary, to confor1n to the policies of ERI.SA.463 The 
fundamental rule that has_ emerged was first stated in Freund v. Mar-
shall & Ilsley Bank:464 ''The wrong of participation in a breach of 
trust is divided into two elements, namely (1) an act or omission 
which furthers or completes the breach of trust by the trustee; and (2) 
knowledge at the titne that the transaction amounted to a breach of 
trust, or the legal equivalent of such knowledge.';465 The rule has 
460. See, e.g., Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339; Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgt., Inc., 829 
F~2d 1209 (2d Cir~ 1987); Fink v. National Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 955, 
958 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Dole v. Compton, 753 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa~ 1990); Pension Fund 
-Mid Jersey Trucking_ Industry Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 
161 (D.N.J. 1990); PBGC v. Ross, 733 F. Supp~ 1005 (M.D.N.C. 1990); Brock v. Gerace, 
635 F. Supp. 563 (D.N.J. 1986); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 
1143 (D.D.C. 1986); Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96 (D. Nev. 1984); 
Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (B.D. Pa. 1983); McDougall v. Donovan, 
539 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Marshall & !Isley-Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629. See also 
Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 
(1980) (recognizing principle but declining to impose liability because to do so would 
violate policy against forfeiture of benefits). 
461. See, e.g., Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298; Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064 (7th 
Cir. 1982); Whitfield v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benvenuto v. 
Schneider, 678 F. Supp. 51 (E.D.N.Y. 19,88); Donovan v. Daugherty, 550 F. Supp. 390 
(S.D. Ala., 1982); Schajfier, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2485 (W.D. Pa., 1985); 
Kouba_v. Burke, No. 83 C 451 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1984) (LEXIS Genfedlibrary, Dist file); 
Donovan v. Unicorn Group, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 166S (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
See also Nieto, 845 F.2d 868 (rejecting general principle of liability for participating in 
fiduciary's breach but opening to attorney liability in certain circumstances). 
462. See generally G. BoGERT, supra note 111, at ch. 43. 
463. E.g., Thornton, 692 F.2d 1064; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986). 
464 .. 485 F.-Supp. 629 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
465. /d. at 642 (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 901). In using the common 
law term "trustee,'' the court did not intend to limit the rule only to participation in 
breaches by ERISA trustees. The rule applies to participation in the breach of any ER-
ISA fiduciary~ 
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come to be further elaborated. It is not a prerequisite to liability that 
the participating non-fiduciary have profited from the breach;466 it is 
not a prerequisite to liability that the non-fiduciary have dealt directly 
with the breaching fiduciary;467 and it is not a requirement that the 
participating non-fiduciary have actual knowledge of the breach. 
Constructive knowledge is enough.468 Furthermore, liability is not 
litnited to the arnount (if any) that the non-fiduciary gained. Rather, 
liability extends to the full amount of the plan's loss.469 
2. The Federal Common Law Character of Non-Fiduciary Liability 
Rules 
The legislative history of ERISA suggests that Congress may 
have intended at least some non-fiduciaries to be subject to liability 
under ERISA for participating in breaches of duty.470 However, ER-
ISA's fiduciary and civil enforcement provisions do not unatnbigu-
ously pertnit actions against non-fiduciaries who participate in a 
breach. Thus, actions of this kind are better treated as claitns arising 
under federal cotntnon law.47t 
466. Lindemann, 853 F.2d 1298; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. at 1168. 
467. Gerace, 635 F. Supp. 563. 
468. Hendershott, 840 F.2d at 342; Marshall & !Isley Bank, 485 F. Supp. at 642. See 
Schwartz, Non-Fiduciary Liability Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 
69 MARQ. L. REv. 561, 565-69 (1986). 
469. Lindemann, 853 F.2d at 1303. 
470. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 295, reprinted in III LEG-
ISLATIVE HISfORY, supra note 22, at 4562, and in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5075: "Fiduciaries (and parties-in-interest) are to be personally liable under the 
labor provisions for losses sustained by a plan that result from a violation of these [pro-
hibited transaction] rules." 
471. Some recent case law has tried to cast doubt on the propriety of imposing lia-
bility on non-fiduciaries who participate in a breach. The arguments of those cases are 
misguided. 
The leading case that purports to limit the scope of non-fiduciary liability is Nieto v. 
Ecker, 845 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1988). In Nieto, the non-fiduciary in question was an 
attorney. Plaintiffs, participants in a multi-employer fund, sued the plan fiduciaries and 
the plan attorney for their failure to collect delinquent contributions from participating 
employers. This failure to collect was the principal (but not only) breach alleged. In a 
curious opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while the attorney 
could be held liable for participating in a prohibited transaction, neither he nor any other 
non-fiduciary could otherwise be held liable for participating in a fiduciary's breach. 
The holding makes little sense. ERISA prohibits fiduciaries from engaging in pro-
hibited transactions but does not expressly impose liability on parties in interest who 
participate in them. Nonetheless, the Court in Nieto pern1itted imposition of liability on 
parties-in-interest in such cases, reasoning that prohibited transactions are "illegal under 
the Act," id. at 873; that, to "leave plans and their participants with no recourse against 
1170 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 41:1049 
a. Authority for the Rules 
The rules of liability for non-fiduciaries who participate in a 
·breach have been worked out pursuant to the courts' delegated power 
to develop a common law offiduciaries.472 The propriety of -imposing 
such liability on non-fiduciaries is clear. As explained above, ER-
ISA's delegation of common lawmaking power regarding fiduciary 
conduct is exceptionally broad, and is not limited just to power to 
' ' 
develop rules for the conduct of plan fiduciaries.473 A fundamental 
persons clearly covered by the Act who violate its provisions [is] not a result likely con"' 
templated by Congress," id. at 874 n.6; and that, since the prohibited transaction is ·a 
violation of ERISA, there is authority under ERISA § 503(c)(2) to redress it, id. at 874. 
But ERISA does not make prohibited transactions. illegal: it simply prohibits fiduciaries 
from engaging in them. The Court could equally well have said that ERISA makes "ille-
gal" all breaches of fiduciary duty in which a non-fiduciary participates. If it did so, by 
parity of reasoning it would have been forced to conclude that anyone who participates in 
a breach of duty would be subject to liability for doing so. But that is precisely the 
conclusion the Court strove to avoid. 
The Court's arguments against general non-fiduciary liability are equally inconsis-
tent. The first argument is that there can be no non-fiduciary liability for participation in 
a breach "under" section 409(a) because the section refers only to fiduciaries, and 
"[a]bsent an explicit directive from Congress," one may not create federal common law 
claims. 845 F.2d at 871. To the extent the Court meant by "explicit directive'' an une-
quivocal, express statutory instruction to create federal common law in an area, that has 
never been the standard. lndeed, if it were the standard, the Nieto court itself could never 
have allowed a federal common law remedy against parties-in-interest. But if "e~plicit 
directive" means authorization implied from the statute, then the Court's peremptory 
conclusion that there is no such authority simply begs the question and ignores, among 
other things, recent Supreme Court precedent exercising the authority to create federal 
common law. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101. In any event, the 
Court ignores the possibility that common lawmaking authority need not be -delegatedt 
but may arise from the preemption of state law. 
The court in Nieto also argued that authorization to create a common law claim 
cannot be found in ERISA § 502(a)(3), because to treat that provision as allowing mone-
tary recovery would render ERISA § 409(a) which also allows monetary recovery -
superfluous. Nieto, 845 F.2d at 873. The argument proves too much.. ERISA § 409(a) 
allows a court to order "such . . . equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem 
appropriate"; but, in slightly different words, so does section 502(a)(3) on its face. The 
Court's argument, if correct, would lead to the absurd result that even equitable relief is 
unavailable under section S02(a)(3), because to allow it would render section 409(a) "su-
perfluous." The fact is that ERISA is not the most artfully drafted statute, and here 
Congress was simply repetitious. Nothing in section 409(a) can logically be read to pro-
hibit the award of monetary relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
472. See, e.g.,Marsha/1 & 1/sley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629; Foltz, 627 F. Supp. at 1168; 
see also Pension Fund Mid Jersey Trucking Industry Local 701, 731 F. Supp. 161. 
473. Nor is it limited just to the creation of remedies, as some, e.g., Comment, Nieto 
v. Ecker: The Propriety of Non-Fiduciary Liability Under Section 409, 64 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 271, 281 (1989), have argued. 
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legal principle is that a person should not knowingly assist a wrong-
doer in his wrongdoing. To this end, there are com1non law prohibi-
tions, such as those against participation in a breach of fiduciary 
duty474 and against inducing breach of contract;475 as well as statutory 
and statutory-related prohibitions, such as those against aiding and 
abetting crimes and securities law violations.476 This principle is fully 
applicable to wrongs perpetrated in connection with benefit plans.477 
Arguably, Congress intended that the principle should apply as part 
of its clear intent to federalize trust law principles.478 But, in any 
event, for courts to apply the principle and impose liability for partici-
pation in a breach would help protect the interest of participants and 
beneficiaries in receiving their benefits: directly, by imposing stan-
dards of conduct that make breaches by fiduciaries even more diffi-
cult; and, indirectly, by providing another source from which the plan 
can be rei1nbursed for losses. Thus, to allow imposition of liability 
would plainly further the purposes of ERISA. 
b. Special Considerations Relating to Attorneys 
In imposing liability on attorneys for participation in a breach, 
courts have relied on the general rules described above. However, 
there are special considerations that apply to plan attorneys. These 
considerations, when properly taken into account in individual cases, 
should make the rules of liability governing plan attorneys somewhat 
different from the black-letter rules discussed above. 
One consideration is that plan attorneys have obligations which 
other non-fiduciaries do not necessarily have. Non-fiduciaries gener-
ally have only a lit1lited duty to the plan and its participants and bene-
ficiaries, that of not taking action which knowingly furthers or 
benefits from a fiduciary's breach.479 Plan attorneys have many other 
obligations that intersect with the obligations of plan fiduciaries. The 
most important may be the disclosure and co-fiduciary obligations. 
By virtue of these duties a plan attorney, unlike other non-fiduciaries, 
474. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 326. 
475. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 766 (1977). 
476. E.g., Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 1981). 
477. Cf. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d at 115 (since "estoppel principles generally apply 
to all legal actions," there is a presumption that they apply to ERISA actions). 
478. See, e.g., Ross, 733 F. Supp. 1005. 
479. Cf. G. BoGERT, supra note 111, § 901 (trust beneficiary has right that third 
persons shall not knowingly join with the trustee in a breach of duty). 
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may be obligated to take reasonable steps to remedy a fiduciary's 
breach, and his failure to do so may expose him to liability for partici-
pating in the breach. Thus, the disclosure rules discussed in section 
V(A) above are not only be guides to conduct; they are properly taken 
as rules of civil liability. This is very much different from the case of 
most other non-fiduciaries who, under traditional trust law principles, 
cannot be held liable for mere inaetion. 
Other duties of the plan attorney also affect the contours of his 
potential liability for participating in a breach. Because of the plan 
attorney's duty of care, for example, he~ unlike other non-fiduciaries, 
might properly be subject to liability for negligent participation in a 
breach. In general, because of the loyalty and other obligations of the 
plan attorney, his liabilities for participating in a breach may closely 
resemble the co-fiduciary liabilities of a plan fiduciary under ERISA 
section 405(a). 
Another consideration affecting the scope and character of plan 
attorney liability is that delegated lawmaking power regarding fiduci-
ary principles is really not even needed to authorize a remedy for at-
torney participation in a breach. Judicial power over attorneys 
includes the authority to order attorneys who commit any breach of 
duty to make restitution for the amount of the loss. The power is a 
necessary incident to the judicial power to regulate attorney conduct, 
and is a means of enforcing the standards. Courts have ordered resti-
tution both summarily, in the course of civil and criminal proceedings 
in which the attorney serves as advocate;480 and as part of fortnal dis~ 
cipline imposed for violating rules of professional conduct.481 It has 
even been suggested that, ' '[w]henever possible, the disciplinary pro-
cess should facilitate restitution to the victims of the [attomey,s] mis-
conduct without requiring victims to institute separate proceedings at 
their own expense. "482 
What these two considerations reflect is a point alluded to before: 
that attorneys who are held liable for participation in a fiduciary's 
breach often could just as, well be held liable for breach of their own ~ 
480. E.g., In re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 483 (1870); State v. Grant, 487 A.2d 627 
(Me. 1985). 
481. E.g., Grievance Commission v. Garcia, 243 N.W.2d 383, 38S (N.D. 1976). See 
also In re Beckmann, 79 N.J. 402, 400 A.2d 792 (1979) (restitution as condition for 
reinstatement). 
482. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS 
6.12, Commentary (1979). 
1990] Federal Common Law of ERISA Plan Attorneys 1173 
duties with respect to the plan. As a practical matter, it may not 
make much difference for the outcome of a case whether we consider 
a plan attorney's liability to be fiduciary or co-fiduciary.483 What is 
important, though, is for courts to recogttize that, because of plan 
attorneys' fiduciary obligations with respect to plans obligations 
that other non-fiduciaries lack their potential liability in cases of 
plan fiduciary is broader than what is suggested by the canonical rule 
of Freund. 
B. Standing to Sue 
Under the coJntnon law of trusts, the trustee is ordinarily the 
only one permitted to sue third persons for wrongs to the trust. Bene-
ficiaries norrnally have no standing to bring such actions and may do 
so only where the trustee cannot or will not enforce the claim.484 
Should there be a corresponding litnitation regarding suits against 
plan attorneys under federal common law? 
It should depend on the kind of claim. As we have seen, many, if 
not most, claims against plan attorneys are framed as suits for partici-
pation in a fiduciary's breach. ERISA expressly gives participants 
and beneficiaries the right to bring suit against fiduciaries to remedy 
violations of ERISA, and there is no sound reason for not allowing 
joinder of participating non-fiduciaries in the suit. ERISA section 
502(a)(3), which contains no express limitation on defendants within 
its reach, may be read as creating jurisdiction over suits by partici-
pants and beneficiaries against non-fiduciaries who have participated 
in a breach, and the common law of trusts itself permitted such ac-
tions by trust beneficiaries. 4ss 
Different considerations are involved in claixns, such as malprac-
tice suits, involving plan attorneys alone. A plan document may dele-
gate to one or more of the fiduciaries discretionary authority to bring 
suit and obtain satisfaction for the plan's claims.486 A decision by 
such a fiduciary not to sue cannot be set aside unless the decision 
483. The real difference lies in the plan attorney's susceptibility to suit under federal 
common law for wrongs committed without the involvement of a plan fiduciary. Other 
fiduciaries may or may not be subject to such liabilities. 
484. G. BOGERT, supra note 111, § 869. 
485. I d. § 955. And if joinder of a participating attorney is proper, so too should be 
a suit against the attorney alone. 
486. See, e.g., 3 S. YOUNG, PENSION & PROFIT SHARING PLANS (M-B) Plan 14, at 
14.06(c). 
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represents an abuse of discretion.487 It would be inconsistent with this 
rule of deference to the fiduciary's judgment to allow a participant or 
beneficiary to bring suit against an attorney when the appropriate 
fiduciary has decided not to do so. 
Even where the fiduciaries' authority to file suit and resolve 
clairns is not subject to deference, there should be limits on the stand-
ing of participants and beneficiaries to sue directly. The fiduciaries 
will normally be in the best position to know whether the plan attor-
ney has committed a wrong and as persons charged with responsibil-
ity for management of the plan, they should ordinarily have the initial 
say regarding the decision to sue. To allow particip,ants and benefi-
ciaries unfettered standing to sue plan attorneys, in matters that do 
not involve fiduciary tnisconduct, would underrnine ERISA's alloca-
tion of plan management responsibility to fiduciaries and possibly 
sanction interference with the fiduciaries' fulfillment of their 
responsibilities. 
This is not to say that a participant or beneficiary who is dissatis-
fied with a fiduciary's decision not to sue has no remedy. He does 
have a remedy which is in the form of a suit against the fiduciary, on 
the theory that the failure to sue is itself a breach of duty. The rem-
edy in a proper case might be an award of damages to the plan in an 
amount measured by the potential recovery in the unbrought suit. 
The remedy might even be an order appointing the participant as a 
special fiduciary for the purpose of bringing suit agai_nst the attorney. 
Such remedies would satisfy the interests of both the participants and 
beneficiaries in obtaining a remedy for a wrong, and of the fiduciaries 
in being able to carry out their plan management responsibilities with-
out unnecessary interference. 
VII. SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY 
The topics examined above are only a few of the many in the 
common law of plan attorneys that generate important concerns. 
There are certainly many others that warrant attention. 
One such issue is exculpation. ERISA disallaws "any provision 
in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary 
from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or 
duty under [ERISA's fiduciary provisionsJ.''488 Should the policy re-
487. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. 101. 
488. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § lllO(a) (1974). 
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fleeted in the ERISA provision apply to attorneys? The legislative 
history of ERISA demonstrates Congress's belief in the importance of 
abolishing exculpation as a means of strengthening the fiduciary pro-
tection of participants. 489 In light of the great importance given to 
this modification of the law of trusts, it seems that a strong argument 
can be made that the policy should apply to plan attorneys as well. 
The result would be consistent with the policy expressed in the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility, that "[a] lawyer shall not attempt 
to exonerate himself from or litnit his liability to his client for his 
personal malpractice. "490 
The exoneration question suggests a broader question: are there 
any other provisions in attorney-plan (or attorney-fiduciary) contracts 
that are prohibited? For exatnple, tnight ERISA's prohibited transac-
tion rule, limiting compensation to "reasonable compensation,"491 re-
strict the use of contingent fee arrangements? Si1nilarly, are any 
conventional practices by attorneys made imper1nissible with respect 
to plans? For exat·nple, to what extent, if any, can a plan attorney 
hold plan property without having plan fiduciary status attach?492 
A plan attorney's dealings with third parties also raise a large set 
of questions. There is no reason that many of the basic doctrines of 
agency law should not apply to the attorney-plan relationship. But 
the applicability of some agency law doctrines in the ERISA plan 
context is less certain. For exatnple, a principal may be held vicari-
ously liable for an agent's tort where the agent "purported to act or to 
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent 
authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence 
of the agency relation. "493 Yet vicarious liability is not a venerable 
doctrine: it is a recent addition to Anglo-American jurisprudence,494 
and only in the twentieth century has it come to have wide acceptance 
489. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90. 
490. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102 (1980). The 
Model Rules, however, do permit exculpation. Rule 1.8 (h). 
491. ERISA § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2) (1974). 
492. See Chapman v. K.lemick, 750 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (health plan paid 
benefits to participant subject to subrogation agreement; participant's attorney became 
fiduciary with respect to funds received from third party that were to be paid over to 
plan). 
493. RFSI'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d). 
494. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916); Holmes, Agency {pt. 1), 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 345 (1891); Holmes, Agency (pt. 11), 5 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1891). 
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and applicability.495 Do the uncertain rationales of vicarious liability 
extend to ERISA plans and to attorney relationships with a plan? 
A similar question arises with respect to contracts. An agent, 
acting within the scope of his apparent authority, may bind the princi-
pal to a contract that the agent had no actual authority to enter 
into.496 Should the principle apply so as to allow a plan attorney to 
bind a plan? Under what circumstances? 
Finally, there is the practical question of whether at least some 
standards for plan attorneys should be codified, either by court rule or 
statute. Preemption and federal comtnon lawmaking would de facto 
create a plan attorney bar. But there are as yet few rules govertting 
this group of attorneys, and they are all rules developed through liti-
gation. Without a set of clearly stated rules, attorneys may be una-
ware of their obligations; courts may be hesitant to develop comtnon 
law rules; and state courts may continue to exercise disciplinary con-
trol over plan attorney conduct. Written rules governing plan attor-
neys might serve as a stimulus to development of this needed body of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to establish three basic propositions: that 
states cannot regulate plan attorneys; that federal courts not only 
may, but must develop rules to regulate plan attorneys; and that there 
are special characteristics of plan attorneys which often require, for 
495. Originally invoked as a basis for transferring liability for deceit, Hem v. Nich-
ols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709), and negligence, Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 488 (1701), it was 
eventually extended to other torts. In recent years, the doctrine has been applied to viola-
tions of civil rights acts, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Title 
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); the Sherntan Act, e.g., American Soc'y of Mechanical 
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982); and other federal statutes, e.g., 
Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984) (Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act); see generally Black, Application of Respondeat Superior 
Principles to Securities Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO), 24 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825 (1984); for takings of property by 
municipal officials, e.g., San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Brothers, 528 S.W.2d 266, 
272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); and for other breaches of constitutional, see, e.g., Norton v. 
United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978) (violation of 
Fourth Amendment to Constitution); statutory and common-law duties, e.g., United 
States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 
(1946) (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); United States v. Tri-State Home Im-
provement Co., 446 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (FfC cease and desist order). 
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their governance, rules different from those found in professional 
codes and in the common law of benefit plans. In elaborating on the 
last point, this article has reviewed some of the most itnportant of the 
special principles applicable to plan attorneys and some resulting gen-
eral rules. However, it has not tried to work out rules and standards 
in any great detail. That is better done by courts, which, through the 
resolution of specific controversies, can propose and test various rules, 
so as to find the ones that work best. 
The ulti1nate airn of this article is not simply to establish these 
basic propositions; rather, its aim is to try to stimulate the process of 
judicial lawmaking regarding plan attorneys. The role of plan attor-
ney is an emerging one. It develops and becomes refined as the pri-
vate benefit plan system and public benefit plan regulatory system 
themselves develop and become refined. Regrettably, there seems to 
be a general lack of awareness that the role of plan attorney, as a 
unique institution, even exists, and because of this lack of awareness, 
there is little appreciation of either the possibility or need for a spe-
cialized body of plan attorney common law. 
As the article has emphasized, the role of plan attorney is impor-
tant, and should not be left to haphazard regulation unconstrained by 
the policies of ERISA. A plan attorney is an integral part of the plan 
and is an integral part of the world that is within the a1nbit of ER-
ISA's policies. To treat the plan attorney as if he were just another 
business attorney does justice neither to him nor to the plan. If this 
article helps to make attorneys and courts aware of the special role of 
plan attorney and sensitive to the plan attorney's special characteris-
tics, proper rules may then follow as part of the normal process of 
common lawmaking. 
